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ABSTRACT 
 
Arbitral provisional measures  are of great importance in protecting the rights of the parties to an 
arbitration agreement. Arbitration as a dispute mechanism is becoming increasingly powerful 
due to the ability of tribunals and courts to grant and enforce provisional measures which make 
the final award meaningful. The importance of provisional measures has increased in recent 
years as more parties are seeking them,
1
 and is likely to grow still more in the coming years.
2
 
This project examines the problems surrounding arbitral provisional measures in England and 
Wales; as such problems constitute a threat to current and future arbitration. The thesis aims to 
identify, analyse and offer solutions to those problems that impede arbitral proceedings. 
 This thesis initially examines the roots and the legislative development of the powers of arbitral 
tribunals to grant provisional measures and the role of the courts in arbitral proceedings in  
England. The examination highlights the roots of the problems and demonstrates  how the 
approach towards provisional measures in England has shifted in due course from judicial  
dominance  to arbitral competence, and how the role of the courts has become subsidiary. 
Further, the analysis highlights the problem of  arbitrators in the granting and enforcement of 
provisional measures across borders, due to the inadequacy  of the current Arbitration Act 1996, 
which provides very limited power to tribunals under  its S.38,39 and 48. Additionally, the 
research  aims  to demonstrate that arbitral tribunals should be given effective and actual 
authority to grant arbitral provisional measures in order to comply with the arbitration agreement 
(party autonomy). 
Since no dispute mechanism can stand alone as an island, the courts should only become 
involved in support of the process – subject to the arbitral Acts that provide them with exclusive 
jurisdiction –where this is necessary in order to avoid conflicting decisions.  However, the power 
of the courts  to aid arbitration in granting such measures is limited by Council Regulation (EC) 
44/2001 of the European Union, of which England is a member. 
                                                 
1
See  Werbick RJ, 'Arbitral Measures: fact or fiction?' (2002-2003) Dispute Resolution Journal at 57-64. 
2
 See Ferguson SM, 'Interim Measures of protection in international commercial arbitration: problems, proposed 
solutions and anticipated results', (2003) Current International Trade Law Journal  12:15. 
  
 iii  
 
 In international arbitration, timely application and enforcement of interim measures have a 
substantial effect on the possibility of the enforcement of  a final arbitration award, especially 
when issues relating to the protection of assets or evidence arise before or during the course of 
proceedings. Hence the purpose of this project is to provide a brief analysis of the international 
practice regarding the enforcement of provisional measures in international arbitration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Provisional measures play an important role in England and Wales,
3
 and in many legal systems, 
in facilitating the traditional litigation process, as well as arbitration.
4
 The role that provisional 
measures play in arbitration varies widely from country to country. There are three systems 
across the globe that provide provisional measures; namely, the court model, the free choice 
model and the court subsidiarity model. The first one is where the right to award provisional 
measures is reserved wholly for the arbitral tribunal;
5
the second model is where the right to 
award provisional measures is reserved wholly for the courts;
6
 and the third is where both the 
arbitral tribunal and the courts hold these powers.
7
 It should, however, be noted that in all three 
categories, the supremacy of the arbitral tribunal is more profound, and that the role of the courts 
is subsidiary. This thesis will consider the English Subsidiarity model, where provisional 
measures are first sought from the tribunal. This means that unless the parties give the arbitral 
tribunal such powers as to render the courts’ role in interim proceedings clearly obsolete, then 
the courts should generally be in position to take on a role in respect  of interim measures in 
international arbitration whose seat is in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom approach to 
the interaction in arbitral provisional measures between the courts and arbitral tribunal itself is 
                                                 
3
Scotland  is not a party to English Arbitration Act 1996 or rules  on the grounds that it has an independent Scotland 
Arbitration Act 2010.Hence the title of the thesis suffices for clarification. 
4
 See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 36th Session, New York, 4-8 March 2002. 
5
 See Article 26 of the UNCITRAL, which provides that at the request of a party to the arbitration procedure, the 
tribunal, “may take interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute”, thus giving 
the tribunal wide discretion.  When a dispute occurs, its resolution is also complex and takes time; therefore, it is 
more than often essential to be able to take interim measures during the procedure itself. During such procedure, the 
contract is still effective. Therefore, the  arbitrator designated to intervene in this tense atmosphere must act in order 
to preserve the effect of the contract. 
6
 See EAA 1996, s. 44 (3), 44 (4) 44 (2), 44 (1) and 44 (5). 
7
 See Mustill LJ, in CoppeeLavalin v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (in Liquidation in Kenya) where he 
said that “there is a plain fact, palatable or not, that it is only the courts possessing coercive powers which can rescue 
the arbitration if there is danger of foundering, and that the only court which can possess these powers is the 
municipal court of the individual state.” Indeed this means that those who consider applying for provisional 
measures in arbitral proceedings should not only consider the rules of arbitration or arbitration agreement but also 
the lex forum, which would play a vital part if the need for the measures arises. 
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effectively a system of court subsidiarity such that the court is seen as the last resort.
8
 Indeed the 
power to grant provisional measures is in the first place allocated to the tribunal, hence there is 
an obligation for the parties to opt in, and courts should take a back seat.
9
 
The development of arbitral provisional measures has been influenced by trade practice but more 
so by parliament and by courts. The modern economy is distinguished by the phenomena of 
provisional measures central to forces of commercial transactions or maritime. It became 
increasingly clear that the position of arbitration in the middle nineteenth century in England was 
less than satisfactory. Indeed a survey was carried out to determine the working of the 
Arbitration Act 1996,
10
and to see whether, in light of the ten years’ experience, any revisions to 
it might be usefully be proposed. The survey concluded that no amendment was desirable. The 
author does not agree with the results of the survey, on the grounds that the survey was not 
conducted on the efficacy of provisional measures in England but was a comparative analysis 
with other jurisdictions. In addition, its  seventeen years since this survey was carried out before 
even rapid changes to European position on provisional measures were granted in England. The 
trends of commerce change within a little framework, and in order for provisional measures to be 
effective  another survey needs to be carried out every ten years so as to promote efficacy. 
 Provisional measures are grants of temporary relief aimed at protecting parties’ rights pending 
the final resolution of disputes. Provisional measures emanate from the contractual obligation of 
both parties to arbitration. Parties who go to arbitration expect the arbitral tribunal to execute its 
duties expeditiously and effectively, whereby all the provisional measures are given effective 
enforcement in order to make the mechanism of dispute resolution a meaningful one. The 
contracting parties are aware of the need to protect their contractual obligations, in litigation over 
civil matters. Indeed they choose arbitration convinced to that it is the dispute mechanism that is 
best suited to any disputes whether existing or future.    
                                                 
8
 See English Arbitration Act 1996,s. 44 (1), which provides that “ unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court 
has for the purpose of and in relation to the proceedings the same powers for making orders about the matters listed 
below as it has for the purpose of and in relation to legal proceedings.” 
9
In Re Q’s Estate it was held that even if the arbitration clause states that the arbitral tribunal is to have exclusive 
jurisdiction, this is not enough to exclude the courts’ jurisdiction with regard to interim measures. 
1010
 See Bruce Harris, 'Report on the Arbitration Act 1996',Arbitration International, Vol.23 (Kluwer 2007), 437-
460. 
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Many other legal jurisdictions recognize the procedural necessity of provisional measures as a 
complement to final awards, in the context of international arbitration. Provisional measures may 
be crucial due to the special risks involved in international disputes.  Often the efficacy of the 
arbitration process as a whole depends on interim measures that may prevent the opposing 
parties from destroying or removing assets so as to render the final awards meaningless. Indeed, 
provisional measures are designed to minimise loss, damage or prejudice during the proceedings, 
or to facilitate the enforcement of awards.  There have been many comments regarding the 
alleged ineffectiveness of the tribunal when it comes to enforcement of provisional measures, 
that have resulted in tremendous pressure from both the legal and business circles to reform the 
arbitration laws in regard to provisional measures, and this project aims to find solutions to this. 
A number of legal studies have been published and several research projects have been 
conducted in the field of arbitration, but no particular attention has been paid to English arbitral 
provisional measures. This research examines arbitral provisional measures that researchers on 
arbitration have not examined or discussed in their papers and articles, and thus the author 
attempts to base his assertion of originality of this research on his discussion in different 
chapters. 
1.1 Initiation of arbitral proceedings ( provisional measures) 
It is of great importance that the thesis demonstrates how arbitral proceedings are initiated, in 
order to be able to show how provisional measures are important in arbitral proceedings. It  is 
paramount for one to know who initiates arbitral provisional measures and what the request for 
such measures should contain in order to be successful before the arbitral tribunal. The problem 
is that no clear set of standards  has been advanced with regard to this contentious issue. 
Arbitral provisional measures are generally initiated through a party request or sought by a party 
to the arbitration agreement.
11
Any circumstances in which provisional measures would be 
required but where no party makes a request, are difficult to conceive. This view that a request 
should be party-oriented is confirmed or adduced by the English Arbitration Act 1996,
12
 and the 
ICC Rules.
13
 The issue is that by parties seeking provisional measures from the tribunal, the 
                                                 
11
See EAA 1996 s. 39 (1). 
12
 Ibid. 
13
ICC Arbitral Rules 1931. 
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tribunal acts as a facilitator to the proceedings in order to maintain the doctrine of party 
autonomy or to see that the parties perform their contractual obligations which are enshrined in 
the arbitration agreement.
14
 Ali Yesilirmak in his book, “Provisional Measures in International 
Commercial Arbitration”, asserts that twenty-nine sets of rules surveyed confirm the view that a 
request should be party-oriented.
15
  It should be noted that some international rules occasionally 
provide authority to the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures without party-oriented 
mechanism.
16
  It should be noted that the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law)Model Law requires the claimant to make a request for any provisional 
measures in order to maintain the principle of party autonomy.
17
 Indeed the English Arbitration 
Act 1996 has given effect to the Model Law in s 30 (c).
18
 
 Under the doctrine of party autonomy, the parties are free to seek provisional measures,
19
 if they 
need them as a matter of arbitral agreement.
20
   The main purpose of empowering the arbitral 
tribunal to grant such a request upon its  own initiative in international commercial arbitration is 
perhaps to avoid aggravation of a dispute, and thus to enable the arbitral tribunal to proceed with 
the arbitration smoothly, effectively and efficiently.
21
 As noted above, some rules do not deal 
with the issue of requests for a measure at all, so it would be safe to assume that in principle a 
party should request a measure, due to the doctrine of party autonomy. The author argues that if 
both parties make a joint request for the same measure, there is a strong incentive for the tribunal 
to comply with the request or grant that request as a matter of urgency. 
                                                 
14
 See EAA 1996,s. 1 (a) which provides that the objective of the tribunal is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes 
by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense. See s 1 (b) which provides that the parties are free to 
agree on how their disputes are to be resolved. 
15
Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International2005) 
p167. 
16
 See ICSID Article s 39 and 47. See Charted Institute of Arbitration Rule 7 (9) and Statute of International Court 
of Justice Article 41. 
17
Model Law Article 17. 
18
 S. 30 (C) provides that the tribunal may rule on any matters within its jurisdiction subject to party autonomy. 
19
Ibid s. 39. 
20
See Article 244 of the EC Treaty, and Dutch Building Companies v Commission Case T-29/92 [1992] ECR. 
21
See Holiday Inns SA and others v Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1) (Decision unreported),.and Maffezini v 
The Kingdom of Spain (Procedural Order No.2, 28 October 1999), extracts published in XXVII YCA 17 (2002), see 
decision of the tribunal 14 June 1993,4 ICSID Rep p328. 
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1.1.1 The composition of a request 
An arbitral request should contain or specify the rights to be preserved,
22
 the measures requested 
and the circumstances that necessitate such measures.
23
One may argue that without a good cause 
no measure would probably be granted by the arbitral tribunal.
24
 Where the request does not 
contain any of the above elements, the tribunal may undoubtedly require the relevant party to 
supply further information concerning the elements prior to making its decision. Under English 
Law such request needs to be in writing.
25
 The request should be dealt with in a speedy manner 
as required in order to preserve the rights of the party.
26
 There is no delay in request for an 
arbitral provisional measure since the arbitral tribunal has the ability to distinguish whether or 
not the request is flagrant. This thesis does not support the notion of Yesilirmak,
27
 that the 
request should be made orally during the arbitral proceedings. If the request is made in such a 
manner it would be very difficult for the respondent to examine in it the proceedings. In addition, 
Yesilirmak does not take into account that arbitral requests are international and in order to 
protect this national status there is a need to for any request to be in writing and not in the 
process of the proceedings as this would delay the arbitral proceedings. Thus it is best to apply 
for such at the outset of the case. 
1.1.2 Duration of a request for provisional measures 
An arbitral jurisdiction has a temporary element. An arbitral tribunal is empowered to issue or 
grant provisional measures, after its formation, upon the commencement of proceedings or 
during the course of arbitral proceedings at any stage. The arbitral tribunal has, however, no 
power to grant provisional measures once it becomes “functus officio”.28  An interim measure 
could be extended further to cover uncertainty during the time when a deadline expires for filing 
an action to set aside the final award.
29
 
                                                 
22
 See ICSID Rules Article 39 (1) which provides guidance where the rules are silent. 
23
 See ICJ Rules Article 66 (1). 
24
 See Capani, Award 23 January 2002. 
25
 See English Arbitration Act 1996. 
26
 See ICSID Rule 39 (2), which provides that a request for provisional measures shall have priority. See the Court 
of Arbitration for Sports Arbitration Rules, Article 37; see also ECJ Rules Article 66 (2). 
27
 Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures In International Commercial Arbitration (2005) Kluwer Law International) 
169. 
28
 See ibid at 52. 
29
 See ICSID Arbitral Rules, Rule 9 (4). 
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Provisional measures, as the term suggests, are intended to have only a provisional effect 
pending the final resolution of the dispute. They are not intended to have ares judicata effect. 
Such provisional measures may be revoked or finalised prior to or in the final award. 
Thus the duration of a provisional measure has a temporary element. An arbitral tribunal is 
empowered to issue a measure, after its formation, upon the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings or during the course of its proceedings. The tribunal has no power at all to grant 
provisional measures once it becomes “functus officio”.  
The main effect of a provisional measure is possibly to extend further to cover uncertainty during 
the time when a deadline expires for filing an action to set aside the final award. It should be 
noted that the final award by the tribunal could contain a ruling reiterating the earlier provisional 
measure or amending or revoking such a measure. It should, however, be noted that even prior to 
the  granting of a final award, under changed circumstances or in accordance with new facts, a 
need may arise to amend, modify or revoke the provisional measures previously granted. 
In such circumstances, the form of the measures becomes the focal point for determining 
whether such revocation could be made. A number of arbitral tribunals do exercise their 
authority to revise or revoke their provisional measures. 
 Although courts and tribunals have tried to advance  the prerequisites of commencing a request 
and to specify  who and what requirements are needed for one to be granted a request,
30
 the law 
is still ambiguous both domestically and internationally. Commentators on this topic-for 
example,Yasri, Gary Born, Hunter have not yet come up with a classic solution to this ambiguity 
in the law. The English Arbitration Act 1996,
31
 which is classed as a beneficial turning point for 
arbitration in England, does not clearly and explicitly express who should initiate or commence a 
request, what conditions the tribunal should take into account in considering a request from the 
parties, and the duration of such request, given that each case is judged on its merit. Under the 
international arbitral rules,for example, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), London Court of International 
Arbitration(LCIA), the Court of Arbitration for Sports Rules(CAS Rules), the Swiss Rules 
                                                 
30
 See Articles 4 and 6 of the Geneva Convention of 21 April 1961. 
31
 See DAC Report February 1995. 
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(CCIG), and even UNCITRAL the current revision does not expressly provide solutions in 
regard to issues of a request for provisional measures.  The English Arbitration should adopt a 
provision which sets or provides guidelines on what request should contain, in other words, the 
formality of whether it should be put in writing or presented orally during the proceedings. Since 
time is of the essence in commercial dealings and since provisional measures are temporary in 
nature, urgent reform is needed to clarify when a request should elapse after a party has sought 
provisional measures from the arbitral tribunal. When presenting the above problems of a request 
for a measure it is very important that the courts should be cautious, in order to maintain the 
doctrine of party autonomy.  In regard to this contention it is true to assert that the arbitral 
proceedings will continue to be disturbed by the requests or delays may be unavoidable due to 
the time that the tribunal may take in reaching a conclusive decision as to whether a request 
should be taken into account. 
 
1.2 The questions that this research aims to answer 
This research thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
What procedures are to be observed and what conditions are required for granting arbitral 
provisional measures? 
Does the arbitral tribunal process, as the best dispute mechanism in granting provisional 
measures, meet all the expectations of the parties or business expectations in international 
commerce today in granting all arbitral provisional measures? 
 Which measures can be  considered as interim measures and as falling within relevant European 
law? 
 When does a national court have jurisdiction to grant measures within European member states? 
How are interim measures that are enforced in a member state different from those in the state in 
which they have been granted? 
 To what extent does the doctrine of party autonomy provide arbitral tribunal jurisdiction to grant 
provisional measures? 
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Does the intervention of municipal courts support the arbitral proceedings? 
To what extent can arbitral provisional measures be enforced in England and elsewhere? 
To what extent does the current English Arbitration Act 1996 and its implementation provide a 
wide scope to the arbitral tribunal with regard to provisional measures? 
 
1.3 Problem 
 The thesis is a study of how the England and Wales, with exclusion of Scotland;
32
 has become 
heavily focused upon maintaining the balance between courts and arbitral tribunals in granting 
provisional measures. This balance between courts and tribunals has led to conflicting decisions.  
The English Arbitration Act 1996 has or provides fewer powers and procedures in regard to 
provisional measures. The Report of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration,
33
 
which recommended that the courts should refrain from arbitral proceedings has not been 
implemented by the Arbitration Act. The other serious problem is that even if the provisional 
measures are granted by the tribunal, there is a lacuna in the law of arbitration, as it does not 
explicitly state how such measures can be enforced by the tribunal either domestically or 
internationally; and this has been hampered by the Brussels 1 Regulation. This thesis posits that 
the provisions in the Arbitration Act 1996, which encourages courts, to grant provisional 
measures should be focused on a reformed arbitral process, hence enabling the tribunal to grant 
provisional measures and enforce them. 
 
1.4 Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the early experiences under the 1996 Act which have borne out the stated 
principles of the DAC or where courts have continued their willingness to intervene in  a manner 
which became associated with the English courts under earlier legislation. The work is not an 
attempt to develop a new theory but simply to analyse the approach of courts and tribunals in 
granting provisional measures, and whether there is a need for reform. 
                                                 
32
 See Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010. 
33
 DAC Report, February 1995. 
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The purpose of the research is to promote awareness of some of the jurisdictional  difficulties 
that cause tension between the courts  and tribunals in granting provisional measures, and which 
if allowed to continue  might seriously  reduce the utility of international arbitration in settling 
disputes, and even jeopardise the future of the remarkable arbitral institution in England and 
elsewhere. The study aims to provide legislators with an opportunity of comparing their own 
system with other systems and to clarify any inadequacies in the Arbitration Act and Rules in 
England and Wales. 
The thesis aims to examine the position of English provisional measures in respect of the 
Brussels 1 Regulation, in order to adduce how it hampers the  granting and enforcement of 
arbitral provisional  measures in England and within European member states. 
The role of the courts in arbitral proceedings should be subsidiary, supporting the parties’ wishes 
(party autonomy) of having their disputes resolved. The courts should only have supplementary, 
palliative and corrective powers.
34
 Judicial involvement is not inconsistent with the interest of 
the parties, as the courts provide useful assistance, such as enforcing provisional measures, and 
granting measures out of arbitral jurisdiction (or example, freezing orders). The thesis is not an 
attempt to examine all the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996; rather it explores those areas 
where arbitration may be called into question or may have to be subject to judicial intervention. 
Through an in-depth analysis of cases decided, arbitral provisional measures or interim measures  
will be considered. The  issue is how to reconcile on the one hand, respecting the wishes of the 
parties to use a private system of dispute resolution, and on the other, the interests of the state in 
supervising that process. 
1.5 The contribution of this study 
 The research provides a general understanding of how provisional measures are perceived in 
England, as well as to investigate the inadequacy of the current trends of the provisional 
measures ‘framework.  The study is the first to critically address the role of courts and arbitral 
tribunals(subsidiary model) in granting provisional measures in England and Wales. The thesis, 
through examination of legislative developments, tries to remedy the legislative short-comings 
and mistakes and fills in the legal gaps.  
                                                 
34
 This will be discussed in the chapter on the judicial involvement in arbitral proceedings. 
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The study tries to provide a clear position of provisional measures between courts and 
arbitrators, from both a legal and practical perspective, in order to open door for researchers and 
commentators of laws to contemplate and devise the nature of provisional measures. They can 
then identify the effects on the final awards before enforcement. By identifying the problems and 
offering solutions, the people who chose arbitration will be liberated from the uncertainties and 
problems they face when one seeks provisional measures from the two jurisdictions, since the 
tension that may arise is already provided by solutions  in the thesis. 
The research shows that according to party autonomy doctrine as the main source of arbitral 
tribunals, all provisional measures should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
with limited intervention of the courts for enforcement. This theory adduces that any recourse to 
courts breaches the main objective of parties to submit to arbitration. Indeed, this provides advice 
for the development of legislation consistent with party autonomy, which in turn leads to 
confidence in the parties and harmonizing the process. The willingness to interfere in the arbitral 
process by the courts as evidenced by s.9 and 30, public policy limitations and Brussels 
convention, sections 67 and 68 are still problematic.  If the courts are going to achieve the stated 
principles of DAC and to continue to make London a leading arbitral centre, then courts will 
need to think through their approach on these matters, to avoid taking arbitration back to an 
earlier era of judicial intervention.  The thesis demonstrated that arbitration is the vehicle to do 
away with a dispute between the parties as comprehensively and as quickly as possible. 
Therefore, once a dispute on the fulfilment of an agreement has led to the initiation of arbitral 
proceedings, the arbitrators should undertake their best effort to consider all disputes arising 
from that agreement in order to bring a solution enabling the parties to resume a normal 
relationship as their business requires. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 In order to deal with the questions of research,
35
 a doctrinal methodology
36
 will be used.
37
The 
word “doctrinal” is derived from the Latin noun “doctrina” which means instructions, 
                                                 
35
Doctrinal methodology  is specifically directed towards solving legal problems and normally includes: assembling 
relevant facts; identifying the legal issues; analysing those issues with a view to searching the law; reading 
background materials (for example: legal encyclopaedias’, text books, law reform documents, policy papers, loose 
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knowledge or learning. Doctrinal research methodology is the systematic and ordered exposition 
of legal science.
38
 Legal science is the exposition of legal doctrine in the works of juristic 
commentators,
39
or the allocation and analysis of primary documents(arbitral awards, cases, 
legislation) and secondly ones (text books, international conventions, arbitral rules, journals, 
government reports, seminars, law reform documents, policy documents and media reports) in 
order to establish the nature and parameters of the law.
40
 Doctrinal research includes the intricate 
step of reading,
41
 analysing and linking the new information to the known body of law;
42
 in other 
words, it is centred on reading and analysing the primary sources of legal doctrine and secondly 
sources.
43
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
leaf services,  and journal articles; and allocating primary sources, mainly legislation or delegated legislation and 
case law, which have all to be synthesised in context, before coming to a tentative conclusion. 
36
 It should be noted that England is a Commonwealth country which established the doctrinal methodology, 
developed from the doctrine of precedent in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. It lies at the basis of common law and is the 
core legal research method.  See declaratory Theory, Law as science; formalism, strict legalism, legal realism and 
ant formalism. See Richard Posner, 'In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914-2007)',(2007) 74 (2) University of 
Chicago Law Review, 435,437. 
37
 See Frederick Schauer cited in Baghoomians(2009) 31 (3) Sydney Law Review 499,499. 
38
 Doctrinal research provides the exposition of rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship 
between rules, explains areas of difficulty and perhaps, predicts future developments or recommends changes to any 
law rules  found wanting. 
39
 See Nigel Simmonds, 'The Decline of Judicial Reason: Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order' (Manchester 
University Press, 1984) at 30.  
40
 See Maggie Walter, Social Research Methods (2
nd
edn,Oxford University Press 2010) at 485. See Diana Hacker 
and Barbara Fister, Research and Documentation Online, <http://www.dianhacker.comresdoc/history.html> 
accessed 17 March 2012. 
41
See Council of Australia Law Deans, CALD Statement on the Nature of Research (May and October 2005), 
<http://cald.anu.edu.au/docs/cald%20statements.pdf> accessed 17 March 2012. 
42
 In other words, doctrinal research is two-part process of allocating the law or doctrine and then analysing the text. 
It has both qualitative and quantitative elements within it, where by it allocates the sources and synthesises the law 
and applies the law to the facts in a context that is subjective. It requires extensive knowledge, precise judgement, 
detailed description and the ability to achieve a high degree of analysis and critique. See Richard Posner, 
'Conventionalism: The Key to Law and Autonomous Discipline' (1988) 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 
333,345, quoted in Richard Schwartz, 'Internal and External Method in The Study of Law'( 1992) 11 (3) Law and 
Philosophy 178, 185. 
43
 See Christopher McCruden, Legal Research and Social Sciences (2006 October) Law Quarterly Review 
632,633,where he defines doctrine as a study of law using reason and logic and argument and the primacy of critical 
reasoning based around authoritative texts. See Oliver Wendell HolmesJr, The Common Law, (Project Gutenberg 
2000), at 210 <http://www.gutenberg,org/dirs/etex00/cmnlw10.txt>, accessed on 10 October 2013. 
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1.7 Previous studies 
In addition, the thesis examines the views of commentators and the books of prominent writers: 
for example, Gary Born, who has addressed  the issue of provisional measures partially. 
AliYasilirmak, a prominent scholar on provisional measures,
44
Redfern and Hunter,
45
 who have 
addressed the topic of provisional measures in an international dimension, without focusing on 
England as central, Merkin on arbitration,
46
 Eva Lein,
47
 and Adrian Briggs
48
  The present study 
is two-pronged, as every problem confronted is considered both from a theoretical point of view 
and a practical one. Within the theoretical point of view, there will be a trace of the various 
solutions proposed by writers. 
1.8 Limitations of this research 
 There is no definition in international conventions such as the New York one
49
to show what 
provisional measures are.  In addition, the English Arbitration Act 1996 does not explicitly 
provide a clear definition of them,
50
 and in fact the provisions are too limited in scope for one to 
argue in favour of the arbitral tribunal, although sections 38 and 39of the 1996 Act provide the 
arbitral power to grant provisional measures. Moreover, there no clear guidelines to provide for 
the standards of granting provisional measures:
51
 such standards are all developed from the 
municipal courts, which the tribunals do not want intervene in, due to party autonomy. 
 Indeed, few books have been drafted on the topic of provisional measures. Most of the authors 
of arbitral books provide only a sentence in regard to provisional measures, apart from 
Yesilirmak,
52
who tries to explore the issue of provisional measures, but the irony is that his 
materials focus on provisional measures internationally with few references to UK standards on 
provisional measures. He does not address the scope of the provisions in the UK and the 
                                                 
44
 See Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Arbitration(Kluwer Law International  
2005). 
45
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1999). 
46
 English Arbitration Act 1996  (Informal 2009). 
47
 See The Brussels Regulation Reviews Proposal Uncovered  (British Institute Of International and Comparative 
Law 2011). 
48
 See Adrian Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction & Judgements (5
th
edn, Lloyds Press 2009). 
49
 See New York Convention 1958. 
50
See  Robert  Merkin, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edition Informal 2008) at 30;see also Flannery &Merkin, 
Arbitration Act 1996 (5th edn, Routledge, to be published 2014) at 20. 
51
 See Wendy, Enforcement of Provisional Measures  in Europe ( Oxford University Press 2009) at 130. 
52
See  Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Arbitration ( Kluwer Law International 
2005) at 4. 
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ambiguity in regard to the powers of arbitral tribunals to grant provisional measures, nor does he 
highlight, or take into account, the reality of arbitral proceedings in the UK; he only looks at the 
theoretical perspective and not the actual nature of provisional measures in the UK. Furthermore, 
he does not acknowledge the limitation of the scope of the Arbitration Act with reference to the 
European Court of Justice Rulings and the Brussels I Regulation.
53
  In addition, given the nature 
of confidentiality in arbitral proceedings, there is a problem of accessing arbitral awards in 
regard to provisional measures. 
There is an attempt in this research to limit its scope to arbitral provisional measures in England 
and Wales, although the role of the tribunal is too wide as a dispute mechanism.   There is no 
consensus as to which category should be adopted; however, many  experts have accepted the 
party autonomy as the best mechanism for provisional measures, with the support of the courts. 
The thesis aims to show how such co-operation promotes efficacy, but how at times there is a 
collision due to the two jurisdictions in a proceeding.  
 Many researchers have dealt with the enforcement of arbitral awards, but there is no previous 
study carried out on the topic “A Critical Analysis of Provisional Measures in England and 
Wales.” Hence this research will be a contribution to knowledge in the areas of provisional 
measures in arbitral proceedings.  
Another limitation is the time frame in carrying out the research, which is subject to mitigating 
circumstances.  The arbitration seminars I attended at the Institute of Comparative Law in 
London, and at the George Washington College of Law, were helpful; however, they were 
mostly conducted by barristers, solicitors, arbitrators and professors, and were too expensive for 
me, which at times impeded my attendance. 
1.9 Definition 
Although provisional measures are widely known and enforceable in many legal jurisdictions,
54
 
there is no widely explicitly accepted definition
55
 of the concept of provisional measures or that 
                                                 
53
44/2001. 
54
 See Lawrence Collins, Provisional Measures and protective Measures in International Litigation (1992) at 9-23. 
See English Arbitration Act 1996 from the preamble and the DAC Bill of the Act 1995. 
55
 See The Commission Communication of 26 November 1997 noted that ;there  is no definition of protective 
measures in the current version of the current  Brussels Convention. see Case C- 391/95 [1998] ECR 1-7091 [1999] 
Int Lit Procedure. 
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of interim measures. In other words, there is no clear uniformity in respect of the concept of 
provisional measures in both public law and private international law. Furthermore, there is no 
definition of that concept or its scope found in international commercial arbitration. A 
provisional measure is, broadly speaking, a remedy that is aimed as safeguarding the rights of the 
parties to a dispute pending its final resolution.
56
 The new UNCITRAL revised version of the 
Model Law (15 October 2010),
57
defines provisional measures as: 
“ any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by which 
the disputes is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example and without 
limitation to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending the determination of the disputes; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause,(i)current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute. 
 
The European Court of Justice in the case of Reichert and Others v Dresdner Bank,
58
 defined 
provisional measures as  a mechanism  intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to 
safeguard rights.
59
 
 
Provisional measures can  be described as measures intended to maintain a legal or factual 
situation  in order to safeguard rights an application for the recognition of which has been made 
to the court with jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
60
 
 
The main objective of provisional measures in arbitral proceedings is that parties’ rights are not 
damaged or affected due to the duration of the adjudication process.
61
 In other words, the aim of 
                                                 
56
Under UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17 (2) (b) it includes even anti-suit injunctions, which are alien to many 
legal systems. 
57
 See UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17. 
58
 Case C261/90 [1992] ECR 1-12149 para 34 see also Pacific Reinsurance Management Corporation v Ohio 
Reinsurance Corporation, 936 F2d 1019 ( 9
th
 Cir 1991); and Julian D M Lew, 'ICC Commission on International 
Arbitration' , (1988) 91 Int’lArb Bull 37. 
59
 2010 Arbitration Rules,Article  26 (2). 
60
 W. Kennett, Enforcement of Judgements in Europe, (Oxford University Press  1999) at 150. 
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provisional measures is to facilitate the effectiveness of the judicial or arbitral protection by 
providing provisional measures which complement the final award.  The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) defines provisional measures as those judicial measures that are characterized by 
efficiency and speed, and aimed at protecting the future enforcement of a judgment.
62
 The 
fundamental basis of provisional measures is based upon the existence of the called 
“fumusboniiuris” (an apparent existence of the right), and by “periculum in mora” (the risk of 
imminent infringement of the right). It is under such that tribunals and courts should be able to 
grant provisional measures to avoid some anticipatory effects of the judgment. The author 
defines provisional measures as a restitution remedy to comply with the terms and procedures of 
parties’ arbitration agreement. 
 
1.10 Terminology 
In international commercial arbitration, provisional measures are referred to as protective 
measures,
63
 interim measures of protection,
64
 interim relief,
65
 or conservatory measures,
66
 
preliminary measures, preliminary injunctive measures, precautionary measures and holding 
measures,
67
 or urgent measures.
68
 The terms ‘provisional measures’ and protective measures’ are 
not also defined by the Arbitration Act but they courts render there characteristics to define the 
terms. 
 
1.11 Characteristics of   arbitral provisional measures 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
61
 See Margaret L Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) at 101. 
62
See G Cuniberti, Les Measures Conservatoires (Paris 2000) at 26. 
63
 The terms’ provisional measures’and‘protective measures’willbe used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
64
 See Emmanuel Gaillard& John Savage (eds), Fourchard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer  Law International 1999) para 1303. 
65
 See UNCITRAL Article 26. 
66
 See International Arbitration Rules 1996 of the Chamber of National and International Arbitration in Milan –Italy, 
Article 14. 
67
  The term means the use of coercive powers by the courts to help arbitral proceeding where orders (for example 
attachment orders, freezing orders, disposing of property, production of documents, payment security on account) 
are not conservatory.  
68
 See EAA  1996, s. 39. 
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 It may not be very simple for one to list all the characteristics of provisional measures, and this 
is because of the difficulty that lies in the types of provisional measures. There are, however, 
certain essential characteristics of provisional measures that this thesis will address. The first 
characteristic is that applications for provisional measures and the existence of a dispute of 
which already or will be sought from the same or a different forum.
69
 In other words, there has to 
be a dispute to be litigated. This means that provisional measures should only be available where 
final protection is sought. Indeed, such a characteristic implies that an interim measure can never 
become “res iudicata”, and that the effects are limited to the relief given in the main trial.  In 
case law of the European Court of Justice, interim relief is considered to be an aspect of the right 
to effective judicial remedies and to a fair trial for the protection of freedoms and rights 
guaranteed by the European law.
70
 
 
The second characteristic is that provisional measures are temporary in nature. The measure is 
subject to the tribunal’s final adjudication. A provisional measure is temporary and only needed 
for a specified limited duration,
71
 until the final protection is granted or award. In other words, 
provisional measures preserve the parties’ right pending the final award.  Provisional measures 
do not exceed the final relief, since they aim to complement which is ancillary to the final award. 
Thirdly,  they are only granted where there is a real risk involving in waiting for the final award; 
in other words, where the property may be dissipated by the defendant or removed to a safe 
haven, which will render the final award meaningless and useless, since the property would have 
been sold by the defendant before the final award.   For the tribunal or courts to grant such 
measures there must be a degree of urgency and the criteria of both the courts and the tribunal 
have to  be fully satisfied  in order for any measure sought by the party to be granted.
72
 
 
Fourthly, provisional measures could be reviewed, modified or terminated prior to the final 
award or final determination of the dispute, where circumstances of the case of progress of the 
                                                 
69
Ibids.39 ( 3). 
70
See the judgment of the ECJ in relation to interim relief granted by national Judges, 19 June 1990, Case C-
213/1989. 
71
 See Bernardo Cremades, 'The Need for Conservatory and Preliminary Measures', (1999) 27 (5) Int’l Bus Law 
226; also see Laurence Craig, William Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration(3
rd
edn, Oceana Publications 2000),460. 
72
 See EAA 1996 s.38 ( 3), and s.39 (2). 
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arbitral proceedings demands. In addition,  there will be no need for such provisional measures if 
the final decision on the merits satisfy all the interests of the parties in a dispute. 
 
Provisional measures may be granted ex parte; in other words, where the defendant has not been 
served with the document. Although ex parte measures are acceptable in England they arenot 
permitted under the Brussels Regime among the signatory states.
73
 It should, however, be noted 
that because of due process considerations, on the measures should be given following a 
previous ex parte decision. 
 
  Another characteristic is that arbitral provisional measures are not self-executing; in other 
words, they lack coercive power to enforce decisions, and in most cases courts play a passive 
role in order for such measures to be enforced.  In addition, provisional measures are limited to 
parties to the arbitration agreement, and do not apply to third parties, such as banks, which find 
themselves in the middle of the disputes when attachment orders are being granted and enforced.  
 
In Chapter two (historical legislative framework regarding provisional measures), the historical 
developments of tribunals and courts with regard to the power to grant provisional measures will 
be examined; such examination will go to the roots of some of the problems and uncertainties 
about arbitral provisional measures. The examination will enhance an understanding of some of 
the trends concerning arbitral provisional measures and show how the developments have shifted 
the “doctrine of rivalry” to mutual respect or the subsidiary position of courts to arbitral 
proceedings. 
 
Chapter  three examines  the doctrine of party autonomy under the current English Arbitration 
Act 1996. Party autonomy, as evidenced in the arbitral agreement, is the essence of arbitration.
74
 
 The thesis will examine the theories advanced in support of this doctrine as the main source of 
arbitral power to grant provisional measures; namely, the doctrine of competence, which argues 
that since parties vest all the powers in the tribunal, they also have the power to rule on their 
                                                 
73
 See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, 'Arbitration and the Courts, Interim Measures of protection – Is the Tide 
about to Turn?',(1995) 30 Texas Int’l Law Review, 71-79. 
74
 See Peter Nygh Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press 1999) at 1. 
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jurisdiction.
75
 This notion has been supported by international jurisdictions, arbitral rules and 
conventions, mainly the New York and UNCITRAL.  Other theories are contractual theory, 
jurisdictional theory and separability theory. 
 
With the enactment of the English Arbitration Act 1996,
76
containing a special section and 
provision with regard to the power of the tribunal to grant on all arbitral matters, was a landmark 
for arbitral jurisdiction. The doctrine of party autonomy established new era where the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal was given autonomy in all matters of current or future disputes. 
 
 The powers of the tribunal that provides jurisdiction are derived from the arbitration agreement, 
which confers powers on the tribunal to grant or rule on its jurisdiction.
77
 The word jurisdiction 
means any issues subject to arbitration agreement. The principle of party autonomy in arbitral 
proceedings dictates such a conclusion. The tribunal is entrusted, for instance, with finally 
determining the parties’ rights. It is because of the doctrine of party autonomy that one may 
argue that all provisional measures should be within arbitral jurisdiction. However, given the 
scope of party autonomy not all provisional measures are granted under the party autonomy 
doctrine. The tribunal is faced with some shortcomings; for example, the Brussels Regulation 
limits the scope of arbitral power of granting provisional measures. In this chapter, therefore, the 
author aims to offer solutions or suggest reforms in order to enhance arbitral provisional 
measures. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the procedures and conditions for provisional measures.  The 
determination of such standards is crucial to arbitral proceedings. Although the arbitral tribunal 
should be the best forum in granting or seeking provisional measures, there are strict conditions 
fora tribunal which affect its powers to grant provisional measures. Such conditions are more 
examined than litigation, hence a platform that sets the orbital jurisdiction as the best dispute 
mechanism in settlement of any provisional measures.  Such standards have been developed by 
case law or the courts in order to safeguard parties from serious injuries that may cause delays in 
                                                 
75
See ARedfern and M Hunter (eds) International Commercial Arbitration (2
nd
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) a146 
paras 1-6. 
76
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 30. 
77
See Emilia Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract (Routledge 2010) 33-36. 
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the litigation process. Unless the tribunal sets such standards, its objectives of providing a final 
relief may be lost. Hence the parties may suffer greater damage or unnecessary costs. The thesis 
will examine both the negative and positive requirements of provisional measures. 
 
In addition Chapter five, focuses on examination of the types of arbitral provisional measures. 
In addressing the question as to whether the arbitral tribunal can grant all provisional measures 
sought by the parties to the arbitration agreement, the thesis   examines all provisional measures 
that can be granted by the tribunal as provided by section 38 and section 39 of the Arbitration 
Act 1996. The thesis in its examination will identify the problems of granting some provisional 
measures in arbitral proceedings and, with reference to other jurisdictions, will offer solutions in 
relation to the lacunae that have not  been rectified by the arbitral laws in England,. The main 
types of provisional measures the thesis addresses, therefore, are: the preservation of the status 
quo, orders for specific performance of a contract obligations, orders for prohibiting aggravation 
of parties disputes, security for underlying claims, ex parte orders, security for payment, 
enforcement of confidentiality obligation, measure for later enforcement of award, and security 
for costs. 
 
Preservation of evidence provisional measures: Indeed in all these above provisional 
measures, it is paramount that evidence is preserved, in order to avoid fading away due to 
modern technological advancement where a mouse can be used to transfer millions of useful data 
to the proceedings. If such evidence is not preserved, key witness statements or expert reports 
about proceedings might be required in order to establish the case that is to be adjudicated. The 
power to preserve evidence is entirely different from the power to inspect goods or collection of 
evidence.  However, although there is a difference between the measures for preservation of 
evidence and collection of evidence, at times the tribunal grants them simultaneously. 
 
Preservation of status quo: This form of provisional measure is aimed at the preservation of the 
status quo between the parties. In other words, it is a measure aimed at maintaining the 
contractual obligation between the two parties who entered into the arbitration agreement. Indeed 
it prohibits either party from terminating the agreed dispute resolution in settling disputes and it 
protects business status. 
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Specific performance: Like any contractual obligation in commerce. These measures facilitate 
performance of the agreed obligation by a party, and a failure may lead to damages or fines by 
the tribunal. 
 
Orders for aggravation of parties’ disputes: Such measures are aimed at preventing any action 
that would exacerbate the parties’ disputes. Such orders are commonly used to maintain the 
reputation of a given industry or a company, where a person is prohibited from disclosing 
company secrets to any press or any form of media or competitor to wreck the reputation of the 
other company. 
 
Interim payment: Such measures are direct payment to the client which may be subsequently 
revised on final judgments. It is a common remedy in many states. The main aim is to protect the 
moving party before any final arbitral proceedings to the disputes. 
 
Measures for later enforcement of an award: In order to avoid assets being dissipated from 
the final judgment, such measures are granted in order not to put the claimant in appalling 
circumstances. Indeed the claimant may win but by that time all the assets have been dissipated, 
hence such measure aims not to leave the winning party empty-handed, with a pyrrhic victory, 
where all the assets to the proceedings have been lost, which commonly occurs in cases where 
the defendant has a joint account with other third parties. 
 
Chapter six examines the role of the national courts in arbitral proceedings in the context of 
arbitral provisional measures. It is worth examining whether there is wide support for the role of 
municipal courts in arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, the thesis examines the theories that have 
been advanced with regard to the role and involvement of the courts in arbitral proceedings, 
mainly the concept of co-operation, freedom of choice approach, the principle of complimentary 
and subsidiary, and the doctrine of compatibility. 
 
 Stages of court involvement in arbitral proceedings will be critically examined, and the author 
aims to provide solutions where there is ambiguity in the law in relation to court involvement. 
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Finally, the thesis will discuss the role of the courts in arbitration and the disadvantages of court 
involvement in arbitral provisional measures. 
 
The main problem in chapter six, is still the court involvement in arbitral proceedings, which was 
the main aim of the DAC,
78
 to make the arbitral tribunal independent of its own jurisdiction. 
Interim measures are an interface between the arbitral tribunal and the courts,
79
 which is both 
complex and ever changing, and is not the harmonious product of the agreement between the 
parties to an arbitration agreement.  Interim measures in international arbitration involve the 
intersection of national law and arbitral power, and so a degree of conceptual uniformity is 
required if interim measures are to complement arbitral effectiveness, as they are designed to do. 
The interaction is brought about by  the parties acting jointly. In such a context, arbitration is 
often said to be an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to litigation. Hence proceedings in 
courts which arise out of an arbitration agreement are to some extent seen as a disappointment of 
the intentions of the parties as disclosed in the arbitral proceedings. It should, however, be noted 
that excluding courts from arbitral proceedings is likely to damage the process and reputation of 
the arbitration system.  
 
The fact that parties have chosen courts does not mean that their right to independence and 
impartiality has been waived. Since no man is an island, no dispute settlement can stand alone, 
and in this context the courts are called upon by the tribunal in order to support the process. The 
power of the courts to grant such measures or support the process is subject to arbitration tribunal 
permission.
80
 Given that the tribunal lacks coercive powers, and cannot grant all provisional 
measures, courts provide such a service that enhances the arbitral proceedings. In addition, when 
someone seeks emergency provisional measures, they are unlikely to be successful in obtaining 
them at the commencement stage, since there is no constituted tribunal to handle the case, and 
the only alternative is  to seek such remedies from the court in support of the arbitration process. 
Although the role of the courts is very important for the effectiveness of the arbitration, its 
jurisdiction is limited by the Brussels 1 Regulation. 
                                                 
78
 DAC Report, Feb 1995 par 19. 
79
 See EAA 1996, s. 44, 43, 66, 45 and Supreme Court Act 1981, s .37, which provide jurisdiction to courts to 
support arbitration. 
80
 See Arbitration Act, s. 44 (5). 
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Chapter seven examines the enforcement of provisional measures. Arbitration is a voluntary 
submission to an arbitral tribunal, based on an agreement between parties.Thus,the enforcement 
of interim measures ordered by the tribunal first and foremost relies on the goodwill and 
voluntary compliance of the parties. Arbitral provisional measures  have no coercive powers like 
municipal courts; however, they have a certain weight to their provisional awards.  Parties to an 
arbitration agreement voluntarily abide by the provisional awards granted by the arbitral 
tribunals, and failure to comply means that the tribunal may impose negative sanctions against 
the recalcitrant party. In addition, the tribunal may impose penalties for late performance of the 
order or may grant damages and costs  concerning some provisional measures; for example, 
measures related to the conduct of arbitration proceedings and measures granted  to facilitate 
later enforcement. It should be noted, however, that given the nature of arbitration, the order may 
still not be complied with, and in some cases, a recalcitrant party might even sell the assets and 
hide in another venue. 
 
 Since the arbitrators’ orders measures under s.39 mean that a final award is likely to be made, 
parties in practice usually comply with such orders to avoid any antagonism in the process.  
Indeed, arbitration depends on the co-operation of the users. In England,  several enactments 
have been passed to support the enforcement; for example, the Arbitration Act  1996
81
, the 
Supreme Court Act 1981,
82
 and the Civil  Jurisdiction and Judgement Act 1982
83
. In addition,  
international conventions
84
 and regulations
85
 support the notion of the enforcement of 
provisional measures. Up to now there has still not been any clear and explicit convention or 
enactment internationally that provides an enforcement mechanism. The gravity of enforcement 
and how effective it would be to enhance it through enforcement will therefore be examined. 
 
Chapter eight will present a holistic conclusion of the research and make recommendations from 
the study, with the aim of reforming the grant of provisional measures in England and their 
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enforcement across borders. Suggestions for future research and identification of the key 
contribution of the study will be included in this final chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 The legal developments of provisional measures 
2.1 Introduction 
 It is important to examine how the historical  legislative framework in arbitration law played 
such a pivotal role in  empowering the tribunal with the jurisdiction to rule  or grant provisional 
measures. London is  leading hub for international commercial arbitration due to its pre-
eminence as the centre for shipping, insurance, commodity and finance. Arbitration became 
ubiquitous in London, not least because of the volume of commercial transactions and, 
inevitably, disputes which occurred there.
86
  Given that England is the mother of common law, 
offered a legal regime of lawyers to handle the provisional measures emanating from arbitration. 
Only a handful of laws dealt with the role of the courts with respect to provisional measures, as 
almost all arbitral proceedings were based on adversarial lines, instead of an inquisitorial 
approach, where arbitral tribunals could act within their competence.
87
 The power to grant 
provisional measures was thus vested in municipal courts, even though the final protection of 
such rights was, by the arbitration agreement, sought from the tribunal.  It was in the  early20
th
 
century that maritime and commercial disputes increased rapidly and thus triggered municipal 
courts to accept assistance from arbitral tribunals, as a mechanism necessary for effective 
international commercial disputes and effective distribution of justice.
88
 Given the prominence of 
London as an international arbitration centre it was essential that laws developed to cater for 
those who chose the arbitration mechanism.   Tweeddale and Tweeddale
89
 express the 
developments of arbitration law in England as falling into six distinct periods. Common law 
governed arbitral proceedings until legislative provision was first enacted in the Statutes.9 and 10 
Will3 of 1698. Then, further statutory provision was made in the Common Law Procedure Act 
                                                 
86
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1854 before the first specific Arbitration Act was enacted in 1889. The Arbitration Act was 
revised at various chronological intervals (1950, 1979) until the most recent, the Arbitration Act 
1996.
90
 
 This chapter is of great importance as it discusses the historical legislative framework of 
provisional measures in England.  It examines the roots of the problems and uncertainties about 
arbitral provisional measures. This examination will enhance an understanding of some of the 
trends concerning those measures and assist in shaping such trends. The author aims to provide 
some recommendations for reform in the law, since the Arbitration Act 1996, in order to  make 
provisional measures more effective. 
This chapter therefore addresses the question as to what extent the historical legal framework has 
shifted the power of the courts through the granting of provisional measures to arbitral tribunals 
(party autonomy).In order to address this question, the chapter will be divided into five sections: 
Firstly, the Arbitration Act 1889;secondly, the Arbitration Act 1950; thirdly, the Arbitration Act 
1979; fourthly, the UNCITRAL Model Law and finally, the Arbitration Act 1996. 
 
2.2 Arbitration Act 1889 (the adversarial approach or Common Law) 
Arbitration has traditionally been the common way for dispute resolution in the United Kingdom 
ever since the first arbitration came in 1698.
91
   The English merchants applied arbitration to 
settle their disputes according to customs and practice.
92
 However, there were different concepts 
of provisional measures,
93
 due to the case system.
94
 The concepts were based on the historical 
                                                 
90
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proximity between the arbitral tribunals and municipal courts,
95
 which was not a benevolent 
one.
96
 
 Later the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 improved the granting and enforcement of arbitral 
provisional measures.
97
 The arbitration practice was then codified by the Arbitration Act 
1889,
98
and a ‘statement of case’ was where the award or provisional measure was deemed to be 
made according to the law as supervised by the judicial courts. Arbitration laws were legally 
developed in a modern way in the 20th century through the 1934 Act, which aimed to improve 
the arbitration regime in the United Kingdom.  The reasons for the attitude of the courts towards 
arbitration do not appear entirely clear, when one examines the decided cases, but these suggest 
that the relationship has not been a smooth one. 
 The first authority for this political bias was evident in the comments of Hardwicke in the case 
of Wellington v Mackintosh,
99
 where he took the view that: 
“persons might certainly have made such an agreement as would have ousted this court of 
jurisdiction, but the plea here goes both to  the discovery and the relief; and if I was to 
allow the plea as to relief, I could not as to discovery, and then the court too must admit a 
discovery, in order to assist the arbitrators, which is not proper for the dignity of the court 
to do.” 
This trend of an inferiority complex of municipal courts, that arbitral agreements should not oust 
such courts, continued in Kill v Hollister,
100
 where the courts took the view that the agreement of 
                                                 
95
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the parties cannot oust the court. In addition,  in Mitchell v Harris,
101
 it was held by the judge 
that: 
“I have looked into many cases at law, where the subject matter of the reference became 
afterwards the subject of action; and it is not said in any, that a mere agreement to refer 
can take away the jurisdiction of any court in Westminster Hall. If an award had taken 
place, and was pleaded, it would be examined in a court of law; and also in a court of 
equity, if impeached upon an equitable matter.”102 
 The same procedure was evident in Thompson v Charnock, where Kenyon LJ said that: 
“an agreement to refer all matters  in difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the 
Court of Law or Equity of their jurisdiction.” 
It should be noted that Lord Kenyon did not explicitly explain why this position had been 
adopted; rather, he treated the principle as being that an arbitration agreement could not oust the 
jurisdiction of the municipal courts, given the fact that his decision gave precedent in Harris v 
Reynolds.
103
 
These quotations above may lead the author to suppose that the reasons why the courts were not 
so receptive to arbitration was purely based on public policy reasons and jealousy in order to 
protect the common law, and that it was against the spirit of both common law and equity that a 
party, by agreeing to refer a dispute to arbitration, deprived of the right to apply to a court of 
equity. The author argues that the reasons were entirely based on either judicial jealousy or 
public policy in the form of an attempt to safeguard the jurisdiction of the courts. It is important 
to note that an arbitration agreement was effective to the extent  that an action could be brought 
for damages for breach of it,
104
 and where an award was granted before the authority of the 
arbitral tribunal  had been revoked, the award could be enforced.
105
 The public policy argument 
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was brought to public attention by the comments of Campbell LJ in Livingston v Ralli,
106
 where 
he said that: 
“Legislature has recently in the Common Law Procedure Act 1854, S.11 made a 
provision that not all arbitration agreements shall be pleadable in bar, but that the court 
may stop the action. This shows the opinion of the legislature that such agreements are 
not contrary to public policy.”107 
Indeed, Campbell LJ
108
 reiterated this opinion again in Scott v Avery,
109
 and similar views were 
expressed by Watson LJ, where he commented that: 
“The rule that a reference to arbitrators not named cannot be enforced does not appear to 
me to rest on any essential consideration of public policy. Even if an opposite inference 
were deducible from the authorities by whom it was established, the rule has been so 
largely entrenched upon which it was originally based could now be regarded as of 
cardinal importance.” 
 
It may be argued that  the recognition of arbitration clauses was not total in Scott v Avery, and the 
rule in Scott
110
 could not give effect to the intention of the parties to arbitrate unless the 
agreement was worded in a way that would suggest that an action may only be brought after an 
award has been issued. In such a situation, the court was free to apply the policy of the law and 
allow action notwithstanding the arbitration clause. According to Scott v Avery, the court could 
not give the intentions of the parties (party autonomy) to the arbitration agreement. This was 
evident in the judgement of the Lord Chancellor ,Lord Cranston, who said that: 
“if I covenant with A. to do particular acts, and it is also covenanted between us that any 
question that may arise as to the breach of the covenants shall be referred to arbitration, 
that latter covenant does not prevent the covenantee from bringing an action. Aright of 
action has accrued, and it would be against the policy of the law to give effect to an 
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agreement, that such aright should not be enforced through the medium of the ordinary 
tribunal. But if  I covenant with A.B. that if I do or omit to do a certain act, then I will 
pay to him such sum as J.S. shall award […] and I have omitted to pay the sum awarded, 
my covenant has not been broken and no right of action has arisen.”111 
Scott was followed in subsequent cases like Scott v Corporation of Liverpool,
112
 and Braunstein 
v Accidental Death Insurance Co
113
.   According to the cases like Thompson  &Mitchell, there 
are no clear elements of public policy to wreck the arbitration agreement. There is no adduced 
evidence in the court judgement as to what public interest was supposed to have been threatened. 
The author wonders what, if there were no clear explicit reasons in relation to public interest, the 
reasons were for this hostility. 
It may be submitted that the reasons were based on jealous grounds in order for municipal courts 
to guard their jurisdiction, which was perceived as threatened by the arbitral tribunal. Indeed this 
becomes evident when this thesis examines the approach of the courts towards arbitration 
proceedings; for example in Vynoir's case,
114
 Cook LJ characterised the relationship of courts 
and arbitral tribunals as that of agent and principal, thus ensuring the revocability of the 
arbitration agreement at common law. The jealous attitude of the municipal courts in England 
was adduced by the comments of Campbell LJ in Scott v Avery,
115
 where he said that: 
“The doctrine of hostility to arbitration at common law originated in the context of the 
courts of ancient times for expansion of the jurisdiction of all of them being opposed to 
any thing that would altogether deprive anyone of them jurisdiction.”116 
No subsequent decided cases have denied this approach.  In fact, recent cases have approved 
such views; for example, Moulton LJ in Doleman and Sons v Ossett Corporation, said that: 
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“the courts will not allow their jurisdiction to be ousted as their jurisdiction is to hear and 
decide the matters of the action and for a private tribunal to take that decision out of their 
hands, and decide the questions itself, is a clear ouster of jurisdiction.”117 
In addition, Scrutton LJ in Czarnikow v Roth Schmidt, considered public policy  as a platform 
where he said that: 
“This is done in order that the courts may ensure the proper administration of the law by 
inferior tribunals. In my view to allow English citizens to agree to exclude this safe guard 
for the administration of the law is contrary to public policy. There must be no Alsatia in 
England where the King’s writ does not run.”118 
 The municipal courts, under the common law approach of development, felt that it was of great 
importance that the law was kept uniform so as to avoid arbitral tribunals from interpreting the 
law in different ways, and this was clearly expressed by Atkin LJ in Czarnikow, where he 
observed that: 
 “The policy of the law has given to the High Court large powers over inferior courts for 
the purpose of maintaining a uniform standard of justice and one uniform system of 
law.”119 
 It is demonstrably clear that the relationship between arbitral tribunals and judicial courts to 
grant provisional measures was not a benevolent one, as demonstrated by Willcock v Pickfords 
Removals Ltd,when he asserted that:  
“one thing is clear in this branch of the law. An arbitrator cannot decide his own 
jurisdiction.”120 
 Hence it is clear that the courts were jealous of their jurisdiction,
121
and did not want their 
powers usurped by the arbitration tribunals.
122
In the bid to try and wreck arbitration 
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jurisdiction,
123
 in order to guard their jurisdiction, courts tried to argue on grounds of public 
policy to justify their attitudes. Arbitral tribunals were very inferior and they had no 
jurisdictional to rule on any matter, since all the powers were reserved to judicial courts. There 
was no party autonomy to parties at all,
124
 since citizens could not make their own laws,
125
 they 
had  to rely upon the courts to be a vehicle for resolving their disputes, where the contract was 
interpreted according to the laws of contract, subject to damages awarded by the courts. 
The author argues that public interest was a mechanism to deny arbitral tribunals the competence 
to grant provisional measures. The courts considered arbitral provisional measures to be within 
their jurisdiction.
126
 The users of arbitral tribunal thus became victims with threats from the 
courts to intervene in arbitral tribunal jurisdiction. The government was slow to respond to 
remedy this negative perception by enacting arbitral laws that provided exclusive jurisdiction to 
arbitral tribunals.  This hostility ignited a public outcry which ushered in arbitral enactments to 
ease the hostility and also to allow arbitral tribunals to grant provisional measures. It is probable 
that the advantages of arbitration had been to some extent under-estimated by lawyers and 
exaggerated by commercial people, hence these shortcomings led to the Arbitration Act 1950, in 
order to harmonize arbitration in England. 
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2.3 The Arbitration Act 1950 
The hostility of arbitral tribunals and courts continued,
127
and this was evident when one 
considers the special case procedure under section 21 of the 1950 Act. Under this procedure, 
either party to the arbitration agreement could apply to the arbitration tribunal to state a special 
case to the High Court for judicial opinion on some point of law arising in the course of 
arbitration. Where an application was made by one of the parties, the arbitrator had the discretion 
as to whether or not to state a special case. If he refused, a party could apply to the High Court 
for an order compelling the arbitrator to state a special case. The main purpose of the state 
procedure was to ensure that the law was applied correctly in arbitrations. However, the 
procedure became abused particularly after Halfdam Grieg & Co v Sterling Coal & Corporation 
(The Leyland),
128
 where the Court of Appeal ordered that the case be stated over the arbitral 
tribunal’s objection, on the grounds that disputes under the arbitration agreement in London had 
been made under the assumption that the points of law could be referred to the judicial 
jurisdiction for determination.  The circumstances in which an arbitrator could state a special 
case were laid down by Lord Denning MR.
129
  This allowed a party to delay the arbitral 
proceedings, because the tribunal was required to spend time preparing the consultative question 
or alternative awards, and the courts had to set a hearing date with the possibility of an appeal 
from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. This meant that the party favoured by the arbitral 
award (or provisional measures), would in the meantime be denied the award. Thus the case 
stated procedure clearly had a major disadvantage as it delayed arbitral proceedings, and also 
increased the cost of the arbitral process. The parties were unable to exclude review under the 
case stated mechanism,
130
 as this was deemed contrary to the doctrine of public policy. 
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There were no special provisions, in the enactment that provided jurisdiction for the arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures even where the arbitration agreement provided for this.
131
  
This attitude or perception was developed by the courts that saw arbitrators as not competent to 
grant provisional measures.
132
  Parties to the arbitration agreement could only apply for a costs 
order from the arbitral tribunal, but with reference to a judge and subject to a long period of 
fourteen days.
133
  This long duration provided a negative attitude or perception that arbitral 
tribunal could not grant provisional measures.
134
 The fees of arbitrators were set and paid 
according to the Rules of the court as in litigation proceedings. The arbitral tribunals lacked an 
armoury to enforce arbitral proceedings without the intervention of the case mechanism.
135
 
Although both the arbitral tribunal and municipal courts in England operated an adversarial 
system of achieving justice, arbitrators used to take a back seat,
136
 expecting municipal courts to 
come armed with a team of lawyers. This lack of balance restricted their competence to perform 
their duties; namely,
137
 the granting of all provisional measures, due to mistrust and legal 
intervention.  Under the Arbitration Act 1950, arbitrators were not allowed to order provisional 
measures.  The power to grant such measures rested with the courts.  For example, arbitral fees 
were paid according to the rules of court procedure, as in litigation proceedings, not under party 
autonomy which provides authority to the tribunal to rule on any arbitral dispute.
138
 It should, 
however, be noted that part II of the Act introduced the commencement of arbitral proceedings 
and the enforcement of provisional measures under the Geneva Convention, which was 
superseded by the New York Convention 1958. 
The courts developed a concept of procedural mishap, which allowed the requirement of 
misconduct. This was achieved by elevating remission from mere remedy for misconduct to a 
right available whenever something had gone wrong during proceedings.
139
 It should, however, 
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be noted  that arbitrators were for the first time allowed to grant provisional measures; namely, 
the ability to cross-examine a witness under oath, to register oaths and to  award costs.  Lord 
Lister, one of the major advocates of this development, argued  for the independence of the 
arbitral tribunal and their ability to grant provisional relief. 
The Arbitration Act 1950 incorporated an implied term into every arbitration agreement to the 
effect that where a reference was to two arbitrators, the two were obliged to appoint an umpire 
immediately following their own appointment.
140
 The notorious deficiency of the statutory 
implied term was that it required the immediate appointment of an umpire in all circumstances, 
the problem being that if the two arbitrators never reached an agreement, the arbitral proceedings 
could not proceed. The power of the arbitral tribunal was still subject to the courts.  This 
common law approach restricted the freedom of the arbitral tribunal to give free reasons,
141
and at 
the same time had a desirable effect of accentuating the rationality of the arbitral process.
142
  
Hence it is true to assert that the 1950 Arbitration Act was a scapegoat, as it was a mechanism 
that appeared to provide autonomy to the parties to solve their disputes in theory but in reality it 
provided no remedies as to the special case mechanism, where the dominance by the courts 
became the order of the day.
143
 This can be demonstrated by one of the most controversial cases 
in  this regard,Coppee-Lavalin NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd, where an 
application was made to an English court for an order for security for costs, on the basis that 
Ken-Ren was an insolvent company, as provided by the International Chamber of Commerce 
Rules. Coppee-Lavalin argued that there was a residual power of the court to grant such 
provisional measures, although such power should be used in exceptional circumstances. The 
House of Lords held that it did have the power to order the respondent to provide security for 
costs and that there were exception circumstances justifying such a provisional order. In fact, this 
episode led to international commercial arbitration centres being established outside London, 
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with many aggressively pursuing arbitration business.  For example: “The Netherlands, France, 
Sweden and the Far East tried to seize a share of the multi-billion pound industry.”144 
 
2.4 The Arbitration Act 1979 
Accordingly, the next major development in arbitral competence to order provisional measures 
was the Arbitration Act 1979 which reformed the 1950 Act. The 1979 Arbitration Act was an 
attempt to redress the disincentives, which were turning parties away from London.  The 
motivation for reform was principally because of the concern over the relationship that existed 
between judicial courts and arbitral tribunal jurisprudence and the abuses to which the system 
lent itself.
145
 The enormous scope for judicial review, the abuse of the special case procedure and 
the delay in referring disputes were all cause for concern. 
 Under the Act, appeals were to be heard exclusively on points of law with leave for appeal 
having to be sought beforehand.
146
 Through a string of cases, however, the House of Lords had 
to temper the scope of the appeal process to ensure that it too was not abused. However, there 
were no explicit provisions on the power of the tribunal to grant provisional measures, and this 
resulted in a grey area in regard to the arbitral competence with regard to interim measures. 
 The Act derives from the recommendations of the Commercial Court Committee: the 
commercial judges made known their concerns about the defects in the prevailing law and how  
it might be corrected in both judicial and extrajudicial capacities. The main objective of the 
committee was to grant the arbitral tribunal authority to grant provisional measures such as final 
awards.
147
 One of the particular forces was the 1978 Alexander Lecture entitled “Case stated: its 
use and abuse”, and delivered by Diplock LJ, outside the judicial arena, to the London 
arbitration group,
148
 the joint committee of the London Court of Arbitration,
149
the Institute of 
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Arbitrators and the London Maritime Association.
150
 The Report was published as a command 
paper. The government was quickly satisfied with the merits of the reformist case and the Bill 
was brought forward in the House of Lords, which in its later progress sped up through the 
parliamentary committee stages, and received the Royal Assent on 14
th
 April 1979. In the first 
part of the Report, the Commercial Court subsumed its deliberations and recommendations under 
the title “Judicial Supervision and Review of Arbitration Proceedings”. The main concern was 
the judicial review of arbitral interim measures, subject to the case mechanism procedure 
provided by the Arbitration Act 1950.
151
 The committee recommended further that at the time 
there existed “without doubt considerable and justification abuse of the case procedure”152 
Nevertheless, the 1979 Act received its share of disapproval: “some have criticised the 1979 Act 
for having been rushed through the legislative process with indecent haste; some say that it was 
ill-prepared, made in response to pressure from the international community” 153 
 The Arbitration Act 1979 was a tremendous enforcement of arbitral laws,
154
 whereby it tried to 
shift the balance between finality and legal accuracy towards finality,
155
and abolished both state 
procedures and the power of the High Court to remit an award on the grounds of errors of fact or 
law on the face of the award.
156
 The historical and traditional posture of court intervention was 
restructured and rationalised,
157
 where   arbitral decisions were to a certain degree respected by 
the courts.
158
 This was expressly demonstrated by rendering valid exclusion clauses in arbitral 
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agreements,
159
 by virtue of which the risks of application to the courts and appeals from awards 
or provisional measures on question of law were excluded,
160
 but limited to historical ethos.
161
 
 There was a major usage of arbitration, according to Mustill Boyd: about 10,000 arbitral 
references were instituted annually in England, but the number of disputes on point of error of 
law that reached the High Court by way of special case procedure was reduced  to around 20-30 
per annum.
162
However, although the Arbitration Act was seen as a deterrent to court 
intervention, difficulties between the courts and tribunals continued, as demonstrated in the 
judgement of Goff LJ in The Oinoussian Virtue,
163
 when he took the view that he was unable to 
find: 
“ anything in s.1 of the 1979 Act which indicated that in considering whether to give 
leave to appeal from an arbitrator’s award any limit should be placed upon what was the 
question of law involved except that its determination must be such that could 
substantially affect the rights of one or more parties.”164 
 The courts purposively interpreted the word “substantial” as granting leave of appeal.165   This 
can be demonstrated by the application of Oinoussian Virtue,
166
 by Goff LJ in International Sea 
Tankers Inc v Hemisphere Shipping Co.Ltd.
167
 The House of Lords tried to address the problem 
in B.T.P,
168
 where Diplock LJ laid down guidelines for the granting of leave to appeal. These 
went through a range of circumstances from one-off clauses to standard terms where less strict 
criteria would apply and were  reaffirmed in the Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen 
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Rederierna AB (The Antaios).
169
 Furthermore, the House of Lords did little to enhance the 
arbitral procedure; this was because it held that where one party had been guilty of inordinate 
delay the other party was under an obligation to keep the procedure moving.
170
 The Court of 
Appeal and House of Lords rejected the argument that arbitrators had the power to dismiss a 
claim where there was reasonable delay by the claimant in pursuing his claim at first instance. 
This meant that a party to the arbitration agreement was put in a non-compromising situation, 
which was a more disadvantageous one than that of a party who went to municipal courts. This is 
because a claimant who delayed proceedings could have his claim struck out for want of 
prosecution. The race for power between the two jurisdictions was further evident in the 
comments of Dunn LJ in Lloyd v Wright,
171
 where he asked:“Why on principle, should the 
arbitration and the action not proceed side by side?”, and went on to say that “the court has 
ample power to restrain further proceedings in the arbitration by an action and in these 
circumstance there can be no question of a race between arbitration and court proceedings, the 
court retains control thought.”172 
Accordingly, the power of the tribunal to rule on its competence or to grant provisional measures 
or solve its disputes was somehow restrictive and hence the shortcomings were to be settled by 
further arbitration enactment, in order to harmonise arbitral proceedings. One of the greatest 
weaknesses to the 1979 Act is that it did not consider foreign jurisdiction, hence impeded 
international parties from considering arbitral tribunal proceedings. It should be noted that the 
mistrust and negative perceptions of the arbitral tribunals’ competence continued despite the 
legislative address of judicial jealousy and intervention. It should be noted that after the 
enactment of the 1979 Act, arbitral tribunals had a certain degree of competence to grant 
provisional measures, though such provisions were not clearly expressed in the Act. Arbitral 
decisions were no longer set aside by municipal courts, unless a specific question of law had 
been submitted. The Act therefore struck a balance between courts and tribunals in order to grant 
measures with less court intervention.  Furthermore, the 1979 Act developed a distinction 
between the reference of a specific question of law and the reference of a question of material to 
                                                 
169
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the resolution of a dispute.  The tribunal continued to make findings of facts and in consultation 
with the parties formulated the question of law. However, it was the municipal courts which 
expressed an opinion as to the correct answer to the question of law posed. The intervention of 
the municipal courts was demonstrated by the comments of Clive Schmitthoff, who said that: 
“The special case procedure has been much criticised by international users of English 
arbitration because it makes it in practice impossible to give an arbitral tribunal final 
jurisdiction if a question of law arises. That may lead to delay, and lends itself to abuse; it 
may also add to the costs.”173 
 The 1979 Act provided an overriding impact to arbitrators, and  this was achieved by keeping a 
check on the municipal courts’ intervention and procedure abuse;  hence the powers of the courts 
to intervene in arbitral proceedings were no longer curious, but only subject to review of interim 
measures if an error of law appeared and subject to stringent conditions.  The harmonisation 
efforts on the rule of law introduced the idea of a Model Law on arbitration, which was adopted 
by England to revise arbitration, and as a result the current system is largely regulated under the 
Arbitration Act 1996. 
2.5 Arbitration Act 1996 Origin 
The enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996 was intended to be a departure from the traditional 
close supervision of the courts and to reinforce the principle of party autonomy. Lord Steyn 
commented on the historical relationship between courts and arbitration in England: 
“the supervisory jurisdiction of English courts over arbitration is more extensive than in 
most countries, notably because of the limited appeal on questions of law and the power 
to remit.”174 
He went on to confirm that: 
“it is certainly more expensive than the supervisory jurisdiction contemplated by the 
Model Law.”175 
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Mindful of the intricacies in the 1979 Act, and the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law was 
gaining momentum, the legislators in England initiated the Departmental Advisory Committee 
on Arbitration (DAC) to consider whether the United Kingdom should adopt the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Perhaps surprisingly, the DAC concluded that this Law should not be adopted in 
England. In June of that year,Mustill LJ, the chair of the committee, published a report which, 
although rejecting the Model Law, approved of its presentation and logic.
176
 The Mustill Report 
pointed out that while there were a number of things in the Model Law which could be usefully 
to be adopted, it was not a complete code and in any event would have to be supplemented. The 
Report also outlined its reasons for the rejection of this Law in England as follows.  
First, given that the Model Law provides only international commercial arbitration, the DAC 
noted in its report that the introduction of it in England would lead to a divorcing of arbitral 
regimes; domestic and international. Wilberforce LJ played a pivotal role in this enactment 
during the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords when he explained the essence of the 
new law and the philosophy enshrined in it. He stated: 
“I would like to dwell for a moment on one point to which I personally attach some 
importance. That is the relation between arbitration and the courts. I have never taken the 
view that arbitration is a kind of annex, appendix or poor relation to court proceedings. I 
have always wished to see arbitration, as far as possible, and subject to statutory 
guidelines no doubt, regarded as a freestanding system, free to settle its own procedure 
and free to develop its own substantive law.[…] I have always hoped to see arbitration 
law moving in that direction. That is not the position generally which has been taken by 
the English law, which adopts a broadly supervisory attitude, giving substantial powers to 
the court of correction and otherwise, and not really defining with any exactitude the 
relative positions of the arbitrators and the courts”,177 
the former being governed by the Arbitration Act and the latter by the Model Law.  
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Secondly, the whole adoption of the Model Law would remove the existing power of the English 
courts to correct errors of law. The consequences of that were thought to be unsatisfactory, as 
they would leave those aggrieved by an error in law without a sufficient remedy. The third 
concern of the DAC related to the existing law, legal framework and experience of lawyers and 
arbitrators in England. The DAC felt that the Model Law did not resemble a typical English 
statute, and as a result, those involved in arbitral procedures would be required to revise 
substantially their existing wealth of knowledge and established approach. The Report 
recommended that England should promulgate a new Arbitration Act to cater for the needs of 
modern commerce and reflect the spirit of the Model Law.
178
 The DAC pointed out that the 
Model Law was most suited to those jurisdictions with no developed arbitration law or with a 
practically redundant corpus of arbitration law. England,
179
 however, was not such a jurisdiction, 
given its developed law as well as its standing as a prominent hub of commerce.
180
 The Model 
Law was regarded as skeletal and enacting it without substantial changes and additions would 
resurrect all the uncertainties that English law had grappled with and solved.
181
 The Report 
concluded that: 
“In these circumstances we recommend an intermediate solution in the shape of a new 
Act with a subject matter so selected as to make the essentials of at least the existing 
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statutory law tolerable without calling for a lengthy period of planning and drafting, or 
prolonged parliamentary debate.”182 
 The consultation paper was published in 1994 together with the draft of the Arbitration Bill.
183
 
Despite the DAC report that the Model Law should not be adopted, the Arbitration Act expresses 
the spirit of the Model Law, and virtually every article of that Law is enshrined in the Arbitration 
Act 1996. It should be noted, therefore, that the origin of the Arbitration Act comes from the 
Model Law, as confirmed by the Consultative Paper on the Arbitration Bill.
184
 
 Whilst the problem of court intervention,
185
 in arbitral proceedings and the attempt to promote 
party autonomy, it is submitted that there was a desire to keep London as the leading arbitral 
centre in the world,
186
 though this was not addressed in the DAC Report.
187
 The view that 
London is an international centre was echoed by Saville LJ, who said that: 
“ I hope that those from abroad who read the Act will be persuaded that this jurisdiction 
is an ideal place to hold an international arbitration, since they can now understand what 
it is likely to entail, and can see that we have tried to reflect generally accepted 
international views on the proper conduct of the arbitration process. Only time will tell 
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whether we have succeeded in our objective to retain and enhance the reputation of this 
country as the leading place for the form of dispute resolution known as arbitration.”188 
 
2.5.1 The Philosophy of the Model Law and its effect on the English Arbitration Act
 1996 
 Since the English Arbitration 1996 in many ways is similar to the Model Law,
189
 it is worth 
examining the philosophy of the UNCITRAL Model Law. A Working Group on International 
Practices was established, which had the task of drafting the Model Law.
190
This Law went 
through five drafts and the Working Group adopted the final one.
191
 The Working Group 
considered that the Model Law should be based on the principle of the freedom of the parties 
(party autonomy), and that the parties should be free to submit their disputes to arbitration and to 
provide for rules that would be in accordance with their specific needs. UNCITRAL adopted the 
Model Law on International Arbitration in 1985.
192
  The first principle of the Model Law is the 
recognition of the freedom of the parties’ agreement, whether the reference is to standard 
institutional rules or adhoc arbitration. The parties’ are very much in control of how their 
disputes should be resolved, and not restricted by any peculiar local rules of procedure.
193
 The 
second principle is to grant the arbitral tribunal substantial powers, and (failing agreements by 
the parties) wide procedure discretion. This is to ensure that arbitral proceedings are free from 
any local law restraints. Hence in the absence of the arbitration agreement the tribunal has 
jurisdiction or considerable autonomy.
194
 The third principle of the UNCITRAL Model Law is 
that municipal courts should have a limited role to play in arbitral proceedings.
195
 The Model 
Law expressly provides that no court“shall”196intervene in arbitral proceedings except where the 
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Model Law provides for support of the arbitral process.
197
 Fourthly, the Model Law seeks to 
ensure that the fairness and due process of the system and municipal courts should only be 
involved during the post award stage.
198
Indeed, the main aim was to create a vehicle or restrict or 
limit any court intervention in arbitral process to promote the doctrine of party autonomy and 
promote a high degree of harmonisation.
199
   It should be noted that the Model Law is not 
comprehensive: it is a very general piece of legislation and many issues have not been addressed; 
for example, it does not deal with issues such as the fees and costs of arbitration and the duties of 
arbitrators. The wording of the Model Law is extremely general and this is due to difficulties in 
drafting an instrument to be adopted by countries with different legal cultures and drafting 
techniques. Hence the words used are too general for it to appeal to a wide range of different 
legal cultures.  As the adoption of the Model Law became increasingly widespread, however, the 
deficiencies in English arbitration law were exposed and calls for a systemic overhaul grew: 
” London’s pre-eminence as a world arbitration centre began to be challenged. Foreign 
users were dissatisfied with such delays and high costs. They wanted less delay, less cost. 
They wanted their provisional measures or disputes to be  resolved with certainty. The 
law was ripe for reform”200 
Further, Rutherford and Sims stated that: 
“ there was a strong feeling that our arbitral system should take account of the needs and 
wishes of the commercial and trading community.”201 
2.5.2 The Structure of the Arbitration Act 1996 
The proposal for developing the English Arbitration Act 1996 was designed in a more friendly 
manner and language than had been customary hitherto, in order to reflect the provisions of the 
Model Law in simple English and with a logical format. The main aim was the appointing of 
arbitral tribunal or arbitrators, conduct of proceedings, and grant of provisional measures and 
awards.  The Act was to be a remedy to the earlier enactments that impeded arbitral proceedings 
                                                 
197
 Ibid Article 11 (3), 11 (4), 16 (3) and 34 (2). 
198
 Ibid Article 18. 
199
See  DAC Report 1996 at 138. 
200
 See Rutherford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, (FT & Tax 1996) note 28 at 5. 
201
Ibid at 10. 
  
 45  
 
under court intervention.  It repealed entirely the Arbitration Acts of 1950 and 1979, and 
established the general principles on which arbitral proceedings should be adopted. Thus, the 
1996 Arbitration Act defined the jurisprudence of Arbitration, which .Lord Saville once 
described, stating that: 
“we have highly developed rules and principles governing all aspects of arbitration, 
which is one of the reasons why this country has been and still is a world centre for 
arbitration.”202 
 
The Act consolidated all earlier legislation, and, which is most important, included clear 
provisions to give the tribunals power to grant provisional measures.  The Act was thus intended 
to be both a fresh start and the closest to a definitive code of arbitration law that has ever been 
enacted.
203
   The structure is similar to the Model Law, and is divided into four chapters.  The 
most important part of the project was the modification to party autonomy. This  is demonstrated 
by section 34(1) which provides that matters of evidence and procedure are to be determined by 
the tribunal, although the parties themselves are free to agree on any or all matters themselves 
including provisional measures.
204
Secondly,section4 (1) of the Act introduces Schedule 1, which 
indicates those provisions within the Act which are mandatory.
205
  The tribunal has powers to 
grant provisional measures with the supervisory model support of the municipal courts where 
called upon.
206
 The role of the courts was demonstrated by Wilberforce LJ, who said that: 
“Other countries adopt different attitudes and so does the UNCITRAL Model Law. The 
difference between our country and others has been and is, I believe, quite a substantial 
deterrent to people sending arbitration here. After reading the debates and the various 
drafts that have been moving from one point to another point, I find that on the whole, 
although not going quite as far as I should personally like, it has moved very substantially 
in this direction. It has given the court assistance when the arbitrators cannot act in the 
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way of enforcement or procedure steps or alternatively, in the direction of correcting very 
fundamental errors.”207 
It should, however, be noted that the parties under party autonomy are free to exclude mandatory 
provisions, provided they do so in writing.
208
 Mandatory provisions are designed to ensure that 
minimum standards are maintained in the conduct of arbitral proceedings and that municipal 
courts have the necessary power to provide assistance to the arbitration; for example, with regard 
to freezing orders or anti-suit injunctions,
209
 or where the agreed appointment process fails.
210
 
The main principles of the Act are clearly expressed in Clause 1 of the DAC Report.
211
 
The author does not agree with the powers of the court
212
 to intervene, since the Model Law 
which was adopted provides that no courts shall intervene in arbitral proceedings. Indeed the 
main aim of the 1996 Act was to reduce judicial intrusion by the courts
213
 and for the courts o 
respect party autonomy.
214
 The DAC report stated that: 
“ this reflects the basis of the Model law and indeed much of our own present law. An 
arbitration agreement is a consensual process.Firstly,the parties should be held to their 
agreements and secondly, it should in the first instance be for the parties to decide how 
their arbitration should be conducted.”215 
 
This should also be adopted, so that no residual powers can be exercised by the municipal courts, 
since any intervention of the courts may wreck the doctrine of party autonomy. The other 
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limitation is the scope of the Act; the Act is limited to only England and Wales.
216
Nevertheless, 
some provisions of Part 1 still apply if the seat of arbitration is not England; for example, 
section2 (2), sections9-11 dealing with stay of legal proceedings and section 66 dealing with 
enforcement, apply where the seat is not England.  It may be argued that if legal proceedings 
have been brought in England in breach of an arbitration agreement in another country, the 
municipal courts of that other country may not have the power to restrain the English 
proceedings by an injunction or may feel unwilling to act in any way which may be thought to 
trespass on English sovereignty.  In such circumstances there is a reason to permit and require 
the English municipal courts to intervene with their own remedies in aid and support of the 
arbitration agreement.
217
In addition,  it would be absurd if arbitration resulted in an award  and 
this could not be enforced against the assets in England. The power of the tribunal with regard to 
provisional measures
218
is also supported by international conventions and arbitral rules.
219
  Thus 
the Act complies with Model law to a certain degree but not entirely.
220
 
As mentioned earlier, the harmonisation efforts on the rule of law introduced the idea of the 
Model Law on arbitration, which was adopted by  England to revise its legal systems, and as a 
result the current system is largely regulated by the Arbitration Act 1996.  
One of the main limitations of the Act is that it does not provide a definition of arbitration or 
provisional measures, thereby inviting the courts to come with their judicial technicalities or case 
law to provide definitions. The absence of definitions under the Arbitration Act 1996, and even 
Model Law is problematic and is likely to become more so with the increasingly autonomous 
status that arbitration is gaining relative to litigation. It will therefore be important to determine 
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 See Model Law, Article 19 (2) which confers on the tribunals the power to determine the admissibility and  
relevance of any evidence, similar to s. 1 of EAA 1996 and s.34 (2) which bestows on the tribunal the power to 
order measures for disclosure and interrogate during trial. This power historically resided in the courts until the EAA 
repealed earlier enactments. 
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those issues that are arbitrable in order to ensure that arbitrators are clear on the remit of their 
jurisdiction. 
In addition, the power of the courts
221
 is not restricted in practice and some of the court 
procedures are more rigid than the Model Law in other states,
222
as demonstrated by the DAC 
Report,
223
 which stated that: 
 “nowadays the courts are much less inclined to intervention in arbitral process than used 
to be the case. The limitations of the right to appeal to the courts from awards brought 
into effect by the Arbitration Act 1996, and [the changes in] attitudes generally, have 
meant that courts only intervene in order to support rather than displace the arbitral 
process. We are in favour of this modern approach.”224 
 The author recommends that the power of the tribunal to issue provisional measures at both 
domestic and international level should firstly consider whether the parties have an arbitration 
agreement between them.
225
.If so, then the arbitration agreement between the parties should have 
an opt-out clause if they wish to disregard the courts’ involvement,226 in the granting of 
provisional measures. The irony is that even where an opt-out clause is inserted for the courts not 
to intervene in arbitral proceedings, the court have power outside the Arbitration Act; for 
example, under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act and Civil Procedure Rules.
227
 The Tribunal 
should be given the power to examine the validity of the parties
228
 agreement instead of the 
                                                 
221
 See Belair LLC v Basel LLC[2009] EWHC 725 (Comm), where the court granted provisional measures under s. 
44 od the EAA 1996 and emphasised that its intervention was for the protection of the status quo pending the 
constitution of the tribunal. 
222
 See the Court of Bermuda in IPO International Growth Fund Ltd v OACT Mobile [2007] Bermuda LR 43 
(Bermuda CA). 
223
 DAC Report 1996. 
224
 Ibid. 
225 Stavros Brekoulakis, On Arbitrability - Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern, in Loukas 
Mistellis and Stavros Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law  
International  2009) at 39. Loukas states that a condition for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction over a particular 
dispute.  
226 See Stewart Shackleton, ‘Internationalization of English Arbitration Law’, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin 11 (1) Spring (2000) 19-36. 
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commercial bargain. See George Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampsons [1875] LR 19 Eq 
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courts doing so, and also to determine whether a measure is suitable for arbitration.  The powers 
of the courts should be limited tosection66,sections44 and 45 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in 
circumstances or urgency of evidence, making orders relating to property subject to proceedings  
of the sale of goods. 
 The author further argues that the English Arbitration Act 1996 freed commercial parties from 
the national constraints of procedural law, with the result that fundamental English rules no 
longer necessarily apply in arbitral proceedings in England.
229
 The object of these reforms has 
been, of course, in the words of Lord Saville, to reflect generally accepted international views on 
the proper conduct of the arbitral process.
230
Apart from a few mandatory provisions, parties are 
free to exclude large parts  of the Arbitration Act itself in order to adopt procedures with which 
they are more familiar, or which they believe are best suited  to the particular circumstances of 
their dispute. Arbitrators likewise enjoy broad powers to fashion rules of procedure where the 
parties fail to agree.
231
 
The tribunal is limited to the application of the law in arbitral proceedings.
232
  It should however 
be noted that the Arbitration Act 1996, has not taken into account the main purpose of limiting 
the court intervention in arbitral process.
233
 The doctrine of party autonomy is associated with 
the freedom to exclude local law or municipal courts, and is accordingly, incompatible with 
judicial review or intervention now expressed by English judges.
234
 Security for costs is still a 
problematic; following sharp criticism of orders by English courts for security in international 
arbitral proceedings, the fact that one party has its central management and control outside 
English law is now a prohibited ground for granting such a relief. This accords with the spirit of 
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230
 See Lord Saville,The Arbitration Act 1996 and its  Effect on International Arbitration in England (unpublished 
paper 1996). See also Arbitration International 13 (4) LCIA (1997). 
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 See H Holtzman and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1989) 764-807. See also Martin 
Hunter, Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 1991) at 121. 
232
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international law where no parties are foreign, despite the express ant-discrimination provisions, 
in the Act. The English municipal courts take into account one party’s location outside England 
in granting orders for security in the context of arbitration-related litigation, even where the 
foreign party is found to have adequate assets and neither party has any link to England other 
than the decision to arbitrate in London. The extent and scope of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement should be determined by the tribunal, not the courts, as this impedes party autonomy. 
In addition,  direct access to local courts during the initial stages of arbitration deprives English 
law of the benefits to be gained from doctrine and practice developed at the international level 
where experienced arbitrators have devised solutions to jurisdictional challenges that differ 
considerably in nature from those encountered by the English courts. This means, however, that 
there is a quagmire faced by litigants, as Thomas comments: “The challenge of maintaining the 
position of the city as a leading international financial centre is a real one; what role the legal 
system plays is difficulty for lawyers to assess, but it is not insignificant.”235 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the historical development of the legal frame work for arbitration from 
1889 to the current Arbitration Act 1996.  The chapter examined the evolution of arbitral powers 
to grant provisional measures. It discussed the connotations of politics and jealousy surrounding 
arbitration and how the municipal courts dominated arbitral proceedings. The chapter 
investigated and analysed the legal framework, and addressed the question as to what extent the 
courts’ jurisdiction in the granting of provisional measures shifted to arbitration competence. The 
chapter identified some of the problems and suggested solutions to issues that have not been 
resolved by the Arbitration Act 1996; one of them was to preclude the courts in arbitral 
proceedings, which is now manifested in the Arbitration Act 1996.  Accordingly, the 1996 Act 
provides only  one general power exercisable  by the tribunal in granting provisional measures 
under section 39 (1), which provides that: 
“ the parties are free to agree that the tribunal shall have the power to order on 
provisional basis any relief which it would have the power to grant in a final award. 
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In addition, section 39 (2) provides only two measures a tribunal can as shown below: 
(a) A provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property as between 
the parties, or 
(b) An order to make an interim payment on account for costs of the arbitration. 
 It is expressly provided that the arbitral tribunal's power in granting provisional measures is 
limited, even if the tribunal  use section 48 in trying to give remedies,  under section 48 (3)-(4). It 
is not expressed in the enactment that section 48 was to allow the tribunal to order all provisional 
measures. The restriction for  an arbitral tribunal to order only two particular types of measures 
seems out of date in comparison with the scope of the interim orders that can be granted by 
courts and even arbitral tribunals themselves according to the amendments made to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law
236
 (originally adopted in 1985) in 2006.The lack of clarity and limited 
scope of arbitral power under the 1996 Arbitration calls for some reform in order to broaden that 
scope, in order to avoid the problem of earlier enactments with regard to arbitration competence 
to grant provisional measures. 
The Arbitration Act is too restrictive, being limited to only England and Wales, and should be 
modernised to meet the demands of commerce internationally, especially in relation to issues of 
the granting and enforcement of provisional measures.  The doctrine of party autonomy should 
be protected and all procedures with regard to the competence of arbitral proceedings and 
arbitration agreements should be left to the tribunal, since the parties chose arbitration in order to 
avoid the complexities of litigation and also to maintain the status quo. Since it was adopted on 
the recommendation of the DAC committee which was to adopt the Model Law, it would of 
great impetus of the current registration mirrored the Model  Law Article 5, which provides that 
no court “shall” intervene in arbitral proceedings. In order to meet the demands of justice, the 
Convention on Human Rights needs to be addressed in a new reform in arbitration, so that ex 
parte orders  are not seen as a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights. 
                                                 
236
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial  Arbitration, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law ( Interactive),1985,2006, <http://www.unitral.org/pdf/English/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-
86998_Ebook.pdf>, accessed 13 January 2010. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 Arbitrators’ powers (The concept of party autonomy) 
3.1 Introduction 
International commercial arbitration is primarily based upon the parties’ consent and not 
surprisingly the arbitration agreement is considered by leading commentators to be the 
foundation stone of international arbitration.
237
This feature reinforces the contractual basis of 
arbitration and is reflected in the vast majority of international conventions,
238
 national laws and 
institutional laws; therefore, party autonomy
239
 is considered one of the most relevant principles 
in international arbitration.
240
 
Party autonomy rule is based on the assumption that the parties to an arbitration agreement are 
knowledgeable and informed,
241
 and that they use the doctrine responsibly.
242
 As a matter of 
general principle, the expression “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” is a frequent 
occurrence in many arbitral enactments, conventions or arbitral rules,
243
 that gives parties a great 
degree of autonomy, universally, as an acceptable principle.
244
  The doctrine of party autonomy 
at times can be implied,
245
 where disputes arise. Where there are no explicit powers (default 
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powers) given to the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures,
246
 it is submitted that such 
measures be granted on the basis of the implicit powers. This is common where the arbitral 
tribunal operates within a territorial boundary of which is marked by “lexarbitri”. It can be stated 
that arbitrators are generally empowered to grant provisional measures, as many laws of states 
provide this competence.
247
 Implied powers are relied on mainly by a small number of arbitral 
tribunals in the international commercial arena.
248
  It should be noted that such powers receive 
some criticism,
249
 since implied powers are seen as a common law concept, and that lack of 
statutory foundation infringes the principle of legality.
250
However, such criticisms appear to be 
baseless, on the ground that when the parties confer authority to the tribunal to adjudicate 
disputes or interpret
251
 the arbitration agreement, the tribunal has extensive authority under the 
party autonomy principle “voluntpartiumfacit”. 
This principle derives from the concept that the intent of the parties shall be respected and 
enforceable,
252
 all arbitration,
253
 party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the 
procedure to be followed in any international commercial arbitration; indeed,
254
 it sets a platform 
for the tribunal to grant provisional measures in most cases.
255
 The lawyers acting on behalf of 
the parties exercise the rule of party autonomy.
256
 The authority of the arbitration tribunal rests 
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on the agreement between the parties executed in accordance with the law.
257
 Such agreement 
can take two forms: one that submits to arbitration (for already existing disputes) and the one that 
covers disputes that may arise in the future. The former is traditionally called a “Compromis” 
and the latter a “clause compromissoire”.258 The parties may agree  to arbitrate because they 
have a common interest in finding a relatively speedy, less adversarial and less public policy way 
of solving disputes. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to adduce or establish that the party autonomy is considered 
to be the pillar of the arbitration system, in granting provisional measures.
259
 Arbitration is a 
consensual process based on the principle of party autonomy,
260
 whereby it owes its existence to 
the parties, and the tribunal can only grant provisional measures that the parties have referred to 
it.
261
It is a truism of arbitration law that arbitration is a creature of party choice.
262
 
 Actually, party autonomy is based on the law of contract; in other words, the parties to the 
arbitration agreement
263
 are free to choose the applicable law,
264
 the law governing arbitration, 
the place of arbitration (lex arbitri),
265
 the law of the substance,
266
the composition of the 
tribunal,
267
 and the arbitrability of a dispute.
268
 
                                                 
257
 See Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
1999) at 247, where they state that “party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the procedure to be 
followed in international commercial arbitration. It is also a principle that has been endorsed not only in national 
laws but also by international institutions and organisations. The legislative history of the Model Law shows that the 
principle was adopted without opposition.” 
258
 See TiborVarady, John Barcelo and Arthur Von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational 
Perspective  (2
nd
edn, Thomas West 1998) at 84. 
259
 See EAA s.30 (1). 
260
 See Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356. 
261
 See Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3
rd
edn,  Sweet and Maxwell 
1999) at  247. 
262
 See Jonathan Blackman and EstiTambay, Class Action Arbitration Opinions Focus on Party Autonomy(2013) 
The New York Law Journal, <http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/pubArticleNy.jsp?id+120615607575>accessed 
21 August 2013.  
263
 See Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books 1994) 30. 
264
See Union of India v McDonnell Douglas Corp [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 48.See also UNCITRAL Model Law 
Article 19; New York Convention, Article V (1) (d); EAA 1996 S.15 (1),16 (1), 103 (2) (e); UNCITRAL Article 18 
and Chukwumerije above, 78. 
265
The law of the place of arbitration. An English Judge defined “lexarbitri” as a body of rules which sets standards 
external to the arbitration agreement, and the wishes of the parties, for the conduct of the arbitration. 
266
 See Model Law, Article 28 (1). See also Chukwumerije, 108; UNCITRAL Rules, Article 35 (1); Redfern and 
Hunter,  para 3.98. 
267
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The doctrine of party autonomy in England in the general sense started to develop in the 
nineteenth century,
269
 and was later adopted in the USA in the American case of First Options,
270
 
where the Supreme Court held that arbitration should be the place to settle disputes and to 
provide all remedies, due to the party autonomy principle. Party autonomy emanates from the 
ethos in which commercial arbitration systems developed and became established.
271
 In the 
author’s view, party autonomy is the bible of the whole process of arbitration; therefore, it 
should be respected by all the parties to arbitration.
272
However, with all its advantages, this 
autonomy is subject to some limitations, which this thesis will discuss. 
The arbitral tribunal can only grant provisional measures subject to the principle of party 
autonomy. Indeed, the power of the tribunal to grant provisional measures is closely related to 
the question of jurisdiction to grant any provisional measures sought by the party to 
arbitration.
273
 International commercial arbitration is primarily based upon the parties’ consent 
and not surprisingly the arbitration agreement is considered by leading commentators as the 
foundation stone of international arbitration.
274
 This feature reinforces the contractual basis of 
arbitration as mentioned in the vast majority of international conventions, national laws and 
institutional rules.  Therefore, party autonomy is considered to be one of the most relevant 
principles in international commercial arbitration.
275
 It should also be emphasised that the 
arbitral tribunals also depend not only on  the parties’ consent but also on the legal system that 
legitimates their authority and limits their jurisdictional power.
276
 The proposition of conferring 
unlimited powers on the arbitral tribunal may not be attractive as some control is needed so as to 
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ensure that parties are not left without remedies should the arbitrators abuse the powers conferred 
on them. On the other hand, arbitrators should  be as free as possible to grant provisional 
measures, without fear of being challenged by a party who may delay the proceedings where he 
realises that he has a weak case, so that the tribunal can sufficiently and effectively carry out its 
task.
277
 This chapter aims to promote a conception under which the parties’ consent if the 
guiding element in arbitral proceedings and therefore, limitations imposed by the law should be 
interpreted restrictively and taking into account the actual circumstances of the case.
278
 
 This chapter will address the question as to what extent the doctrine of party autonomy can 
determine the (jurisdiction) power of the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures. 
In addressing the above set question this chapter is divided into the following sections: 
Firstly, this chapter will discuss the source of jurisdiction and powers of the arbitral tribunal to 
grant provisional measures, stating with case law, which provides grounds for party autonomy as 
the main source of arbitral power. In addition, relevant provisions of the English Arbitration Act 
1996, international arbitral rules and conventions (for example, the New York Convention), 
comments of some academic scholars in the field of arbitration and advanced theories will be 
discussed in support of this doctrine. 
Secondly, the chapter examines the advantages of party autonomy to arbitral proceedings. 
Thirdly, the chapter examines limitations to party autonomy in international arbitration 
procedures with regard to provisional measures. 
Fourthly, the author aims to provide recommendations in regard to the doctrine of party 
autonomy in order to highlight arbitral proceedings as the best mechanism in settling commercial 
disputes. 
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3.2 The sources enabling the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures 
As briefly pointed above, the consent to arbitrate is a pre-requisite of any international arbitral 
proceedings,
279
 which is primarily based on the principle of party autonomy.
280
 Accordingly the 
arbitration agreement is the main source of the jurisdiction and the power of the arbitral 
tribunal.
281
 The parties may agree to limit the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to certain 
subject matters, and in the same way they are free to choose to arbitrate instead of having 
recourse to the national courts.
282
 However, they can only submit the dispute issues that are not 
central to public policy and that are arbitrable (in other words, capable of being resolved by 
arbitration).
283
  Since the arbitration agreement is the main source of the jurisdiction and power 
of the tribunal, it is of great importance that arbitrators respect the limits of such agreement. 
There is no clear explicitly expressed provision in the current EAA 1996,
284
 or in international 
law and conventions on arbitration, that defines party autonomy. The definition has become a 
matter of theory rather than practice. However, scholars in the field of arbitration like Professor 
René David have defined party autonomy as: 
“ a device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two or more 
persons is entrusted to one or more other persons  the arbitrators or arbitrators  who 
derive their power  from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a State,  and 
who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such agreement.”285 
In similar vein Albert Jan van den Berg defines party autonomy as: 
“the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties by a third party person who 
derives his powers from the agreement of the parties, and whose decision is binding upon 
them.” 
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In addition,  Redfern and Hunter, who respect the doctrine of party autonomy, define it in the 
following terms: 
“It is a principle that has been endorsed not only in national laws but also by international 
arbitral institutions and organisations.”286 
Tweeddale & Tweeddale assert that: 
“ the autonomy of the arbitration agreement is considered as being one of the 
cornerstones of the UNCITRAL Model Law.”287 
One of the problems in English jurisprudence or arbitral proceedings is the lack of a clear 
definition of this term “party autonomy”. In order to avoid ambiguity in the application of this 
doctrine it is essential for the Arbitration Act 1996 to provide clarity on this. The author also 
recommends that international conventions like the Model Law, the New York Convention or the 
LCIA should adopt a clear procedure, in order to harmonise arbitration jurisdiction with regard 
to provisional measures. It may however, be argued that it was in order to provide a wide scope 
for party autonomy that the legislators did not limit its scope and application to arbitral disputes 
or provisional measures. 
3.2.1 Case law and party autonomy 
 Case law supports the notion that party autonomy is the cardinal element of arbitration,
288
 and 
that the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant provisional measures due to the arbitration 
agreement or clauses in the agreement.
289
 The doctrine of party autonomy was first brought to 
attention by municipal courts in American jurisdiction, in the famous case of McCreary Tire 
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&Rubber Co v CEAT SPA,
290
 where a dispute arose which related to a breach of the exclusive 
distribution agreement subject to the arbitration agreement, between McCreary, a Pennsylvanian 
corporation, and CEAT, an Italian Corporation, under the ICC Rules in Brussels (Belgium). 
McCreary attempted to frustrate the arbitration agreement and initiated a suit. The Court of 
Appeal for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia was called to rule on the compatibility of the pre- 
trial attachment (interim measures) under the New York Convention.
291
 The Court referred the 
parties to arbitration rather than stay the trial of the action. The court in support of party 
autonomy saw that allowing a stay would bypass the agreed-upon method of settling disputes 
and such a bypass is prohibited by the New York Convention, if one party to the agreement 
objects to it. Further, the court held that the New York Convention forbids the Courts of the 
contracting states from entering a suit which violates an agreement to arbitrate.
292
 The Court of 
Appeal provided that the obvious purpose of the enactment was to permit the removal of all 
cases falling within the terms of the treaty, in order to prevent the vagaries of state law from 
impeding its full implementation. Permitting a continued resort to foreign attachment in breach 
of the agreement was held to be inconsistent with the purpose.  
The ruling was better developed in England by the House of Lords in the famous Channel 
Tunnel case, where Lord Mustill critically analysed the doctrine of party autonomy in depth.
293
 
The main issues in the case were an agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration for 
settlement.  The employer, the Channel Tunnel Group, contracted both French and English 
contractors who formed a consortium to build the tunnel between England and France, and by a  
later variation, to construct a cooling system. The contract provided for initial reference of 
disputes or differences, including disputes, to a panel of experts, and contained an arbitration 
clause providing for final settlement by ICC,
294
and arbitration in Brussels under clause 67 (1).
295
 
Later a dispute arose as to the amounts payable  in respect of the work on the cooling system, 
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and by letter the defendants (contractor) threatened to suspend that work alleging that the 
claimants  were in breach of contract. The contractors commenced proceedings in court under s 
37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981; however the claimants sought an injunction under party 
autonomy and the arbitration agreement. The defendants’ court proceedings were halted and a 
stay was granted in order to maintain the doctrine of party autonomy. 
Mustill LJ, in examining the principle of party autonomy and the arbitration agreement, made a 
reference to Black Clawson International Ltd,
296
and said that this should be deemed a 
submission  to arbitration, within the meaning of the Arbitration Act 1950. Mustill at para 453 
said 
“The only factor apparently pointing towards English law is the reference to the 
Arbitration Act 1950. Common sense suggests this provision cannot have been intended 
to apply the whole of the Arbitration Act 1950 as an arbitration which was from the 
outset designed to take abroad. For otherwise, the arbitrators would have been obliged to 
state a special case from Zurich arbitration to the English Court; and the latter court 
would have had the power to set aside or remit the award, and to make an interlocutory 
order for discovery, security for costs, interim preservation and so on, whilst at the same 
time recognise the absurdity of their choosing their English curial law for arbitration 
abroad.”297 
Indeed Mustill LJ was at the point in Channel Tunnel reciting the submission of the Counsel, 
was considering the power of the parties in settling any disputes that arise, and that courts should 
not intervene unless the arbitration is null and void. His argument was supported by Stoughton 
LJ who suggested that: 
“The validity of an arbitration agreement is governed by the law which the parties have 
chosen, and if none, by the law of the place where any award is made; … that arbitral 
procedure is governed by the law which the parties have chosen…….” 
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Kerr LJ said in para 120 that: 
“There is equally no reason in theory which precludes parties to agree that arbitration 
shall be held at a place or in country X. The limits and implications of such an agreement 
have been much discussed in the literature, but apart from the decision in the instant case 
there appears to be no reported case where it has happened. This is not surprisingly when 
one considers the complexities and inconveniences which such an agreement would 
involve. Thus, at any rate under the  English law, which rests upon the territorial limited 
jurisdiction of our courts, an agreement to arbitrate for X subject to English procedural 
law would not empower our courts to exercise jurisdiction over the arbitration in X.” 
Indeed this quotation above precludes or limits intervention by the courts in arbitral proceedings, 
where the parties have submitted their disputes to arbitration; in other words, the tribunal has the 
privilege of granting provisional measures with wide discretion, where the parties have provided 
autonomy. This quotation was further advanced in Mustill and Boyd,
298
as follows: 
“The English court would be highly unlikely to assume jurisdiction to intervene in the 
reference or to set aside or remit the award. Any attempt to exercise powers to appoint or 
to give ancillary relief, such as orders for inspection of property, would in fact present 
formidable difficulties of enforcement. Moreover the prospect of two courts exercising 
supervisory power over the same reference to the same time would appear 
unacceptable.”299 
LJ Evans, one of the judges on the appeal, also advanced his judgment in support of party 
autonomy as the main source of the arbitral tribunal in any arbitral proceedings including interim 
or provisional measures, where he said that: 
“a party to an arbitration clause was not entitled to disregard that arbitration procedure 
and bring an action at law merely because a preliminary step had not been taken; that to 
the panel there had not been a decision by or even a reference to the panel, there was a 
dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, which could 
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be referred to arbitration, since it could be shown, readily and beyond doubt, that the 
defendant had no right to suspend.”300 
The quotation above illustrates that if any party to an arbitration agreement commences any legal 
proceedings in municipal courts against any other party to the arbitration agreement in respect of 
any matter agreed to be referred, any party to proceedings may at any time after appearance, and 
before delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to 
stay proceedings. The court has to be satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed,
301
in order to grant any provisional measures; for 
example, an interlocutory or any other injunction, under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 
1981. It should be emphasised that section 37 of the Supreme Court Act should not be exercised 
where the parties have agreed to arbitrate. 
The Channel Tunnel ruling in support of party autonomy has been advanced in the recent ruling 
by Kagan J of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, 
where the respondent (Sutter, a paediatrician), provided medical services to the 
claimant/petitioner (Oxford Health Plans)_under a fee-for-services contract that required binding 
arbitration for contractual disputes. Several years later, Sutter filed a suit against Oxford in New 
Jersey Superior Court on behalf of himself and a proposed class of other New Jersey Physicians 
under contract with Oxford. The complaint alleged that Oxford had failed to make full and 
prompt payment to the doctors, in violation of their agreement and various state laws. The 
question was whether Oxford had exceeded their powers under the Federal Arbitration Act under 
s 9. Oxford moved to compel arbitration over Sutter’s claims, relying on the clause in the 
contract which provided that: 
“No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this agreement shall be instituted 
before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration 
in New Jersey, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one 
arbitrator.”302 
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The court in support of the doctrine of party autonomy granted Oxford’s motion, thus referring 
the suit to arbitration.  Kagan LJ reasoned that the clause sent to arbitration “the same universal 
class of disputes” that it barred the parties from bringing “as civil actions in court: the intent of 
the clause was to vest in the arbitration process everything that is prohibited from the court 
process.”303 
Under USA jurisdiction,
304
 it has been adduced in many cases that the courts are willing and will 
not allow any suit against arbitration agreement.  Under AAA section10 (a) (4), a person seeking 
provisional measures from the court bears a heavy burden, just showing that an arbitrator made 
an error or even serious error, because the parties bargained for arbitration construction of their 
agreement, and an arbitration decision stands regardless of the court’s view of its merits.305 
3.2.2 Party autonomy under international arbitral rules and conventions 
The doctrine of party autonomy is given the utmost respect internationally under many arbitral 
rules and conventions. Given that England is a centre for international arbitration it is important 
to consider the most prominent arbitral rules and conventions, as will be discussed below. 
The LCIA Rules provide that: 
“The tribunal shall have the jurisdiction to rule on its jurisdiction including any objection 
to the initial or continuing existence, validity or effectiveness of the arbitration 
agreement.”306 
Furthermore, the LCIA rules similarly state that: 
“The arbitral tribunal shall have the power, unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
in writing, on the application of any party: 
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(c) To order on a provisional basis, subject to final determination in an award, any 
relief which the Arbitral Tribunal would have the power to grant in an award, 
including a provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of 
property as between parties.”307 
The New York Convention provides that: 
“The court of a contracting state, when seized of an action in a matter in respect 
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, 
shall at the request of one of the parties refer the parties to arbitration unless it 
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
formed. ”308 
 
 UNCITRAL Rules states that the tribunal may at a party’s request grant provisional 
measures.
309
In addition, in 2006, UNCITRAL decided to broaden Article 17 of the Model Law 
to read: 
“(1) unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may at the request of a 
party grant interim measures. 
(2) An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an 
award or in any form, by which, any time prior to the issuance of the award by 
which, at any time prior to issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally 
decided, the tribunal orders to a party to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
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(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute.” 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16 (1) sets out that: 
 “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the 
contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.” 
Aron Broches has commented in respect of this provision under the Model Law: 
 
“Separability of the arbitration clause is intended to have the effect that if an arbitrator 
who has been validly appointed and who stays within the limits of the jurisdiction 
conferred upon him by the arbitration clause concluded that the contract in which the 
arbitration clause is contained is invalid, he does not thereby lose his jurisdiction.”310 
 
Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is identical to Article 17 except for the absence of any 
reference to the agreement of the parties. Assuming the parties have not reached a contrary 
agreement, the arbitrator’s powers are extensive, covering all forms of property, including 
vessels and even shares. It should be noted that Article 17 in the 2006 version of changes to the 
Model Law has introduced a preliminary order procedure which allows for ex parte orders as one 
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request alongside interim measures, thereby essentially directing the respondent not to frustrate 
the purpose of the interim measures.
311
 
Article 28 of the Model Law provides that: 
“The arbitral tribunal shall decide the disputes in accordance with such rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the 
law or legal system of a given state shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as 
directly referring to the substantive law of that state and not to its conflict of laws rules.” 
The Model Law in relation to party autonomy is supported by many countries; for example, the 
Hong Kong Ordinance, section 2 GB provides for arbitrators to have similar broad powers in 
domestic arbitration. The American Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitral tribunal has the 
power to take whatever interim measure
312
 it deems necessary, including injunctive relief.
313
  In 
France an arbitrator has the same power to arrange his own procedure any agreement by the 
parties. This establishes a ground for the tribunal to grant any provisional measures.
314
Swedish 
arbitral laws are subject to the principle of party autonomy as they provide that: 
“Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the parties may, at the request of a party, 
decide that, during the proceedings, the opposing party may undertake a certain interim 
measure to secure the claim which is to be adjudicated by the parties. The arbitrators may 
prescribe that the party requesting the interim measure must provide reasonable security 
for the damage which may be incurred by the opposing party as a result of the interim 
measure.”315 
 The quotations above clearly show that the doctrine of party autonomy is the main source for the 
arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures or to settle any disputes in any arbitral 
proceedings. The tribunal only grants provisional measures with respect to parties’ agreement, 
when a dispute arises, and when there is clear evidence that if that provisional measure is not 
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granted there is a substantial risk to the victim. It should be noted that in some cases the tribunal 
may decide to grant measures irrespective of the parties’ agreement. 
 
The ICC Rules (2012 version) give the arbitral tribunal wide discretion in ordering interim 
measures: 
“Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted 
to it, the tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any interim measure it 
deems appropriate. The arbitral tribunal may make the granting of any such 
measure subject to appropriate security being furnished by the requesting party. 
Any such measure shall take the form of an order, giving reasons, or an award, as 
the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate.”316 
Article 6 (1) of the ICC Rules provides that: 
“ where the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under the Rules, they 
shall be deemed to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules in effect on the date of 
commencement of the arbitration, unless they have agreed to submit to the Rules 
in effect on the date of their arbitration agreement.” 
Furthermore, in terms similar to those adopted into the UNCITRAL rules, the ICC Rules 
provide that: 
“unless otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal shall not cease to have jurisdiction 
by reason of any allegation that the contract is non-existent or null and void, 
provided that the arbitral tribunal upholds the validity of the arbitration 
agreement.
317
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The ICDR Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
318
 give the arbitral tribunal a 
broad discretion to take whatever interim measures it deems necessary, “including the injunctive 
relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property”.  This is manifested in the 
Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA), where the tribunal is 
entitled to make an order to: 
“Maintain the status quo or restore the status quo pending the determination of the 
dispute; … take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, current or imminent harm .. [and] preserve evidence that may be relevant and 
material to the resolution of the dispute.” 
It should be noted that international arbitral rules and conventions and arbitral enactments are in 
support of party autonomy as the main source for granting provisional measures.  It should 
however, be noted that in England, the power of the tribunal under party autonomy provided 
under section 39 of the EAA 1996,
319
 is limited. Although section 39 limits the autonomy of the 
parties, section 30 of the Act provides unlimited powers for the tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. 
This means that the English tribunal may use section 39 to grant provisional measures, subject to 
limitation of draconian freezing orders and anti-suit injunctions.
320
 
3.2.3 Theories advanced in support  of the doctrine of party autonomy 
Party autonomy establishes a contract between the disputing parties to an arbitration agreement. 
Since arbitration is a bilateral contract, one party to the arbitration agreement makes an offer 
with the legal intention to be bound (upon acceptance)by the other party. Upon acceptance of this 
offer to arbitrate existing or future disputes, the agreement to arbitrate comes into 
existence.
321
An arbitration agreement is owned by the parties just as a ship is owned by the ship 
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owners, in command of the captain (arbitrator), and subject to dismissal by the parties 
(disputants).
322
 
Theories have been developed in support of the doctrine of party autonomy to adduce that the 
powers of the tribunal to grant provisional measures result from the parties ‘acquiescence  or the 
result of the will of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement; namely, contractual  
and jurisdictional theories.
323
 
3.2.3.1 Contractual theory 
The proponents of the contractual theory argue that party autonomy, as evidenced in the arbitral 
agreement, is the essence of arbitration.
324
 Party autonomy is force of the 
arbitration
325
agreement, which has no state authorisation.
326
 Since the arbitration agreement is 
created through the will and consent of people,
327
 it provides authority to the arbitral tribunal to 
grant provisional measures.  According to the contractual theory, an arbitrator is an agent of both 
parties, and therefore what is done by him has to be regarded as the will expressed by the 
parties.
328
 The contractual theory is rooted in the arbitration agreement between the disputing 
parties and that the arbitrator draws his power from the same agreement and not from the public 
authority. The contractual theory basically provides that the state has nothing to do with arbitral 
proceedings conducted in its territory, since the formation of the tribunal and procedures is all 
done in accordance with the arbitral agreement between the disputing parties.
329
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It may be argued that parties exchange promises with the legal intention to be bound to the 
performance of those promises.
330
 Thus, parties to arbitration perform under a contractual 
obligation that emanates from the principle of party autonomy. The whole arbitration process 
commences with the existence of the arbitration agreement, which confirms the contractual 
nature to arbitrate future disputes.
331
 The disputing parties owe a duty of care to comply with the 
arbitral tribunal’s decisions.  The relationship between the parties is based on contract, and on 
the formation of this contract, cases relevant to provisional measures from various jurisdictions 
are concluded. The theory is based on the promise that it is the parties that decide to have their 
disputes resolved by arbitration, since arbitration is created by the will of the parties and they 
voluntarily agree to submit their disputes to arbitration. 
The contractual theory is supported by many writers; for example, Francis Kellor said that: 
“Arbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The contract of which the arbitration clause 
is a part is a voluntary agreement. No law requires the parties to make such contract, nor 
does it give one party power to impose it on another. When such agreement is made part 
of the principal contract, the parties voluntarily forego established rights in favour of 
what they deem to be the greater advantage of arbitration.”332 
Lord Diplock in BremerVulkan v South India stated that: 
“The arbitration constitutes a self-contained contract collateral or ancillary to the 
ship building agreement itself.”333 
Fourchard, Gillard and Goldman express the view that: 
 “A contract does necessarily exist between the parties and the arbitrators; the 
 contract is bi-lateral and creates rights and obligations for both the arbitrators and 
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the parties. However, where arbitration is administered by an arbitral institution, the 
contractual relationship becomes triangular. ”334 
 
Mustill and Boyd take a contrary view. They argue that: 
“To proceed by finding a contract and then applying to it the ordinary principles of the 
law of contract will not produce a reliable answer unless a contract really exists to be 
found. Even in the case of a massive reference, employing a professional arbitrator for 
substantial remuneration, we doubt whether a businessman would, if he stopped to think, 
concede that he was making a contract when appointing the arbitrator. Such appointment 
is not like appointing an accountant or lawyer. Indeed it is not like anything else at all. 
We hope that the courts will recognise this, and will not try to force the relationship 
between the arbitrator and the party into an uncongenial theoretical framework, but will 
proceed directly to a consideration of what rights and duties ought, in the public interest, 
to be regarded as attaching to the status of arbitrator. ”335 
The English Courts, however, appear to disagree with Mustill and Boyd’s view. In at least two 
cases,
336
 it has been found that the arbitrators become parties to the arbitration agreement itself. 
In Compagnie Europeene de Cerelas SA,Hobhouse J observed as follows: 
“It is the arbitration contract that arbitrators become parties to by accepting appointments 
under it. All parties to the arbitration are as matter of contract (subject as always to the 
various statutory provisions) bound by the terms of the arbitration contract.
337
 
Further Merlin and Felix assert that: 
“[The] arbitrator upon accepting appointment becomes an agent of the disputing parties. 
The disputing parties as principals authorize the arbitrator to make provisional measures 
as a measure of settling disputes, since the interim measures contribute to the final award 
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in arbitral proceedings. Such provisional measures are executed by the courts not as 
judgements but as an unexecuted contract between the disputing parties. The tribunal 
only decides what the parties could have done by the agreement; (the parties) give the 
tribunal a real mandate to decide in their place. The award is thus impregnated with 
contractual character, and according to the law, it appears to be the work of the parties it 
must have, like all agreements, lawful effect and must possess the authority of granting 
interim measures.” 
The role of the courts should be only to enforce the obligation in the arbitration agreement and 
supplement the parties’ agreement and to provide a code of regulating the conduct of arbitration. 
However, national laws and courts in some cases regulate arbitral proceedings, and this conflicts 
with the party autonomy doctrine. Two well-known cases demonstrate the attitude of the 
courts,
338
 in regard to party autonomy as the main source of arbitral power to grant provisional 
measures.
339
 It may be argued that the contract theory is rooted in the arbitration agreement 
between the disputing parties and that the arbitrator draws his power from the same arbitration 
agreement and not from the public authority. Basically the state has nothing to do with the 
arbitral proceedings conducted in its territory, since the formation of the arbitral agreement or 
proceedings is all made in accordance with party autonomy. 
Although the contractual theory is a cornerstone of arbitral power to grant provisional measures, 
in arbitral proceedings it is, however, subject to criticisms. First, the maximum freedom of 
contract is doubted even if it is accepted that the existence of arbitration is derived from the 
expressed intentions of the parties.
340
 This principle of freedom that exists in most legal systems 
is restricted by states, as pointed out by Atiyah: 
“Even before the acknowledgement of the perpetual economic warfare, limitations 
existed, and although merchants had been left to trade substantially free from economic 
regulations, that were only if they acted within the general protective framework of 
national legislation.” 
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From Atiyah's analysis, the author argues that the maximum scope of freedom of contract, in 
accordance to the contractual theory is therefore not clear and practical.  Professor David 
explains that: 
The reason why arbitration is considered as institution of the law of contract is probably 
not that such a view is regarded as having a sounder theoretical foundation, but that it is 
considered more likely to further the development of the practice of arbitration. If 
arbitration is classified within the domain of law of contract, then it is thought that the 
parties will enjoy a maximum freedom in the matter. Whether such a consequence 
actually occurs in the contractual thesis is not however clear.
341
 
 It is further submitted that an arbitrator is not an agent as the contractual theory states. The duty 
of an arbitrator, like that of a judge, is to give the parties a fair hearing and render a decision 
which may or may not be against both the parties. Conversely, an agent is bound to his principal. 
The agent, of course is prohibited from being a judge in his own cause, therefore he cannot 
empower his agent to do the same. Besides, an arbitrator is immune from liability to the parties’ 
with respect to defaults committed by him in his capacity as arbitrator.
342
 An agent, on the other 
hand, may be liable as principal for any default committed by him.
343
 
  The author argues that the above criticisms against the contractual theory in support of party 
autonomy need some critical analysis. The practicability of   an arbitral tribunal is like that of a 
judge, since the arbitrator acts impartially in arbitral proceedings, a principle that any national 
court practises. The role of the arbitrator in a practical context is similar to that of an agent 
whereby he performs his duties under the doctrine of party autonomy which manifests the 
intentions of the parties.  For the appointment of an arbitrator to be valid and binding on the 
respondent in a contract, a notional agency has to be implied into the relationship between the 
parties as it affects the appointment of the arbitrator. By the time the disputing parties conclude 
the arbitration agreement, each party to the arbitration agreement gives the other party a fictional 
power of attorney, or the other party agrees to the other party acting as its agent, for the purposes 
of appointing an arbitrator. The main purpose of this power of attorney or imputing of a notional 
                                                 
341
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342
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agency is to enable the arbitral tribunal to solve disputes or grant provisional measures to 
enhance the arbitral proceedings.  It should be noted that in concluding an arbitral agreement,
344
 
each party agrees to perform it in their own interest and in the interest of the other party to the 
agreement, which manifests the party autonomy as the major source of arbitral jurisdiction to 
grant interim measures. 
Further, the contractual theory represents the legal nature of the relationship between the 
disputing parties and the arbitrators.
345
 The obligation and rights of the disputing parties and the 
arbitrators arise out of this contract between them. Any provisional measures granted by the 
arbitral tribunal are within the contractual obligation. The parties undertake to accept the 
arbitrators’ awards having a contractual nature. The parties under the contractual theory agree to 
be bound by such awards, as Niboyet argues: 
Arbitration awards have a contractual nature, as the arbitrators do not hold their 
power from the law or judicial authorities but from the parties’ agreement. The 
award is thus impregnated with a contractual character and according to the law, it 
appears to be the work of the parties,[so] it must have, as with all agreements, 
lawful effect, and it must possess the authority of a final judgement.
346
 
Since the disputing parties delegate the power to grant interim measures to the tribunal under the 
terms of the arbitral agreement, and such terms cannot be derogated from without the consent of 
the parties, there is a duty of compliance with the decisions of the arbitral tribunal in a bona fide 
cooperation.
347
 
3.2.3.2 Jurisdictional theory 
In 1965,Rubellin-Devichi formulated the judicial theory.  Courts in most jurisdictions were still 
hostile to arbitration and fewer subject matters where held to be arbitral, while institution 
arbitration was beginning to spread. There was no clear demarcation between the arbitral tribunal 
                                                 
344
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and the judicial courts.
348
 The jurisdictional theory highlights the dominance and control 
exercised by the sovereign state in regulating any arbitral proceedings conducted within its 
territorial jurisdiction through national laws.
349
 The main theme of this theory is derived from the 
idea that every state is entitled to control any activities which take place within its territory, and 
that every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a 
system of municipal law.
350
 
Jurisdictional theory is based on the premise that the arbitrator performs a judicial function as an 
alternative (through private) judge as permitted under national law or international convention 
(which the state has implemented) of the particular sovereign state. It thus emphasizes the fact 
international arbitration references cannot take place in a territorial vacuum, without the 
permission of the state, and must therefore be subject to the law of a particular state. This 
permission of the sovereign state covers matters such as the disputing parties to opt for 
arbitration over an arbitral subject matter and the procedure phase of the arbitral reference. 
It has been argued that party autonomy according to this doctrine is derived from the state not the 
parties to the arbitral agreement. Hence the power is not similar but they almost perform the 
same function, thus the granting of provisional measures by the arbitral tribunal is impliedly or 
expressly provided by the state, since an award in the form of a provisional measure is 
comparable to the judgement rendered by the state in that it is not self-executing and if not 
voluntarily performed. The winning party has the authority to apply to the state for enforcement 
in the same way as an ordinary court judgement.
351
 
 It should be noted that some writers, like Hong Lin Yu, argue that jurisdictional theory just 
regulates the arbitral proceedings, which commence due to the will of the parties or to party 
autonomy. Hong Lin Yu, summarised the proposition of the jurisdictional theory as follows: 
Although the jurisdictional theory does not dispute the idea that the arbitration has its 
origin in the parties’ arbitration agreement, it maintains that the validity of the arbitration 
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agreement and arbitral procedures need to be regulated by national laws and the validity 
of an arbitral award is decided by the laws of the seat and the country where recognition 
and enforcement is sought.
352
 
According to Hong’s comments on the jurisdictional theory, one may argue that arbitral 
provisional measures are supported by the state where the seat of arbitration is set; and supported 
by the parties’ freedom. In the modern practice of international arbitration, the issue of state 
control under jurisdictional theory, works in hand with conventions and bilateral treaties ratified 
and implemented, for example the Geneva protocol provides that; 
“That arbitral procedure, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be 
governed by the will of the parties and the law of the country in whose territory the 
arbitration takes place. 
Although jurisdictional theory is well accepted by many states, it still has some shortcomings. 
The argument that the arbitral tribunal has the power like that of the judge is not true, since the 
arbitrator has the power to modify the arbitration agreement between the parties,
353
 while a judge 
just applies the law and enforces the agreement. The reason why the arbitrator has such power is 
because of the party autonomy which is the main characteristic feature of arbitration 
proceedings. Hence the arbitrator’s duty is to respect the freedom of the parties, by doing what 
the parties stipulate, rather than what is stipulated by government regulation. 
Secondly, the provisional measure rendered is a provisional remedy by nature; it has no 
similarity to a court judgement. It is internationally recognised that national law is important in 
arbitration, where the parties seek assistance. The tribunal seeks support from the national courts 
where it lacks capacity; for example, to force third parties to give evidence in arbitral 
proceedings or the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures.  The courts’ control is fettered, 
in order to see the effectiveness of arbitral proceedings.   
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The Model Law liberalises the party autonomy doctrine as the major source of arbitral 
proceedings, not the state.
354
 Hence it may be argued that jurisdictional theory is just a 
mechanism of assistance of party autonomy doctrine which sets the pivotal platform for any 
provisional measure in commercial proceedings.
355
 It should further be pointed out that the 
jurisdictional theory, which provides that arbitrators rely on the  law of the enforcing state, fails 
to account for the recent developments in commercial  arbitration and the need to free arbitration 
from the shackles of the state and the grip of the judiciary. Since arbitration enactments, 
conventions and rules are international, there is a general consensus for loosening the grip of the 
state on arbitral proceedings. Indeed this was the main aim of the championing of the English 
Arbitration Act, in order to limit or to allow arbitral tribunals to rule on their jurisdiction on the 
basis of the party autonomy principle.
356
 
Redfern and Hunter rightly conclude that international commercial arbitration is a hybrid, 
explaining that it begins as a private agreement between parties, and continues by way of private 
proceeding, in which the wishes of the parties are of great importance. Yet, as they point out,  it 
ends with an award which has a binding legal effect, which, on an appropriate condition being 
met, the courts of most countries of the world will be prepared to recognise and enforce.
357
 This 
approach gives a clear picture of the legal nature of arbitration and is appropriate for current 
practice in international commercial arbitration. With respect to the parties involved in 
arbitration, they still have the right to exercise their freedom as to what is in their best interest, 
and states do not feel that an arbitration is out of control as they still have the power to have the 
last word. The effectiveness of this theory depends on how the state strikes a balance between 
the state’s power to control and the autonomy of the parties.358 
3.2.3.3 The theory of Competence-Competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) 
The theory of competence-competence is taken from Germany legal terminology,
359
and means, 
according to the Federal Court of Germany, that parties to an arbitration agreement (party 
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autonomy) may vest the arbitrators
360
 with the power to rule in a binding way on the issues of 
their jurisdiction.
361
 The essential features of the theory of competence-competence can be stated 
as follows: the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its jurisdiction
362
 and to rule and decide 
on its competence.
363
 The demands of convenience in arbitral proceedings are satisfied,
364
and the 
requirements of logic are asserted.
365
 In order for the tribunal to grant provisional measures, 
under this theory, the tribunal has to prove that there is a rebuttable presumption that such 
jurisdiction was conferred by the will of the parties
366
 (party autonomy) when they entered into 
an arbitration agreement.
367
There is a broad international consensus that arbitral tribunals have 
the competence to consider disputes concerning their own jurisdiction,
368
 and exercise such 
competence to make provisional measures or awards.
369
 As a practical matter,
370
 tribunals 
routinely propose and make decisions concerning jurisdictional matters; for example, the 
granting of provisional measures.
371
 Since the arbitration agreement is not impeached in these 
circumstances,
372
 and because the arbitrators are only considering the merits of the parties’ 
underlying contract, they are in the best position to grant provisional measures.
373
Indeed, when 
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parties do explicitly incorporate an arbitration clause, in order to empower the arbitral tribunal to 
decide on issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of 
the parties’ intention to delegate such issues to the arbitral tribunal. 
According to the theory of competence-competence the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant 
provisional measures within its competence to do so.
374
 Under this theory the tribunal has the 
power to decide on its own jurisdiction without having to refer the question to the national courts 
375
when a party challenges the jurisdiction,
376
 on the basis that arbitrators are the judges in their 
own jurisdiction and have the right to rule on their own competence.
377
Therefore, if the validity 
of the agreement is valid, it is not proportionate to impeach arbitral jurisdictional powers, since 
party autonomy ousts the court’s jurisdiction.378 
 Arbitrators are endowed with powers to decide on their jurisdiction,
379
and thus if the parties 
agree that the tribunal may deal with provisional measures in the same manner as with other 
legal matters arising in arbitration, then the courts will respect the contract and party autonomy 
of the parties,
380
 provided that the arbitral tribunal exercises such powers in good faith. Indeed, if 
such is implemented, the interests of the parties are safeguarded.  Since the arbitral tribunal can 
rule on any arbitral matter,
381
 it is clear that it grants any provisional measures sought by the 
parties to the arbitral agreement in order to meet the realities of party autonomy.
382
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Allowing arbitral tribunals to rule on their jurisdiction is a clear manifestation that the arbitrators 
can also provide provisional measures in their jurisdiction.
383
This allows greater efficiency in 
that it prevents parties from evading their arbitral obligations by simply making frivolous 
challenges on the jurisdiction of the tribunal and thereby delaying the arbitral proceedings.
384
The 
competence-competence theory is widely recognised and supported as one of the theories that 
supports party autonomy as the main source of arbitral proceedings. Any doubt concerning the 
jurisdiction depends on the interpretation of the parties’ agreement385 which provides the tribunal 
to settle disputes.
386
 It should be noted that the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant final 
awards, which is more powerful that that related to provisional measures, thus the granting of 
provisional measures in arbitral proceedings due to party autonomy is not a matter of contention. 
Any prevailing issues which deny party autonomy under the competence-competence theory 
might have an adverse effect on arbitral proceedings by opening the doors to delaying tactics and 
obstruction, and thus undermining the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, failure by the tribunal 
to grant provisional measures will be a contractual breach of an arbitration agreement and an 
impediment to international commercial disputes. The competence-competence theory is an 
implied term in arbitration agreement.  For instance, by applying the officious bystander test, 
parties submit to arbitration in order to exclude any other dispute settlement mechanism, hence a 
failure will provide a loophole for the parties to repudiate their obligation.
387
 
  It should be noted that although international conventions,
388
 national legislations,
389
 and rules 
explicitly or implicitly recognise and give effect to the competence-competence doctrine, the 
New York convention does not deal with it, and nothing in the text of that convention either 
expressly requires or forbids application of the principle of competence-competence, or 
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addresses the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under this doctrine. It should however, 
be noted that despite the absence of express language on competence, the New York Convention 
provides that arbitrators have competence to rule on their jurisdiction,
390
 and this has been taken 
into account by UNCITRAL
391
 and the Model Law.  While allowing the arbitrators to rule on 
their jurisdiction by virtue of the competence doctrine, most national laws recognise that 
arbitrators  are not the sole judges of their jurisdiction: any decision given by the tribunal as to its 
jurisdiction is subject to review by the courts. Hence the courts may be asked at both pre-award 
and post pre-award stages to deal with questions relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitration 
tribunal.
392
 
3.2.3.4 Doctrine of separability and provisional measures 
The principle of separability treats the arbitration clause as an autonomous
393
 agreement that 
survives the invalidity or termination of the underlying contract,
394
 and requires argument in 
jurisdiction challenges to be addressed to facts of law relevant only to the validity of the 
clause.
395
 This principle allows the tribunal to render a valid award even if the underlying 
contract is invalid.
396
 As the tribunal has the power to grant final awards which are more 
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powerful than court decisions,
397
 the granting of provisional measures in arbitral proceedings is 
not a matter of contention.
398
Thus the characteristics of an arbitration agreement are in one sense 
independent of the underlying contract and an arbitral agreement has the character of a separate 
agreement.
399
 The doctrine of separability is now part of the universal consensus
400
among 
arbitration practitioners and most legal systems
401
 of the world as well as international 
conventions or arbitral rules.
402
 
The separability doctrine has been referred to under common law jurisdiction as meaning where 
the arbitral clause is “severable” from the parties’ related contract.403 This is in contrast to civil 
states, which have often referred to the autonomy or independence of the arbitral clause, 
arguably reflecting a greater degree of separation between the arbitration agreement and the 
parties underlying contract. It may be argued that the term “separability” directs attention to the 
central role of the parties’ intentions, as a contractual matter, in forming a separate arbitration 
agreement. 
404
 
The separability principle affects the relationship between the arbitration clause and the 
underlying contract. Born describes this doctrine as having central significance in the granting of 
provisional measures in international commercial arbitration.
405
  The author argues that the 
arbitration clause  does provide the tribunal with the power to grant interim measures in a bid to 
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comply with the party autonomy principle
406
 where the subject matter of the substantive contract 
is illegal (thus making the contract void) under the relevant states.
407
 The separability doctrine 
can only be denied where the party who signed the arbitration agreement lacked the capacity to 
contract, and then clearly this incapacity affects the arbitration agreement contained therein.
408
 
The separability doctrine is a contractual obligation, whereby the granting of provisional 
measures is one of the terms of the contractual obligation under the arbitration agreement. The 
author submits that, in this respect, theoretical consistency is compromised in order to 
accommodate party autonomy. 
3.2.4 Advantages of party autonomy 
England and many modern other states have amended or drastically revised their arbitral laws in 
order to make their venues the best place for commercial disputes. The main element in this 
development is the role played by party autonomy, a doctrine which has made arbitration more 
attractive. It is a tool needed in international commerce to create a practical mechanism to settle 
disputes.
409
 
An initial step, and one of the most vital in any arbitration, is the choice of appointment of the 
arbitrators who are to resolve the dispute.  Parties are free to choose the persons whom they think 
are most suitable for their case. They can therefore choose either a lawyer or a non-lawyer, such 
as a businessperson to decide their rights and obligations. In addition,  they also have the 
freedom to choose the number of arbitrators. The parties determine the method of appointment, 
whether an arbitrator or institutional arbitration. If they select the former, they usually agree 
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upon a set of rules designed to govern the essential parts of the proceedings. On the other hand, 
they may agree to arbitration under the auspices of an arbitration institution, such as the ICC. In 
this case, they must incorporate the rules of such an institution into the agreement. Whatever the 
parties choose, therefore, the arbitrator shall respect and follow the same. 
 Under the principle of party autonomy, the parties are free to choose the place of the arbitration. 
They can choose it in advance or even after the dispute has already risen. In practice, it is the 
norm to choose a neutral forum for the arbitration, and there are two factors that parties take into 
account in choosing a neutral authority: the geographical location and the legal environment. The 
choice of the place of arbitration is related to the psychological state of the parties. It is always 
unpleasant for a party to travel to their opponents’ country to plead their case. The parties prefer 
to choose a neutral place for their arbitration. The location plays an important role in generating 
trust.  The parties are more confident that no one will have an advantage over them in a neutral 
place of arbitration. Indeed, the party autonomy doctrine is certainly most in evidence when the 
arbitration is settled by documents only and when its concerned with legal issues. That is when 
the matter is virtually to be decided by experts without the intervention of any lawyer. In fact, 
this offers a degree of psychological satisfaction to the parties that they may have chosen the best 
arbitrators, the form and forum of arbitration and the governing law. Party autonomy is at its 
fullest when the parties determine the forum and regime of institutional arbitration. This provides 
confidence that the arbitration will proceed according to their aspirations, although the nature of 
the proceedings in reality is not very different from that of municipal court proceedings. 
Party autonomy reduces the court’s interference.  However, although parties to an arbitration 
agreement aim to avoid the jurisdiction of the national courts, this does not mean that arbitration 
operates exclusively from state courts. Accordingly, the state courts still tend to play a significant 
role in the arbitral process, and to a large extent, the effectiveness of arbitration depends on the 
role played by the court. Since arbitral tribunal lacks coercive powers, they do not have the 
power to order third parties to participate in the proceedings, or even to enforce any award made 
by them. The court enforces the arbitration agreement by denying any party to litigate a dispute 
they agreed to resolve by arbitration.  With regard to provisional measures,
410
the courts  assist by 
invoking measures which allow the attachment of assets or disposal of the subject matter of the 
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action pending final determination.   The party autonomy doctrine offers parties confidence that 
it is their arbitration and that it will be conducted in accordance with their plans, although there 
are limits to this expectation. The principle also allows parties to abandon arbitration at any 
stage, whether because of a challenge to the arbitrator as a result of contesting the arbitral 
proceedings or because of a compromise reached by the parties.
411
 
3.2.5 Limitations of party autonomy 
Although the party autonomy principle accepts the view that parties are free to determine the 
proceedings, nevertheless, the freedom of the parties to agree on the rules of procedure is subject 
to necessary precaution in the interests of the fairness and equilibrium of the arbitration process.   
The DAC Report states that “the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are solved, 
subject only to such safeguards as necessary in the public interest.” Even though the parties can 
contract out of most of the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 under the principle of party 
autonomy, the mandatory provisions place limits on such freedom. As a result, the public interest 
and mandatory rules of the Act under s 4 (b) are the edge on the party autonomy principle under 
English law.  
There is a potential conflict between the tribunal and the courts,
412
 under the party autonomy 
doctrine. A situation could arise where parties have agreed a procedure, but then find it 
unsuitable. This raises a conflict between the mandatory powers of the tribunal under s 31 (b) of 
the Act and the power of the parties under section 33 (1). This may even be escalated by sections 
40 (1) and (2) (a), which provide that parties, must comply with orders given by the tribunal. As 
arbitration is a consensual process, party autonomy should prevail where there is conflict 
between the parties and the arbitrators, and this argument is supported by the DAC.
413
  It is worth  
considering  how a tribunal might or should react in a situation in which the parties have agreed 
on a procedure that the tribunal sees as a breach of its duty under section 33 (1).  If the parties 
have agreed before appointing the tribunal, the arbitrators should write to the parties expressing 
reservations about the procedure. If on the other hand the procedure is agreed after appointment 
of the tribunal, the tribunal may resign and the parties may have to pay the fees and expenses of 
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the arbitral tribunal.  Moreover, the tribunal may refuse to follow the procedure agreed by the 
parties, who may then seek to remove the arbitrators.
414
 In practice this is unlikely to succeed,
415
 
and parties will not strive to claim breach of duty in order to challenge the arbitral orders.
416
 
Since section 33 (1) is mandatory, any procedure to be adopted by the tribunal which falls short 
of the principles set out
417
 is void. 
 The party autonomy assumes that the parties to arbitration have the autonomy to conduct their 
proceedings in the manner they prefer.  This is not the case, however, where a claim is time-
barred under the arbitration agreement: the claimant is required to seek the court’s permission to 
extend the time for commencing arbitral proceedings, and Limitation Act.  In addition, for the 
revocation of the arbitrator’s authority, whereby the parties are free to agree to the circumstances 
in which an arbitrator’s authority may be revoked, the removal of an arbitrator can only take 
place under a court order; in other words, in the latter situation, the party autonomy rule does not 
apply.  The tribunal is also expected to comply with institutional regimes or rules, in so far as 
rule of procedure and evidential matters are concerned.  It is up to the tribunal to decide, subject 
matter of course, to the right of the parties to agree on any matter.  The phrase “the right of the 
parties” does not relate to the party autonomy rule. It is simply an opportunity offered to the 
parties to exercise their options, based on convenience, legal or otherwise. When an issue is 
referred to the court, the court has the power to take action as they deem fit in the circumstances 
of the case.  
 The Arbitration Act provides duties to the parties and tribunal. The Arbitration Act 1996 
requires the tribunal to act fairly and impartially between the parties, and give each party a 
reasonable opportunity to present the case.  In addition, the Act requires the tribunal to adopt the 
procedure appropriate to the circumstances of each individual case, and avoid unnecessary delay 
and expense in the resolution of the dispute.  It should be emphasised that the Act refers to a 
party having a “reasonable opportunity” to present their case instead of a “full opportunity” as 
referred to in some jurisdictions. The word “reasonable” is possibly chosen deliberately to 
                                                 
414
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415
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underline the approach of the legislation. It should be noted that the English law has not followed 
the Model Law on authorisation of the tribunal under party autonomy to decide “exaequoet 
bono” or as “amiable compositeur.”  
Party autonomy is further limited on the grounds for removing an arbitrator.  It is worth noting 
that a party to the arbitration who is aware of some irregularity during the arbitration proceeding 
will lose the right to challenge any subject matter.  The Act also provides that the arbitrator has 
immunity from anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of their 
functions as arbitrator, unless proven to be in bad faith. Robert Merkin comments that the 
widely-drawn immunity clause in the Act provides flexibility and freedom to the arbitrator in 
handling disputes. The Act undermines the party autonomy when it excludes liability of the 
arbitrator for any failings in the discharge of its functions or a failure to comply with the 
arbitration agreement of party autonomy. 
Party autonomy is limited under English law, as follows: the parties shall do things necessary for 
the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitral proceedings. This includes: complying without 
delay with any determination of the tribunal as to procedural or evidential matters, or with any 
order or direction of the tribunal. The Arbitration Act 1996, provides that the tribunal may seek 
assistance where appropriate without delay on question of jurisdiction and law. Indeed this 
adduces that that party autonomy is too regulated in arbitral proceedings.   
With regard to arbitration procedure, it is clearly evidential that the doctrine of party autonomy 
as the cornerstone is regulated. The Arbitration Act 1996 provides that, unless agreed otherwise, 
the arbitral tribunal has the freedom to decide on procedural and evidential matters on 
arbitration.   The test must be whether the adoption of inquisitorial powers is conducive to the 
economic, expeditious and fair resolution of the dispute before the tribunal.  The freedom of 
party autonomy is subject to limitation, under the above-mentionedsection33, which states that 
arbitrators must be fair and impartial and must give each party a reasonable opportunity to 
present theircase. Otherwise it would prima facie constitute a serious irregularity and be subject 
to challenge. This means that courts have to determine such challenges, where the tribunal and 
party autonomy cannot handle the situation, since the Act provides for minimum interference by 
the national courts.  The fact that parties choose arbitration under party autonomy rather than 
choosing the courts to solve their disputes must be respected. Although the English Arbitration 
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Act 1996 was enacted to end the historical hostility of court intervention in arbitral proceedings 
and to respect the principle of party autonomy, the wording of the Act shows there is still a 
reluctance to remove court powers in relation to arbitral proceedings, and it seems to be more 
conservative than the Model Law. For instance, the Model Law provides that “no court shall 
intervene”.  Further, the procedural rules are not governed by the 1996Act itself but by the 
English procedural rules (Civil Procedure Rules 1998 - CPR).  This makes the arbitration under 
the Act somehow more complicated. It would be better to have one Act that handles arbitral 
proceedings. 
 Another important limitation is the choice of law by the parties. The parties’ freedom to agree 
on the arbitration regime of their choice and to choose the procedure to be followed is subject to 
some limitations.  There are situations where it may be appropriate for the tribunal to select and 
apply a different law from that chosen by the parties. The effect of national mandatory rules is 
complicated. Mandatory rules limit the will of the parties and must be applied to certain 
situations. National courts usually apply their mandatory laws without regard to the will of the 
parties. In the event of any conflict between the party autonomy principle and the mandatory 
rules of jurisdiction, the latter prevail. 
3.2.6 Reform of party autonomy 
Although the English Arbitration Act 1996 has improved the standard of arbitral proceedings 
internationally and made London the best venue, the author believes that there is still some need 
for reform with regard to the doctrine of party autonomy, and that such reform will enhance 
arbitral proceedings and restrict the court interventions. 
Firstly, the scope of the section that provides the tribunal with the power to make provisional 
measures under the doctrine of party autonomy is too narrow: section 39 of the Arbitration Act 
1996 provides that the tribunal can  make a provisional order for the payment of money or 
disposition of property or an interim payment on account of the costs of the arbitration. The Act 
should be amended or should adopt the French law in relation to the arbitral jurisdiction to grant 
provisional measures. The tribunal’s scope of power can be interpreted by the courts as limited. 
This may become a ground for court interference, as the Act does not expressly provide all the 
  
 89  
 
provisional measures. This therefore requires the court to provide attachment orders since the 
Act does not expressly provide for such provisional measures. 
Secondly, the Arbitration Act 1996, s 1 (b) provides that: 
“The parties should be free to agree how their disputes should be resolved, subject only 
to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.” 
The Act does not, however, expressly provide a definition of “public interest”, and in the end it 
calls in the court to monopolise the arbitral proceedings under their mischief interpretation. The 
author recommends that the English Arbitration Act should eliminate the term “public interest” 
in the arbitral proceedings, as this affects the main purpose of choosing arbitration over 
litigation.   The Arbitration Act 1996 should consider the application of the Model Law, which 
confers a broad power on the parties to agree the arbitral procedure.  It should be noted that 
under section 1 (b) of the current Arbitration Act 1996, the courts are allowed to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral provisional measure where it is against public policy. 
The author recommends the application of the New York Convention.  
At the start of the tribunal there is no established tribunal to handle the dispute. This vacuum is 
provided by the courts. The author recommends that the arbitral tribunal should be established in 
a way that from the beginning is free from court intervention.  Thus, the tribunal will be able to 
grant provisional measures in compliance with the party autonomy principle. It should, however, 
be noted that the recommendation should advocate the court’s role as a support, but not as one of 
intervention in the arbitral proceeding, since the role of the courts would then be a mechanism to 
wreck the main purpose of arbitral proceedings and the party autonomy doctrine.  The author 
therefore recommends the adoption of the Model Law, which provides independence of the 
tribunal and the arbitrators. This will limit the application of section44, which provides that: 
 the court has for the purpose of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of 
making orders about the matters listed as it has for the purposes of and in relation to legal 
proceedings. 
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The  parties should be able to draft their rules and procedures under the principle of party 
autonomy. The Act does not, however, make any express provisions for the parties to draft their 
terms and procedure in regard to their party autonomy. It is at times difficult to maintain the two 
legal systems, as they have procedural differences between the methods of proceedings. When 
judgements under court the new Civil Procedure Rules and arbitral proceedings under the 1996 
Act are to be attained by documents only, then both of them become less time and money 
consuming. It is pertinent to point out that this rule proves an alternative to the parties to 
arbitration, though in reality it is not the parties who participate but their lawyers. 
The author further recommends that parties, when drafting  an arbitration agreement, should seek 
professional advice from experienced and knowledgeable experts in the forum’s law or that of 
any enforcing state concerning any limitations to party autonomy, particularly that of public 
policy. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the doctrine of party autonomy as the main source of jurisdiction for the 
tribunal.  If one imagines international arbitral proceedings as a drama, the doctrine of party 
autonomy is the director of this drama. Normally, it is the director who chooses the actors, the 
scenarios and the other elements of the drama. Similarly, in the context of party autonomy, the 
parties can choose the applicable laws and the conduct of the arbitration process such as 
determining the composition of the arbitral tribunal, as well as the language and place of 
arbitration. In other words, this principle determines all the essential elements of the arbitration. 
Thus the party autonomy doctrine is the fundamental source or principle of arbitral proceedings. 
However, this chapter has demonstrated a further anomaly in English law, concerning the 
distinction between the powers of the tribunals and the parties. This creates a bizarre, especially 
when the parties are not willing to accept with the arbitrators. 
The chapter demonstrated that arbitration owes its reputation to the principle of party autonomy, 
since the principle involves the granting of provisional measures. The principle promotes 
flexibility, since parties do not want their disputes to be through procedural formalities of 
litigation. Under the party autonomy doctrine, parties have the power to exclude the municipal 
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courts. It should, however, be noted that although parties under party autonomy can agree on 
everything about arbitration, nevertheless, in some circumstances, the choice of the parties does 
not make any sense without the support and supervision of the municipal courts. The author 
argues that the courts should not intervene in arbitral proceedings at any time, in order to comply 
with the Model Law,
418
 which states that “in all matters governed by this law, no court shall 
intervene except where so provided in this law.” 
The chapter examined the main rules – international arbitral rules, conventions, and arbitral 
enactments – and theories advanced in support of party autonomy. Furthermore, the chapter 
examined the advantages and shortcomings of the doctrine of party autonomy. The author does 
not support the public policy limitation to the doctrine of party autonomy, since an arbitral 
tribunal can refuse to grant any provisional measure or enforce it, during arbitral proceedings. 
For example: in an ICC case in Switzerland, an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland denied that 
a claim for punitive damages was contrary to Swiss law. In addition,  if the parties confer powers 
on the tribunal which are against the public policy of the seat of arbitration, these powers are not 
capable of being performed by the arbitrators.
419
It should, however, be noted that given the 
nature of commerce, which involves many contracts, it  would  not be proportionate for third 
parties to the arbitration agreement to be denied their right under the party autonomy doctrine.  
The most important consideration should be that arbitration is contractual in nature which has 
party autonomy at its centre. What the Judiciary and indeed the Arbitration Act 1996 should aim 
to achieve is a system that is internationally acceptable and this means final awards would only 
be paramount if provisional measures were given legal effect. At the moment the law is still 
ambiguous with regard to provisional measures under the party autonomy doctrine. 
The parties cannot agree on anything that can affect the third parties directly.
420
 For instance, a 
tribunal cannot compel third parties to attend a hearing as a witness, even if the parties to the 
contract have conferred such power to the tribunal; hence assistance is sought from the municipal 
courts. The courts’ role should only be restricted for the benefit of the arbitral proceedings and 
not as a jurisdiction to intervene; this can be demonstrated by an American case, Mitsubishi v 
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Soler Chrysler Plymouth,
421
 where the United States Supreme Court allowed a dispute 
concerning a supposed violation of anti-trust laws to be settled by the arbitration tribunal. 
Reverting to jurisdiction and party autonomy doctrine, it is pertinent to point that this rule proves 
to be an alternative to parties going to arbitration, but in reality parties delegate their right to their 
appointed lawyers, and this goes against the sanctity of the doctrine of party autonomy, 
particularly when it is considered from the standpoint of how it originated.  It may be argued that 
in reality the lawyers’ autonomy rule has replaced the party autonomy rule, and this 
transformation is disturbing. It should however, be noted that party autonomy plays a vital role in 
the granting of provisional measures. Like any other doctrine or mechanism for settling disputes, 
party autonomy has some shortcomings, but these should not be used as an excuse to undermine 
its effectiveness as the main source of conferring jurisdiction on the tribunal to grant provisional 
measures.  Any prevailing issues that denying the effectiveness of arbitral tribunal or party 
autonomy might have adverse effects, and hence open the doors to delaying tactics and 
obstruction, thus undermining the arbitration agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
421
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
4 Conditions &procedures for the granting of arbitral provisional measures 
4.1 Introduction 
The arbitral tribunal should be the best forum for seeking provisional measures, given the fact 
that it derives its authority from the arbitration agreement (party autonomy).  However, there are 
stringent conditions for the arbitral tribunal to use its powers to grant provisional measures.   
These strict conditions are more examined than litigation cases, hence they establish the arbitral 
jurisdiction as the best dispute mechanism for arbitral proceedings.
422
 Under arbitral 
proceedings, for a tribunal to have the power to grant provisional measures, it has first to 
ascertain whether it has been given such power by the parties to make an order on provisional 
relief. Indeed, after the tribunal has been constituted, it then sets the prerequisites or standards 
and procedures for granting provisional measures.
423
 This approach of determining the standards 
and procedures facilitates the predictability and consistency of arbitral proceedings; and hence 
makes arbitral proceedings more effective and efficient.
424
 The main objective of such standards 
and procedures, as mentioned earlier, is generally to preserve the status quo, facilitate 
enforcement of future or present awards and to facilitate arbitral proceedings.
425
 
Although many enactments and rules are silent on the issue of arbitral standards and procedures 
for the grant of provisional measures,
426
 arbitrators have or are given broad powers and a wide 
scope of discretion in establishing arbitral principles.
427
 It should further be noted that there is 
little precedent in international commercial arbitration and that each case is judged on its 
merits.
428
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Contemporary litigation and arbitration in developed legal systems is accompanied by procedural 
safeguards and the opportunities for all parties to be heard. One inevitable consequence of these 
procedures is delay in the ultimate resolution of the parties’ disputes, and in turn, this delay can 
prejudice one party, sometimes causing irreparable harm; for example, the dissipation of assets, 
destruction of evidence, loss of market value and  interference with customer relations. These 
sorts of damage can be exacerbated where one party deliberately seeks to create delays in dispute 
procedures in order to exert pressure on its adversary. Given the foregoing, arbitral tribunals with 
help of the courts have developed standards and procedures for granting immediate provisional 
measures in order to safeguard parties from serious injuries that would cause delays in the 
arbitration process.
429
 Thus, unless the arbitral tribunal sets procedures or standards for the 
granting of provisional measures its objective of  providing final relief may be lost and 
meaningless, and the parties may suffer considerable damage or unnecessary costs.  
In determining the standards, it is incumbent upon the arbitral tribunal to take into account the 
temporary nature of provisional measures. The standards need to be pragmatic in order to suit the 
practical needs of arbitral proceedings in international commerce. The tribunal looks at case law, 
arbitral rules, and awards, and at times makes a comparative appraisal of international arbitral 
rules and conducts an analysis of arbitral awards and case law as  a yardstick for determining the  
procedures and standards for provisional measures. The irony with regard to international 
comparative analysis is the nature of arbitral awards, which are confidential; hence access to 
some court records is impeded, in relation to providing examples and references on this point. 
 The thesis in this chapter addresses the question as to whether the arbitral tribunal has the 
authority to determine arbitral procedures and standards in order to grant provisional measures.  
In addressing the above question, the chapter will be divided into five sections, dealing with the 
following points: 
Firstly, the authority of the tribunal to determine the standards and procedures; secondly, the 
negative conditions for granting provisional measures,; thirdly, the positive requirements; 
fourthly, the advantages of provisional measures; and fifthly, the relationship between the courts 
and the arbitral tribunal in granting provisional measures. 
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4.2 Authority to  determine procedures and conditions by tribunal 
 
  The English Arbitration Act1996 provides that  
“it shall be for the tribunal to decide procedural and evidential matters, subject to the 
right of the parties to agree to any matter.”430 
The above section adduces that in all arbitral proceedings the tribunal applies relatively 
straightforward procedures to request provisional measures. This has been advanced in the case 
of Mobil Oil Indonesia Inc v Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd,
431
 where the Supreme Court held that: 
“it is for the arbitral tribunal to set the standards for provisional measures as parties 
intend to refer to the rules.”  
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model Law confirms the authority of the tribunal to set conditions 
as to when a measure is to be granted.
432
  Preliminarily, the procedures applied by an arbitral 
tribunal will be determined, or at least heavily influenced, by contractual obligations agreed by 
the parties to the arbitration agreement.
433
 In certain circumstances, parties may agree that 
provisional measures or injunctive relief orders may be granted upon the claimant making certain 
showings.
434
This is common to intellectual property contracts, which often contain provisions 
expressly authorising provisional measures.
435
It should further be noted that arbitral institutions 
have not provided clear meaningful standards for the granting of interim relief.
436
 Most 
institutions provide that an arbitral tribunal may grant such provisional relief as it “deems 
necessary or appropriate”.437 
 The author argues that such formulations confirm the wide powers or broad authority to grant 
provisional measures, but do not establish the standards or procedures for when that actual 
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authority should be recognised. The arbitral tribunal is left with power to apply legal standards 
when granting any provisional measure.
438
 It should further be noted that most institutions 
dealing with arbitral provisional measures in the commercial context consider the following as 
the agreed standards, namely: (1) serious or irreparable harm to the claimant; (2) urgency of the 
matter;
439
(3) no prejudgement of the merits; while some arbitral tribunals also require the 
claimant to adduce a prima facie case on the merits.  
The author further argues that the lack of clarity in relation to standards for granting provisional 
measures was left to the arbitral tribunal to resolve, because it was not ease to foresee the types 
of solutions that might be required.  A clear set of standards would impede party autonomy as the 
tribunal would not be able to adapt to the prevailing commercial circumstances, since commerce 
changes according to economic trends of supply and demand. 
In granting any provisional measure, the arbitral tribunal can in principle take guidance from 
arbitral case law, and the comparative analysis of arbitral conventions and rules. The 
examination of both academic views and arbitral institutions demonstrates that there are general 
requirements, both positive and negative, that the arbitral tribunal needs to take into 
consideration before granting a provisional measure. The tribunal will not deny any party who 
requests a provisional measure, because a refusal will potentially infringe the party’s rights 
(party autonomy).
440
 
In practice, an arbitral tribunal will consider the nature of the provisional measure that are 
requested and the relative injury to be suffered by each party, in deciding whether to grant a 
measure or not.  Provisional measures, for example; preserving status quo or performance of a 
contract, the claimant need to prove or to show urgency, harm and prima facie case, however, 
provisional measures  for example; preservation of evidence, confidentiality, security for costs  
do not require the same showings.
441
  It may be argued that such lacunae provides the arbitral 
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tribunal to grant provisional measures under the probability principle or greater likelihood or the 
material risk or harm if the measure is not granted. 
 
4.3 Negative requirements of granting arbitral provisional measures 
The negative requirements are requirements that are provided by the tribunal: where firstly, the 
tribunal does not need to examine the success or the merit of the case. Secondly, the tribunal may 
not grant or refrain from granting such a measure in the form of a provisional measure. Thirdly, 
the tribunal under negative requirements may refuse to grant any measure sought by the party 
where there is evidence that such order may not be complied with by a party. Fourthly, the 
tribunal may not grant the measure where it is clear that the order will not prevent the harm 
suffered by the party seeking the order. Fifthly, the order may not be granted where it is found to 
be too remote in regard to the case in question, or moot. Lastly, as the doctrine of equity provides 
that whoever comes to the court must come with clean hands, the tribunal will not grant any 
measures where there is some ambiguity, that is to say fraud or duress, theft or misrepresentation 
by a party. 
4.3.1 The request should not necessitate examination of merits of the case 
 Where there is clear evidence that the merits of the case require examination, the arbitral 
tribunal may  refrain or not refrain from issuing the interim relief requested by the claimant. This 
applies on the condition that there is no prejudice to the outcome of the case in question. The 
tribunal has to take the substance of a case in dispute for the establishment of a prima facie 
jurisdiction.
442
 
The arbitral tribunal is to see that justice prevails but not to promote any infringement of parties’ 
rights;
443
 as infringement breaches the arbitral doctrine of impartiality.
444
Provisional measures 
must not prejudge the merits of the parties’ underlying dispute.445 However,  it is not precisely 
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clear what this requirement means: for instance, does it argue against the arbitral tribunal making 
a decision that may prejudice or bias its final decision on the merits, or does it argue against the 
arbitral tribunal granting the same order that is requested on the merits? The author argues that 
there is no need for any provisional measure to be subject to prejudging the merits, because 
provisional measures are subject to alteration  and revocation at any stage  in the final award, 
hence the outcome of a provisional measure should not as a technical matter prejudge or 
predetermine the final award.
446
 
There are circumstances where the arbitral tribunal has refused to grant the provisional measures 
requested, for example in the ICC case 6632, where both parties to an arbitration agreement 
applied for an order for security for costs.  However, the tribunal declined the application, 
stating: 
The arbitral tribunal considers that, in the present stage of its information, it cannot, 
without pre-judging the issues relating to the merits of the case, determine whether the 
contract was validly terminated or not and whether the property was legally or illegally 
seized by the respondent.
447
 
The arbitral tribunal when dealing with any provisional measure in relation to not prejudging the 
merits, must take care to ensure that that it does not, in considering any request, partially close its 
mind to one party’s submission or deny one party the opportunity to be heard in subsequent 
proceedings, on the grounds that the same relief sought as final relief may ordinarily be issued on 
a provisional basis. 
4.3.2 No granting of final relief 
An arbitral tribunal will not grant a decision on the merits under the guise of a provisional 
measure. This means that the tribunal will not order any provisional measure if it happens that 
                                                 
446
See Lew, Commentary of Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitration Cases, II (1) ICC Ct. Bull 23, 27 
(2000). 
447
 See Order of 199 in AAA Case No. 507181-0014299 (unpublished), where a dispute arose from a distribution 
agreement and the claimant requested from the tribunal enjoin, on an interim basis, the respondent objection to the 
preliminary injunctive relief which was that it had never been party to the agreement. The fact that this claim was 
also the essence of the respondents’ defence, the tribunal refrained from dealing with the substance of the case. ICC 
Partial award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int’ l Ct Arb Bull 65-69 (2000), the arbitral tribunal 
denied the request for interim relief as the request by the claimant implied a pre-judgement of the dispute. 
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the relief sought is not convincing.
448
 An arbitral provisional measure may not operate to grant 
the final relief sought for preserving the provisional nature of the provisional measure. This can 
be demonstrated in the case of Behring International Inc v Iranian Air Force,
449
 where the 
dispute arose out of a contract for the servicing of helicopter components owned by the 
respondents. Upon the claimant’s request for reimbursement of the storage costs for preservation 
of the goods, the Iran – US Claims Tribunal, by taking into account the fact that one of the 
claims submitted by the claimant was for storage charges, refused the request by ruling that it 
appeared that the request for the provisional measure was, in that respect, identical to one of the 
claimant’s claims on the merits. Under such circumstances, to grant this request would have 
amounted to a provisional judgment on one of the claimant’s claims. 
However, the tribunal could not convince the claimant to store the goods in a modern portion of 
the warehouse, in order to avoid any further deterioration of the goods, and it therefore held: 
“Since a transfer within the claimant’s own warehouse has not been made possible, the 
Tribunal sees no alternative to transferring the goods to a warehouse selected by the 
respondents. In the circumstances of this case, it would be impractical for this warehouse 
to be selected by and subject to the discretion of the tribunal. Certain goods may require 
special maintenance or special handling or repackaging, for which the tribunal cannot 
assume responsibility.”450 
4.3.3 The tribunal may not grant measures due to doctrine of equity 
This  is an international maximum adopted by the doctrine of equity in England that, when one 
needs justice or when one goes to any legal institution one must go with clean hands. 
451
  In this 
case, the claimant concluded a distribution contract with the respondent, whereby the respondent 
was granted the exclusive right to sell touch screen computers. The parties also signed a non-
competition clause, in which the respondent undertook not to compete. The claimant alleged that 
the respondent breached their contract, and as a consequence, terminated the contract. The 
                                                 
448
 See Interim Award ICC Case No. 8786, 11 (1) ICC Ct. Bull 81 (2000), where the arbitral tribunal rejected the 
application of an order where the defendant failed to be sufficient or convince the tribunal. See ICC Rules Article 8 
(5). 
449
 See (1985),Case No. 382, Interim Award No. ITM 46-382-3 (22 February 1985) or United Technologies Int’l v 
Iran (1986),  Case No. 114, Decision No. 53-114 (10 Dec 1986). 
450
 See Case No 382, Interim and Interlocutory Award No. ITM/ITL 52-382 (21 June 1985). 
451
 See ICC Partial Award 7972 (1997) unpublished. 
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claimant then filed a request for arbitration. The claimant also applied for an injunctive relief in 
order to stop the responding manufacturer from distributing and selling the claimant’s products. 
The arbitral tribunal considered the time essence and found out that the ground of the claim 
requested was time barred. The arbitral tribunal held that: 
“The decision whether or not to grant an injunction lies in the discretion of the tribunal 
from which it is sought or requested. Generally, a tribunal will not grant an injunction 
where it is found that the petitioner does not have clean hands.”452 
The Arbitral tribunal went on further and held that: 
“We have found that the (claimant) discovered…. manufacture and sale of (the products 
by the respondent) in 1991. The Claimant sat on this knowledge for more than two years 
before, on 28 April 1993; it invoked the (respondent) breach and sent a notice of 
termination of the distribution agreement.  In the meantime, (the claimant) actively 
sought and obtained, in May, an additional investment of $5000,000 by (the respondent) 
in the claimant’s business. In such circumstances, we determine that the claimant cannot 
now be heard to say that it is entitled to an injunction to enjoin the (respondent) 
henceforth from manufacturing, distributing and selling (the claimant’s) products.453 
4.3.4 The measure must be capable of preventing the alleged harm 
In considering when to make any provisional measure, the arbitral tribunal has to balance this 
with the objective of the measure. If that measure is not going to provide a remedy for the victim 
to the arbitration agreement there is no need for such request to be granted. 
The provisional measures are designed to safeguard, on an interim basis, the right in question; or 
in other words, to avoid any harm to that right.  Thus they should, at least on the face of it, be 
capable of serving this purpose.
454
In addition the measure requested must not be moot, for 
example in Iran v United States,
455
where the claimant requested the tribunal to prevent the public 
                                                 
452
 Ibid. 
453
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454
 See Yasril on Provisional Measures. 
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sale of nuclear fuel allegedly belonging to it. In fact the fuel had  already been sold before the 
tribunal was able to consider the case; thus the tribunal held that the request had become moot. 
4.3.5 The measure must be capable of being carried out 
 The arbitral tribunal at all times must ensure that order requested will be put into effect. This 
concern partly relates to the duty of arbitrators, according to certain arbitral rules, to take into 
account the enforceability of the award they render.
456
If, however, the arbitral tribunal does not 
consider the future of the order, there maybe a wastage of valuable time and delay of arbitral 
proceedings, where it is not likely that the order requested is capable of being carried out. For 
instance, in an ICC case,
457
 upon the revocation of the licences concerning mineral rights by the 
state H, the claimant applied for an injunction. The main objective of the application was to 
prevent the state H from making any disposition of the mineral rights in any party of the territory 
covered by the relevant licences. The arbitral tribunal never ruled on the order requested until its 
final award. The tribunal at the final award held that one of the reasons as to why it did not rule 
or make the order was because it could not have monitored any order made.
458
 
4.3.6 There must be adequate damages 
When the tribunal is considering granting any provisional measure, especially that of preserving 
the status quo, where there is a likelihood of potentially or actually prejudicing the counter 
party’s rights, in such circumstances, an arbitral tribunal should request from the applicant 
adequate security for damages. Indeed this is a common practice even in judicial courts when 
granting any provisional remedy.
459
 The main reason for requesting security for damages is to 
obtain a form of an undertaking whereby the successful moving party undertakes to indemnify 
the adversary, should the measure prove to be unjustified.
460
 The other fact is that provisional 
measures are based on a summary review of the facts and law, and such review would affect the 
prima facie establishment of the case, and most important, the outcome of the case or review 
                                                 
456
 See ICC Rules Article 35. 
457
 ICC Case 7210 of 1994, published in ii (1) ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 49-52 (2000). 
458
 See ICC Case 5835, where the tribunal, in refusing a request, took the issue of enforceability of that provisional 
measure into consideration. 
459
 See Brussels Convention Article 24, which provides that payment is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as 
regards the substance of his claim. Payment is guaranteed where security for damages is obtained see Van Uden 
Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft, Case C-391/95. (1998) ECR 1-7131 par22. See Hans Herman Mietz v 
Internship yachting SneekBv, case C-99/96, (1999) ECR 1- 2314 par 42. 
460
 ICC Interim award 5835 of 1988 published in 8 (1) ICC Int’l Ct Arb. Bull 67 (1997). 
  
 102  
 
changes at the end of the adjudication. The purpose of the security is to cover to any actual loss 
and potential damages to the adverse party. In practice there are quite a few cases where security 
for damages was dealt with.
461
 
4.3.7 An undertaking 
 An arbitral tribunal may refuse to grant a provisional measure if there is an undertaking or 
declaration in good faith by the party against whom such measure is sought that it does not 
intend to infringe the right in question. Apparently, it is within the discretion of the tribunal to 
accept the undertaking, subject to the terms of the tribunal. In deciding to accept the declaration, 
the circumstances of the case and previous actions of the arbitrating parties need to be taken into 
consideration. The arbitral tribunal has the power not to consider other requirements of granting 
any order requested.
462
 In Case 67692,
463
 a dispute arose from the agreement according to which 
the claimant was entitled to the use of the respondent’s software, which related to the prediction 
of movements in financial instruments. The claimant requested an injunction, in order to prevent 
dissemination of its technology and data by the respondent, pending the final award. The 
respondent, countering the claimant’s arguments, claimed that the claimant’s technology was not 
in possession. There was an initiative taken by the respondent or an undertaking not to use the 
technology during the course of arbitration. It was prima facie established from the outset that 
there was not sufficient likelihood that the respondent would use the technology. Indeed, the 
arbitral tribunal on the balance of probability declined the request on the grounds that it was a 
waste of time and that if it was not granted the claimant would not suffer any substantial harm. 
4.4 Positive requirements 
The positive requirement element is sometimes referred to as the necessity doctrine for the 
granting of provisional measures. Indeed the conditions set under this criteria are almost the 
same as those for the municipal courts when dealing with civil proceedings in the commercial 
arena.  
                                                 
461
 Se ICC case 7544, where the arbitral tribunal ruled that; “the tribunal is faced with the delicate task of weighing 
up the probability as whether, after the claims and counter claims have been fully argued before it, the net result will 
be in favour of the claimant. As the latter alleges, or in favour if defendant….in order to cover the risk that the final 
decision might not be consistent with the decision reached in this award….. the order to the defendant to pay the 
amount is to guarantee…….” 
462
 See ICC Case 7592. 
463
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In other words, the tribunal has to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is an imminent 
or serious danger to the applicant's right and that the tribunal needs to take urgent action to 
remedy the danger.  There are no clearly expressed positive requirements set by any law of any 
country of jurisdiction, and so the tribunals have established four conditions of granting a request 
under positive requirement, according to the merits of the case. Firstly, the tribunal has to have 
jurisdiction to rule on its jurisdiction or to hear the case, in order to grant a provisional measure. 
Secondly, there must be a prima facie case in order for such a measure to be granted. Thirdly, as 
stated above, the request needs to be one of urgency due the harm caused to the applicant. 
Fourthly, the request should be serious or there should be a substantial link and the applicant 
should have to prove the substantial prejudice element if the measure sought is not granted. 
Lastly, the degree of proportionality is crucial, given that the tribunal has to show that justice is 
being done and also to see that its uses its power perfectly in gaining legitimate justice in all 
proceedings of the case in question. 
4.4.1 Irreparable or serious harm 
The arbitral tribunals frequently require that the party seeking provisional measures should 
demonstrate that it may suffer either irreparable or serious injury
464
 unless those provisional 
measures are granted.
465
 In other words, the arbitral tribunal will only order provisional 
measures if the requesting party has substantiated the threat of not easily reparable 
prejudice.
466
 Some authorities argue that irreparable harm is required for a grant of 
provisional measure, in the case of TokiosTokeles v Ukraine,
467
 where it was held that a 
provisional measure is necessary where the actions of a party are capable of causing or 
threatening irreparable prejudice to the rights invoked.  In contrast, other authorities appear 
to require only serious or substantial harm to be shown, without requiring that the injury be 
irreparable in the literal sense.
468
 
                                                 
464
 English Arbitration Act 1996, s. 41 ( 3) (a)&(b). 
465
 See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration Vol.111981. 
466
 See ICC case No. 8786, 11 (1) ICC Ct.Bull 81, 83-84 (2000). Islamic Republic of Iran v USA, Decision No. 116-
A15 ( 18 May 1993). 
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accessed 21 Jan 2012. 
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Most commentaries and decisions gloss over the potentially substantial difference between 
the risks of irreparable and serious damage.
469
  The author argues that it is obviously 
difficulty to demonstrate truly irreparable harm that cannot be compensated by pecuniary or 
monetary damages in a final award. In practice, the irreparable harm requirement would limit 
provisional measures principally to cases where one party was effectively insolvent or where 
enforcement of a final award would be impossible. Most of the arbitral decisions which state 
that the damage must be irreparable, do not appear to apply this formula in its literal form, 
but instead require that there must be a material risk of serious damage to the claimant.  The 
arbitral tribunal in most cases will consider the extent to which the claimant will suffer 
serious injury, the extent to which it is just or fair on the victim that the burden or risk of loss 
during the arbitral proceedings, the extent to which such injury is compensable in a final 
award and the likelihood of success of each of the parties on the merits of its case, and the 
relative hardship to each of the parties if a provisional measure requested is not granted. 
 The arbitral tribunal in many cases is likely to issue provisional measures in order to protect 
or minimise damage resulting from commercial dealings, for example where there is a prima 
facie claim that appears to cause injury as a consequence of steps. For instance, the 
respondent is planning to transfer a disputed property or sell it outside the ordinary course of 
business and the respondent does not appear to suffer material harm from the granting of a 
provisional measure. The grant of such provisional measures is commercially viable as it 
makes the enforcement of the final award more simple which would otherwise be too 
difficult. This is common where intellectual property shares in a company may be frustrated 
by  the disposition of the respondent, hence disposing of the subject matter  or removing 
assets from the business whose ownership is in dispute  frustrates contractual obligation.  In 
such circumstances, arbitral tribunal are likely to consider the conduct of a party under 
balancing interests or balancing hardships in order to issue the provisional measure.
470
 
 
                                                 
469
 See With, Interim or Preventative Measures in Support of International Arbitration in Switzerland. 18 ASA 
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4.4.2 Prima facie case or probability of success on merits 
Some tribunals and commentators have held that the party requesting provisional measures 
must demonstrate a prima facie case on the merits of its claim or a probability of prevailing 
on its claim.
471
 The arbitral tribunal needs to be satisfied that the moving party has a 
reasonable probability of success in a case. In other words, the claim or request must not be 
frivolous or vexatious.
472
 
 Other commentators argue that: 
The present arbitral tribunal is not a referee jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction of the 
seized of provisional measures. The powers of the merits of  ruling provisionally are 
not limited like those of the referee judge and serious dispute does not prevent a 
broader appreciation, although on a provisional basis, of the respective arguments of 
the parties.”473 
At the same time, some commentators have refused to consider whether one party or both 
parties have stated a prima facie case, sometimes saying that this conflicts with the 
requirement that a provisional measure should not prejudge the merits of the arbitral 
tribunal’s judge.474  
In the author’s view, the arbitral tribunal should at all times consider the prima facie strength 
of the parties’ respective claims and defences, in deciding whether to grant a provisional 
measure or not. It should be noted that the prima facie case requirement does not prejudge 
the merits of the case; it is a purely provisional assessment based upon incomplete 
submissions and evidence, without preclusive effects. 
                                                 
471
 See K. Lenaerts and D. Arts, Procedural Law of the European Union, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, p. 299. 
472
UNCITRAL Article 17 A (1) (b). 
473
 See ICC Arbitral Practice, 11 (1) ICC Ct.Bull.31, 34 (2000). See D. Caron, L. Caplan& M. Pellonpaa, and The 
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appearance of pre-judgement, arbitrators are invariably reluctant to express their views on the merits before they 
have considered at least a significant amount of the evidence presented by the parties. For this reason the merits of 
the case rarely play any direct role in the determination of whether or not to grant a provisional measure requested.” 
See Yesilrmak, Interim and Conservatory Measure in ICC Arbitral Practice, 11 (1) ICC Ct. Bull 31(2000). ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary Article 47, (2000) tribunals must strike a careful balance between the urgency of a 
request for provisional measure and the need not to prejudge the merits of the case. 
  
 106  
 
Moreover, it is very important for the arbitral tribunal to assess the existence of a prima facie 
case in order to make a rational commercial decision regarding any provisional measure 
requested by any party. For example, if a claimant licensee has failed to establish a prima 
facie case of wrong termination of a licence agreement, while the respondent licensor has 
presented a comprehensive defence as to why it was contractually entitled to terminate, then 
an arbitral tribunal before granting any order should be hesitant to order the respondent 
licensor to permit the use of the licensed property and to supply updates and similar 
assistance on a provisional basis during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. In such 
cases the claimant needs to adduce an urgent risk of grave and irreparable damage in order 
for the arbitral tribunal to grant that measure requested. 
Furthermore, in circumstances where a party seeking interim relief has made a credible case, 
but has not shown stronger case of serious harm, during the arbitral tribunal proceedings, 
then consideration of the merits of the case appears both  sensible and appropriate given the 
circumstances of that very case in question. It would be better for interim measures arising 
during the arbitration proceedings to be allocated pending a final award in the arbitration that 
will determine the parties’ rights, because a failure would be irrational and unjust. This is 
because the tribunal’s final determination is not known, and any determination by the 
tribunal is partial, based on partial submission. In practice, the examination of the substance 
of a case for prima facie is commonly limited. 
475
 
4.4.3 The need for urgency 
Urgency is an essential requirement for the arbitral tribunal to grant any provisional measures 
requested by a party.
476
 The degree of necessity adduces urgency for the arbitral tribunal to act as 
a deterrent to that effect.
477
  In other words, the tribunal will be coerced to grant the provisional 
measure in order to safeguard the right in question before the final award is rendered. 
478
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In such circumstances, if the tribunal was to wait for the final award,
479
 then the commercial 
users would refrain from coming to arbitration.
480
 But it is of paramount importance that the 
tribunal needs to be persuaded that the immediate action is necessary in order to prevent 
irreparable damage to the claimant and in all circumstances there is some establishment of a 
case.
481
 However, the UNCITRAL Model Law revised in 2006 omits any reference to urgency 
for the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures. 
482
 
The urgency requirement is closely related to the serious harm requirement;
483
 just as relief prior 
to a final award is generally not ordered, save to prevent serious damage from occurring  during 
the course of the proceedings, so pre-award relief is generally not ordered until such time as it is 
necessary to prevent such serious harm from taking place.
484
 If the possibility of such damage 
remains contingent, arbitral tribunals should not intrude into the parties’ relations. However, 
under international practice, the arbitral tribunal may grant provisional measures if any of the 
requirements are satisfactory to their mandate.
485
 It should further be noted that in most cases 
urgency is not interpreted in its literally mechanical form but given a purposive scope, in order to 
take a realistic commercial view of the likelihood if such a measure is declined by the tribunal.
486
 
4.4.4 Proportionality principle 
When considering granting any provisional measure, an arbitral tribunal also has to take into 
consideration the gravity of granting a provisional measure requested by any of the parties to the 
                                                 
479
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arbitration agreement.
487
 The tribunal, when achieving its legitimate objective, has to weigh the 
decision of the outcome to the victim, if it is proportionate given all the circumstances of the 
case. In other words, the arbitral tribunal ought to take into account the effect of any interim 
measures for granting it, on the arbitration parties’ rights to a certain extent.488 It should be noted 
that the injury suffered must not be out of proportion to the advantage which the claimant hopes 
to derive.
489
 The arbitral tribunal in all cases should carefully examine the allocation of risk 
between the parties at the signing of the contract, by looking into the terms of the contract, if 
there silent by making a purposive interpretation to achieving legitimate objectives.  
4.4.5 Jurisdiction 
It is very important to note that for the arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures,
490
 it has to 
have the jurisdiction for the particular order being requested. 
491
 Some commentators argue that 
the tribunal has to establish its jurisdiction before it grants provisional measures.
492
 In most 
practical cases, the arbitral tribunal is able to issue provisional measures notwithstanding the 
existence of any jurisdictional challenge and also notwithstanding the fact that the tribunal has 
not ruled on this challenge. It is therefore important to note that the arbitral tribunal as a practical 
matter is not incapacitated from granting provisional measures which are central to a fair 
resolution of the parties’ dispute, because of jurisdictional challenge.493 
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Arbitral tribunals have not infrequently ordered provisional relief notwithstanding the existence 
of an unresolved jurisdiction challenge. One commentary states: 
The well settled position in international adjudication…[is] that an international 
tribunal may decide on provisional measures prior to establishing its jurisdiction 
over the dispute if it appears that there is a prima facie case, a basis for asserting 
such jurisdiction.
494
 
 It may be argued that in practice, where the arbitral tribunal concludes that a jurisdictional 
challenge is well grounded, and it lacks actual authority to grant provisional measures it will not 
grant any provisional relief. However, the arbitral tribunal’s provisional measures are entitled to 
the same force as its direction regarding the conduct of the arbitration. In other words, the 
arbitral tribunal will establish or will have to determine its jurisdiction in that case in question in 
order to grant provisional measures. Assuming that the general criteria for granting provisional 
measures are satisfied, the tribunal has a substantial discretion in selecting and ordering 
appropriate provisional measures.
495
As the standards of granting provisional measures continue 
to develop, therefore, the arbitral tribunal’s discretion need to be established as a legal right.496 
4.4.6 Advantages of arbitral provisional measures 
Provisional measures play a vital role in commercial proceedings; indeed, without such measures 
the whole arbitral process becomes meaningless and arbitral tribunals would be unable to come 
to final awards, and even if they did so, it would be useless to a victorious party to find that the 
assets pertaining to the proceedings have been dissipated by the respondent in another 
jurisdiction or have been sold or hidden. This would render the award unenforceable and also 
useless, and lead to additional costs in search of the hidden assets. 
                                                                                                                                                             
urgency dictated that prima facie showing of jurisdiction is sufficient at the stage that interim measures are 
requested).” 
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Given the international image of provisional measures and the support of the courts – for 
example, in England a breach of the measures can lead to contempt of court under s 37 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 –there effect has an adverse effect on the parties and also they are 
internationally recognised by arbitral rules and conventions.
497
 There are several reasons that 
support the view that provisional measures should be granted by the arbitral forum.  Parties 
submit to  arbitration to settle their problems because any kind of alternative procedures like the 
courts could wreck the agreed mechanism. The most important reason for provisional measures 
to be granted by the arbitral tribunal is utmost respect for the sanctity of the contract, the 
agreement to arbitrate. When parties choose arbitration to resolve a dispute their primary aim is 
simply to reach a resolution of whatever dispute they may have before arbitrators and to avoid 
resorting to any other forum. The forum that parties seek to avoid is a court and such aim should 
be respected.  Respecting that aim is a reflection of the principle of party autonomy. The resort to 
a court may undermine the arbitral agreement. 
 Respecting the risk allocation agreed between the contracting parties at the time the contract was 
entered into also supports arbitral jurisdiction. Indeed, the chosen arbitral forum is an important 
element in the allocation of risks between contracting parties. At the time of entering into a 
contract, a party may have the intention not to take the risk of dealing with the vagaries of the 
laws of foreign court practice.  Arbitration is a depoliticised forum that does not harbour 
potential biases towards nationals of the domestic court’s jurisdiction.  
 If the resolution of a final remedy in regard of a dispute is entrusted to arbitrators, the same trust 
should logically be shown to the arbitral domain in determining a provisional remedy concerning 
the same dispute.  Arbitrators are generally in a better position than judicial authorities to 
identify whether a request for provisional measures is being used as a dilatory tactic, or as an 
offensive or abusive weapon or whether there is a genuine need. This is because the arbitral 
tribunals are far more acquainted with the facts of the dispute than judicial authorities., as 
arbitrators follow the case from the outset to the end.  
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An interim remedy from the court aims at delaying arbitral proceedings. The application to a 
court for a provisional remedy may be used as a measure or a tactical-oppressive weapon to 
delay the arbitral tribunal proceedings. The request to the court may also distract the opponents’ 
efforts and involve finance. In many cases, the references to  courts is a tactical decision to gain 
advantage over the adversary; for example a party may apply to its own national court, which 
may be receptive of an interim measure request. The grant of the request may further impact on 
the decision of the arbitral tribunal.  Arbitrators are in a better situation than the national courts 
to determine whether a request for provisional measures is made for any tactical purposes.  
 The fact that many of the arbitrators are experts  in their area of competence suggests that they 
are the best equipped and that the arbitral tribunal is the best forum in the circumstances, to deal 
with the case in a speedier manner than judicial authorities, who have no mechanism of 
confidentiality as that attached to the arbitral tribunal. Most of the cases in courts are within the 
public domain; consequently the decisions of the courts in any provisional manner are not 
confidential. The arbitrators have the power to deny any tactical measure if they find that it will 
be in the public domain. 
 Arbitration generally, has a less disruptive effect, in comparison to litigation, on the parties’ 
overall commercial proximity.  It should be noted that appointing an arbitrator-expert gives the 
disputing parties the assurance that the arbitrator understands the technicalities involved in the 
particular transaction. It is generally acknowledged that arbitrator-experts add to the wealth of 
knowledge available to the arbitral tribunal. Hence carrying a dispute away from the arbitral 
domain for an interim measure may have an inflammatory effect on the adjudication process and 
consequently on that relationship. It should, however, be noted that in some few cases arbitration 
may be costly due to the lack of co-operation of the parties or due to the urgency of the case in 
question. However this is minimal when compared to litigation cases. 
The arbitral tribunal has no power to grant an anti-suit injunction which may lead to parallel 
proceedings. The term ‘injunction’ refers to asking a person to do or refrain from doing 
something. In broad sense, many arbitral decisions are injunctions. Experience demonstrates that 
  
 112  
 
arbitrators grant a variety of injunctions.
498
 The English courts have traditionally exercised the 
power to enjoin foreign litigation which is brought in violation of an arbitration agreement.
499
 
 
Under English law, injunctions may ordinarily be granted against the prosecution of foreign 
litigation if it is established that the forum has sufficient interest in or connection with the matter 
in question.
500
  Many English decisions have affirmed the existence of this power in emphatic 
terms.
501
 The fact the mechanism of anti-suit injunction originates from common law systems in 
no way means that the disruption of the arbitration process is an ambush. Despite the many 
debates, the English powers to issue an anti-suit injunction as a provisional measure has not 
diminished.
502
 The notion is that in issuing such an injunction, arbitrators are making use of the 
powers exclusively vested in them by national courts.
503
 
 
 This echoes past debates over the power of the arbitrators to award punitive damages. Such 
power is rooted in well recognized principles of international arbitration law, namely the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrators to sanction all breaches of the arbitration agreement and the 
arbitrators’ power to grant any appropriate measure either to avoid aggravation of the dispute or 
to ensure the effectiveness of their future award. In some cases in which both statutory 
provisions were applied (s 37 of the 1981 Arbitration Act and s 44 of the 1996 Act) were applied 
in order to grant a freezing order, it appears that s 44(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 was applied 
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 See West tankers v Allianz [UKHL] 4, Emmanuel Gaillard, The Misuse of Anti-suit Injunction, New York 
Journal August 2002 
503
  See  UNCITRAL Article 17,  further the Report of Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work 
of its forty-third session (Vienna 3-7 October 2005),  which recognised the arbitrators’ power to issue an anti-suit 
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as a type of jurisdiction test as to whether the court had jurisdiction to consider the granting of 
freezing orders. Clarification is required as to whether this is the correct test. The courts have 
provided a purposive approach
504
 in this matter of considering s 44 of the Act 1996 and it is 
suggested that the courts should only provide such relief after consultation with the arbitral 
tribunal. 
 
 An arbitrator is not required to possess any special professional or technical qualification to 
accept an appointment to act since the arbitral guild does not qualify as a professional in most 
jurisdictions.  However, the disputing parties are at liberty to indicate whatever professional or 
technical qualifications or experience the persons to be appointed as arbitrators in their dispute 
should or must possess. This is in exercise of their powers of party autonomy and such a 
requirement become part of the contractual terms in the arbitrator’s contract.  However, some 
member states, such as Italy, require arbitrators to be lawyers. The wisdom in such provisions 
may be gathered from the Italian case of Sacheri v Robotto,
505
 where the arbitrators were all 
technical men. They decided the dispute and contracted a lawyer to draft their decision into an 
award. The Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) held that the award was invalid for not 
being made by the arbitrators themselves.  This decision highlights the importance of having a 
lawyer as a member of the arbitral tribunal.  In the UK, whenever a problem raises the arbitral 
tribunal calls in the courts for assistance.  Furthermore, under English law, if an arbitrator has to 
have some special qualification in order to be appointed, then in the event of a failure to adduce 
his qualification, his award will be void for lack of jurisdiction.  
4.5 Limitations on arbitral tribunal’s power to issue provisional measures 
Although most developed jurisdictions now recognize the power of the arbitral tribunal to grant 
provisional measures, there are several significant limitations to this power. Such limitations or 
shortcomings arise in part from the inherent nature of the arbitration process, which is a 
contractual mechanism between particular parties, and which requires the constitution of a 
                                                 
504
 See Cetelem SA v Roust Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 618, where the Court of Appeal said “the relationship 
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tribunal for each dispute that arises; these limitations arise mainly from the terms of some of the 
arbitral agreements. The most common limitations that hinder the progress of arbitral 
proceedings are as follows: 
1) The arbitral tribunal lacks the power to grant provisional measures against third parties; for 
example, freezing orders. This provisional measure developed
506
 as a form of recourse against 
foreign-based defendants with assets within the UK, and consequently the early authorities 
assumed that the order was not available against England-based defendants. In the same vein,an 
early judicial guideline for granting the order required claimants to establish the existence of a 
risk of the removal of the assets from the jurisdiction.   The Supreme Court Act
507
 provides that 
the injunction
508
 may be granted to prevent a defendant from removing the assets from the 
jurisdiction or otherwise dealing with them.
509
  Section37 of the Act provides the basis of 
jurisdiction for granting freezing orders in all cases where it appears to the court to be just and 
convenient to do so. The Court of Appeal held
510
that the wording of section 37 did not restrict 
the scope, geographical or otherwise.
511
The Civil Procedure Rules
512
 further provide currently 
that the injunction may be granted in relation to assets whether located within the jurisdiction or 
not. 
2) An arbitral tribunal’s powers are virtually limited to only the parties to the arbitration 
agreement.  As a consequence, an arbitrator generally orders provisional measures only against 
the parties to the agreement. The arbitration tribunal has no power to order any attachment or 
preservation of property orders held by a third party to the arbitration agreement.   
 This limitation is evident in some arbitration legislation, including the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which authorises an arbitral tribunal to order any party to take such interim measures of 
protection as may be deemed necessary.  This is made explicit by the Belgian Judicial Code, 
which provides that an arbitral tribunal may order any provisional measures with the exception 
of attachment orders.  This adduces that the arbitral tribunal’s authority is limited to the parties to 
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the arbitration. Despite the foregoing, an arbitral tribunal would have the power to order a party 
to take steps vis-a-vis third parties in order to prevent specified actions. For example, a corporate 
entity could be ordered to direct its subsidiary to take some steps.  Such orders test the 
limitations of the arbitral powers, but in appropriate cases, where there is a necessity to 
accomplish justice, the arbitral tribunal should be prepared to issue them. 
3) The arbitral tribunal lacks the power to grant provisional measures until it is constituted. This 
is implied by the arbitration legislation which limits the power of the arbitral tribunal to grant 
provisional measures.  It should be noted that although self-evident, this limitation of not being 
able to grant such measures until it is constituted can have substantial practical importance. The 
most critical time for seeking provisional measures is often at the outset of the parties’ dispute. 
One party may seek to dispose of disputed property or evidence, to alter the contractual or 
commercial status quo or to take other steps to pre-empt or position itself for the arbitration. The 
absence of any arbitral tribunal to which requests for provisional measures may be directed in the 
initial weeks or months of a dispute may effectively prevent the arbitral tribunal from granting 
meaningful provisional measures.  The absence of a tribunal at the pre-formation stage may lead 
the parties to resort to the courts. This will automatically affect the principle of party autonomy. 
An invitation of the court by a party, is mistrust to arbitration proceedings and a waiver of the 
arbitral agreement. 
4) Specialised institutional arbitration rules for expedited provisional measures: some arbitral 
institutions have adopted specialised rules that seek to provide a non-judicial mechanism for 
obtaining urgently needed provisional measures at the outset of the arbitral proceedings. The ICC 
Rules for a Pre-Arbitral referee procedure are the leading example of such efforts.  These rules 
have, however, rarely been used in practice. This is because the parties to the arbitral agreement 
must agree in writing to the use of the specialized procedure, and given the realities of litigation, 
this cannot often be expected to occur after a dispute has arisen. At an earlier stage, when the 
underlying contract and arbitration agreement are negotiated, parties have not generally been 
sufficiently focused on the procedural intricacies of future disputes to make provisional measures 
for specialised issues.  
With the modern approach to arbitral proceedings by some countries like the Netherlands  with 
its Arbitration Institute’s current Arbitration Rules,  and the revised version of the ICDR Rules,  
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provide that in case of urgency, a sole arbitrator should be appointed to resolve provisional 
measures prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  The best adopted approach to obtain 
tribunal-ordered provisional measures has been adopted in the LCIA Rules which provide for 
expedited constitution of the arbitral tribunal in appropriate cases, thereby enabling the tribunal 
to be formed and be in a position to consider requests for provisional measures in a matter of 
days. Although not directly addressing the need for rapid mechanism for tribunal-ordered 
provisional measures, this appointment procedure is a sensible and practical means for making 
tribunal-ordered provisional measures a realistic possibility in many disputes.  
5)  Limitation to the subject matter of dispute: arbitration legislation also sometimes limits the 
scope of the arbitral tribunal’s power to grant provisional measures. That was arguably true 
under the original 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law text, which granted the arbitral tribunal the 
power to issue provisional measures which they consider necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute.  It is sometimes said that this language limits the arbitral authority in its 
granting of provisional measures, and there is general support for this conclusion in the Model 
Law’s drafting history, as the language is ambiguous and inconsistent with the Model Law’s 
objectives.  It should be noted that the requirement that provisional measures be issued in respect 
of the subject matter of the dispute ought not to limit a tribunal’s power to particular items whose 
ownership is in dispute. Instead, Article 17 of the Model Law can readily be interpreted as 
extending to the preservation of the contractual relationship for licensing intellectual property; 
where the parties disputes concerns the continued existence of their contractual relationship, then 
provisional measures preserving all aspects of that relationship are properly regarded as being in 
respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The same analysis can be extended to the 
preservation of assets sufficient to satisfy a party’s claim; such relief is properly considered as 
being in respect of the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, because it is necessary in order that 
such dispute can be resolved fairly. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Provisional measures assist in facilitating the effectiveness of arbitration in providing an 
effective means for the interim protection of rights at the pre-formation stage. Indeed, there is a 
growing recognition of provisional measures. The standards and principles for the granting of 
arbitral provisional measures are the cornerstone of interim measures in any arbitral proceedings.  
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These standards provide arbitral efficacy, by making it predictable and consistent, hence 
adducing the fact that the best forum for arbitral provisional measures is the arbitral tribunal. 
However, despite the role played by such standards there is still a lacuna in the scope and the 
application, as there appear to be no clear rules in their application, by the arbitral tribunal, 
which causes a problem, and in the process hinders the efficacy of arbitration. The author argues 
that since provisional measures are given upon request by a party, the request should at least 
contain the relevant rights for which protection is being sought, the kind of measure sought and 
the circumstances that necessitate the order being requested by a party. 
The English Arbitration Act 1996 should add another provision in the Annex of s 39 which 
provides a wider scope to the tribunal to grant provisional measures. Indeed this would explicitly 
provide guidance to the tribunal when determining the standards of granting provisional 
measures and also halt the reference to courts to provide guidance in given cases. The 
UNCITRAL Model law should also provide a revision and add a provision in regard to the 
conditions of provision measures, the initiation of such proceedings and how long the tribunal 
should hold or allow a given measure given to their temporary nature. 
There is a manifestation of party autonomy to arbitral standards, whereby the applicant generally 
makes the request for the measure, due to the principle of party autonomy.
513
 The arbitral 
tribunal may in rare cases, in the absence of such a request, grant provisional measures where 
evidence adduced will aggravate the dispute.  
When parties enter into an arbitration agreement which is widely phrased, they usually intend to 
require that all their disputes (provisional measures) to be settled under the arbitral contract. This 
may be an implied term or clause in the contract; for instance, applying the officious bystander 
test, where the parties submit to arbitration to exclude disputes over the validity of the 
agreement, thus the separability principle gives effect to the will of the parties. Simply by 
denying that the main contract is valid, one party can deprive the arbitrator of the competence to 
rule upon that allegation, and this provides a loophole for the parties to repudiate their obligation 
to arbitrate, hence making the arbitral process cumbersome and meaningless. 
It is a common phenomenon nowadays that parties to arbitration expressly empower the arbitral 
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tribunal to grant provisional measures, on the grounds that the arbitration agreement is a separate 
contract and that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute in their domain. The 
two doctrines of Separability and of Competence-Kompetenz are often called the cornerstones of 
international arbitration as they are both derived from the arbitral agreement, which provides the 
arbitrators with the tools for granting provisional measures, as they work hand in glove to 
maximize the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of resolving international disputes and 
minimising the temptation of delay tactics. Although there may be some be theoretical problems 
in arbitral proceedings, in practice the tribunal limits such problems in order to enhance the 
process. However, given the nature of provisional measures, the scope of the tribunal may be 
limited to granting all the requests sought by the party to the arbitral process, where there is no 
clear prima facie case, or when it has no jurisdiction to the case.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 Types of arbitral provisional measures in support of arbitral proceedings 
5.1 Introduction 
The question of whether or not an arbitral tribunal has the authority to grant provisional
514
 
measures must be determined under the “lex arbitri”. However, the types of measures that may 
be ordered in a specific case is a different question which is governed by either the relevant 
procedure rules or the “lex causae”, depending on which interim measures are involved.515 
As regards the prerequisites for granting provisional measures, there is no typically strict defined 
law of what arbitral tribunal can order,
516
 except that it will order all or any provisional measures 
that it considers necessary in connection with the subject matter of the dispute. It has wide 
discretion in making its decision.
517
  According to many arbitral rules,
518
 the tribunal is given this 
wide scope of discretion to grant provisional measures,
519
since the efficacy of the arbitration 
process as a whole depends on the interim measures that may prevent adverse parties from 
destroying or removing assets so as to render a final award meaningless.
520
Such measures are 
granted to minimize loss or damage or prejudice during proceedings in order to facilitate the 
enforcement of the final awards.
521
 
The English Arbitration Act,
522
 subject to party autonomy, provides a number of powers to 
arbitrators to order on a provisional basis any relief sought by the parties to the arbitration 
agreement.
523
  The standards discussed above for granting provisional measures should be 
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considered in the context of each of the specific types of provisional measures. The English 
subsidiary model provides less novelty power to the arbitral tribunal to grant all  provisional 
measures.  This is enshrined in several provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996, but mainly in s 39, 
which provides that: 
“The parties are free to agree that the tribunal shall have the power to order on a 
provisional basis any relief which it would have power to grant in a final award.” 
In addition, section39 ( 2) (a) and (b) provides the types of provisional measures that a tribunal 
can grant; for instance, making provision for payment of money or disposition of property as 
between the parties or  an order for interim payment on account for the costs of the arbitration. 
The power to grant such provisional measures; for example, orders for security for costs, as 
provided under section 38 (4) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, entitles the arbitral tribunal, 
on the request of any party, to order interim measures of  protection unless the parties have 
expressly agreed in writing to the contrary. This is further evident in section 38 (3), (4) and 
(6).
524
In addition, section 38 provides that the arbitrators will automatically have certain specific 
powers unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary. Moreover, even if there has been 
no such express agreement it is possible that some institutions or other arbitral rules may overlap 
or conflict with it under section 48. The powers granted to the arbitrators by this section are 
discretionary in nature, and it should be noted that arbitrators are not bound by the provisions of 
the Civil Procedure Rules or case law concerning how or when a court will exercise similar 
powers. 
In addition, in the famous case of Channel Tunnel v Balfour and Others,
525
 it was held that the 
court did  have the power to grant anti-suit injunctions but it did stay proceedings in support of 
the arbitration agreement. It should be noted that the genesis of Channel Tunnel was not adduce 
the power of arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures; it was  more  concerned with the 
arbitration agreement.  Lord Mustill, in his judgement, asked  the following questions: 
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Should the actions by the appellants against the respondents be stayed?”526 [….]  Is there 
in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the subject matter of the action? 
[.…] Does the court have the power to grant an injunction to prevent the respondents 
from ceasing work under an agreement dated 13 August 1986 (“the construction 
contract”?” 
 It was against such  aback ground that the court stayed proceedings  and refused to grant an 
interlocutory injunction under section37 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 which provides that: 
“ The High Court may order or grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in 
which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.” 
In addition, the court argued that those who make agreements for the resolution of disputes must 
show good resolution for departing from them.
527
 It was clearly expressed that it was not for the 
courts to enact law which parliament did not provide to intervene in other jurisdictions and grant 
interim injunctions under a law which is not English. Any injunction would be contrary  both to 
the general tenor of the construction and the spirit of arbitration.
528
  There are no clearly 
expressed cases in practice where the courts have given the tribunals authority to grant 
provisional measures when such cases are brought to the attention of the courts; however, where 
there is a breach of arbitration agreement under the subsidiary model it provides support. 
 Lord Diplock in Bremer VulkanSchiffbau and Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping 
Corporation Ltd
529
held that the English courts had no general supervisory power over the 
conduct of arbitration more extensive than the powers conferred by the parties.  
Historically, there were significant limits on the powers of the arbitral tribunal to grant 
provisional measures, and even those limited powers were reluctantly exercised. However, with 
the development of government enactments, international arbitral rules and conventions, many of 
the historical arbitral obstacles in regard to the tribunal’s power to grant provisional measures 
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have been removed.
530
Both in practice and analytically, the type of provisional measure that is at 
issue can significantly affect the type of provisional relief. In principle, the forms of provisional 
relief available in international commercial arbitration are very broad,
531
 as they extend to any 
measures which serve to preserve or protect one of the parties’ rights, the arbitral tribunal’s  
jurisdiction or the subject matter pending the ultimate resolution of the dispute.
532
 It should be 
noted that the tribunal will not be able to grant any measures beyond its jurisdiction;
533
 for 
example, the arbitral tribunal cannot grant freezing orders, or attachment orders, in cases of 
urgency. 
In a survey carried out in 2002 of the international arbitrators by the Global Centre for Dispute 
Resolution Research, 64 respondents identified 50 separate arbitral cases in which interim 
measures were sought either to restrain or to stay an activity, order specific performance, or 
provide for security for costs.
534
 These figures were found to be consistent with earlier reports by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which indicate that 
parties are seeking interim measures in an increasing number of cases.
535
 Indeed the availability 
of arbitral provisional measures is not a subject that can safely be ignored. 
This chapter examines the question as to whether the arbitral tribunal can grant all arbitral 
provisional measures. 
In addressing the above set question, this chapter will examine all the types of arbitral 
provisional measures in order to identify some of the problems the tribunal may face in granting 
some provisional measures. The chapter will provide solutions to identified problems in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of arbitral provisional measures.  
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The chapter examines 1) orders for preservation of status quo; 2) orders for specific performance 
of contractual obligation;3) orders for prohibiting aggravation of parties’ dispute; 4)  orders 
requiring security for underlying claims; orders for arbitral costs; 6) ex parte orders; 7) security 
for payment orders; 8) enforcement of confidential obligations; 9) measures for late enforcement 
of award; 10) security for costs orders;
536
11) forms of provisional measures (order or award);12) 
measures for later enforcement of an award; 13) emergency provisional measures; 14) 
injunctions  and anti-suit injunctions. 
5.2 Orders for preservation of status quo 
One common form of provisional measure is an order for preserving the status quo
537
 between 
the parties or alternatively, preserving specified contractual or legal relations.
538
 This form of 
provisional measure is referred to in the UNCITRAL Model Law;
539
 for example, a party may be 
ordered not to take certain steps terminating an agreement, disclosing trade secrets,
540
 calling a 
letter of credit or using disputed intellectual property pending a decision on the merits.
541
 Such 
measures ensure the effective enforcement of the award, including measures to preserve goods 
such as their deposit with a third person, the sale of perishable goods, the opening of a banker’s 
credit, the use of machinery or works, the posting of a security deposit for any foreseeable 
damages. 
                                                 
536
See Wicketts v Brine Builders [2001] CILL 1805, where the court held that the wording of costs in s.38 is an 
ambivalent terminology and raises a problem. 
537
 See Young M: Duperyrn. C, Interim Measures to Prevent Irreparable harm: what Can be done by The Arbitral 
Tribunal/Swiss Arbitration Association (interactive)  available at http://www.arbitration-ch.org/below-
40/pdf/interim-measures-mycd.pdf, accessed 13 Jan 2010. See Branson C. Interim Measures of Protection in 
Changing International Commercial Arbitration world Croatian Arbitration Yearbook 2002 at 9-10. 
538
 See Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, Procedural Order No.2, ICSID case No. ARB/97/7. 
539
 See UNCITRAL Article 17 (2) (a). 
540
 See Patricia Shaughnessy, Arbitrator power to Preserve Status Quo early , Presentation for the Vienna Arbitration 
( 25 Jan 2013), Stockholm University. 
541See Award ICC case No. 3896, XY>B Comm. Arb. 47 (1985) (“the best solution, in  the arbitral tribunal’s 
opinion, would involve the maintenance, in so far as possible, of the status quo ante” that is the  situation when the 
terms of reference Nos. 1 and 2 were signed.”), see Final Award in ICC Case No. 7895 (party ordered to refrain 
from selling the other part’s products), 11 (1) ICC Ct. Bull 64 65 (2000); Final Award in ICC Case No.9324 ( party 
ordered to reimburse the amount of letter of credit if it were called), in Lew, Commentary on Interim and 
Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitration cases, 11 (1) ICC Ct Bull.23 29 (2000) alternatively the arbitral tribunal 
may order the parties generally not to take  steps that alter the contractual status quo. See UNCITRAL Model Law 
2006 Revision, Article 17 (2) (1) ( “maintain or restore the status quo pending the determination of the dispute.” An 
example of such relief described as follows: “an example of an existing right would be an interest in a piece of 
property, the owner of which is in dispute. A provisional measure could be ordered to require that the property not to 
be sold or alienated before the final award of the arbitral tribunal.” 
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Orders preserving the status quo are often cited as the prime examples of appropriate interim 
measures, in international arbitration.
542
 It may be argued that the orders of preservation of status 
quo are more apparent where the business is at stake and may be damaged through unilateral 
action.
543
  The main objective of such an order is to preserve the status quo until the final 
decision on the merits is rendered.
544
 Such measures can further be used to protect one party 
from harm during the arbitral proceedings or to preserve the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In other 
words, they limit any factual changes that may impede the enforceability of the eventual award 
or to prevent a party from serious harm arising during the proceedings.
545
 
The author argues that appropriate analysis is not to attach decisive importance to the state of 
affairs at the time of the request for a provisional measure, but to take into account the relative 
injury that is likely to be suffered by both parties, respectively during the arbitral proceedings, as 
well as the prima facie claims and defences on the part of each party. Where one party has a 
strong prima facie case on the merits and faces serious injury, the arbitral tribunal should be 
prepared to order the restoration of the status quo, as doing so accomplishes justice between the 
parties. 
5.3 Orders requiring specific performance of contractual obligations 
Arbitral tribunal sometimes order what common law practitioners refer to as “specific 
performance”, requiring a party to perform his contractual obligations.546 A party may be ordered 
to continue to perform his contractual obligation; for example, shipping products,
547
or providing 
                                                 
542
 See Procedural Order in ICC Arbitration No. 12 (1989), 12 ASA Bull.142 (1994).See Consortium Ltd v republic 
of Bulgaria order, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/24p38, available at http://worldbank.org ( provisional measures 
appropriate” to preserve the status quo”. See C.Scheuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary Article 47 78-80 
(2001). 
543
 See Morek R, Interim Measures in Arbitration Law and Practice In Central Europe; The need for further 
harmonization. Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration,(Antwerp - Apeldoorn: Maklu publishers 
2007) at 77. 
544
 See Swartz in Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International Arbitration Ninth Joint Colloquium on 
International Arbitration No.6 1992, Paris ICCHQ. 
545
See Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Request for Provisional Measures, ICSID Case 
No.Arb/81/1/9 (9 December 1983), X1Y.B Comm. Arb 159,159-160 (1986), see Interim Award in ICC case No. 
8879, 11 (1) ICC Ct.Bull.84.89 (2000). 
546
 See LCIA Rules Article 25 (1) (c), Interim award  in ICC No. 8894, 11 (1) ICC Ct Bull 94,97-98  (2000) 
547
 See Framtome Case, ICC No.3896, 1982, J.D.I at 914, where a dispute was submitted to the arbitral tribunal. The 
case concerned a construction contract. The arbitrators considered that they could intervene with the performance of 
the bank guarantees but they added that the validity of these bank guarantees fell within their competence. They 
pointed out that they were competent to deal not only with the main contract but also with the second agreement, the 
guarantee. 
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intellectual property in order to ensure the claimant’s enjoyment of his rights.548 Indeed, such 
measures stabilise the legal relations between the parties throughout the proceedings, including 
requiring continued observance of contractual obligations, protecting of trade secrets and 
proprietary information. 
One commentator describes such measures as: 
 interim specific performance of the contract as when, for example, in a dispute relating to 
the termination of the charter party, the court prohibits or stops any use of the vessel not 
in accordance with the charter.
549
 
In exercising this authority by the arbitral tribunal, the ICC tribunal ordered that: 
“it is essential, until the final award on all the claims and counter claims, that the 
contractual provisions agreed between the parties keep producing all their effects.”550 
  The author argues that given the private nature of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may not be 
able to effect such a measure, on the grounds that the rules of civil procedure  or law of 
obligation does not always apply in arbitral proceedings. A party may refuse to comply with such 
an order granted by the tribunal. The author recommends that the English Arbitration Act 1996 
should specifically provide a clause that all provisional measures have the same effect as any 
other civil or commercial contract, whereby a party which breaches an essential term of the 
contract can be ordered to pay damages or to comply with an order for specific performance of 
the contract. In addition, the agreement should also entail contractual obligation (infringement 
clauses), where parties can agree in the contract that interim measures will be granted by the 
courts. Such measures should be specific in order and should be used where the tribunal lacks 
prerogative, and the only solution is to submit to the exequatur of a national judge. The 
conditions for granting such measures must be fulfilled, and must be expressed in the agreement; 
                                                 
548
See EAA1996s.48 (5) (b), which provides that an arbitral tribunal has the power, like the court, to order a specific 
performance of a contract other than a contract relating to land. This clearly elucidates the arbitral as the actual 
authority to grant such orders, which is a remedy to enhance arbitral proceedings. 
549
 See  Raymond who concluded that; if it was justified by the protection of the interests in issue, the arbitrator may 
even order the provisional performance of the parties’ obligation until the matter has been decided....”C.Reymond, 
Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse Article 183 9 1989) at7. See ICSID decision of 1972, 12 
ASA Bull. 148, 152 ( 1994), “inviting parties to abstain from all measures incompatible with the maintenance of the 
contract and to assure that measures already taken in the future have no effect contrary to the maintenance.” 
550
 See the partial Award in the ICC case, in Schwartz, The Practices and Experience of the ICC court, in 
Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International arbitration 45, 61-62 (1993). 
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for example, a contract for the sale of shares contains provisions on due diligence, the date room 
accompanied by a confidential clause. Hence in the case of any infringement the arbitral tribunal 
can grant interim awards within ten days after the submission of the request to arbitrator. It is 
also possible to see that each party has the possibility to exchange written memorials on this 
demand; for instance, three days after the communication of the submission: the plaintiff one 
day, the defendant one day, and the hearing can take place thereafter. 
5.4 Orders for prohibiting aggravation of parties’ dispute 
The main objective of such orders is to prevent or prohibit any action that would aggravate or 
exacerbate the parties’ dispute.551 Such orders may be directed towards forbidding public 
statements obstructing or interfering with contractual obligations.
552
  There is a tendency by the 
tribunal to construe the aggravation order as an urgent order to prevent irreparable harm or to 
avoid aggravation of the dispute that is the subject matter of the arbitration. 
The principle that the arbitral tribunal may take steps to prohibit aggravation of a dispute is well 
established, from the order of one arbitral tribunal, where it was decided that: 
Provisional measures may be ordered not only in order to prevent irreparable 
damage but also to avoid aggravation of the dispute submitted to arbitration.
553
 
In practice, the arbitral tribunals have not frequently granted orders forbidding aggravation of the 
parties’ dispute.  For example; in the case of AMCO v Indonesia, the arbitral tribunal referred to 
such an order as:  
“[A] good and fair practical rule, according to which both parties to a legal dispute should 
refrain from doing anything that could exacerbate the same, thus rendering its solution 
possibly more difficult.”554 
                                                 
551
 See UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17 (2) (b) of the 2006 Revision. 
552
 See UNCITRAL Article 26 (3) (b) 
553
 See ICC case NO.73888. see the Award in ICC Case No. 3896, XY.B Comm. Arb.47 (1985) (“the tribunal 
considers that either exists, undeniably, the risk of the dispute before it becomes aggravated or magnified, and that 
the parties should, in the same spirit of goodwill that they have already demonstrated in signing the terms of the 
reference, refrain from any action likely to widen or aggravate the dispute, or to complicate the task of the tribunal 
or with more difficultly, the observance of the final award.”), 
554
See Amco Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Request of Provisional Measures, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1 (9 December 1983), X1 YB 159, 161 (1986). 
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5.5 Arbitral costs orders 
The phrase “costs of arbitration” is something of a term of art in the Arbitration Act 1996. The 
phrase is defined in s 59 to refer to the arbitrators fees and expenses or any institutional fees,   
expenses, legal or other costs incurred by the parties during the arbitral proceedings. This is 
payment to the court in the form of cash or a bond by an appellant to secure the payment of costs 
in case the appellant does not prevail. Such an order covers all the costs of the arbitral tribunal 
proceedings; for example, the tribunal seating costs, and travelling costs for arbitrators.
555
 Such 
measures assist the applicant; for example, in the event a party is suspected to have financial 
difficulties from which recovery will be unlikely. 
There are two differences between the two provisional measures powers relating to costs. First, 
the s 38 (3) power is to order a claimant to provide security for costs; the s 39 (2) (b) power is to 
order an actual interim payment on account of the costs of arbitration. It should be noted that the 
power to order provision of security for costs is an opt-out power; the parties may exclude it by 
agreement, but even in its absence the tribunal has powers.
556
 The power to order an interim 
payment on account of costs is, however, an opt-in power; the tribunal only has that power if the 
parties have agreed that it may make such orders.
557
 
The  arbitral power to grant provisional measures for costs has various forms: firstly, an order to 
provide security for the costs of the arbitration, a power set up in s 38 (3); and secondly, an order 
to make payment on account for the costs of the arbitration, a power set out in s 39 (2) (b). Given 
the nature of tribunals compared to municipal courts such costs should be avoided,
558
 since 
contracting parties normally accept risks when they enter into an arbitration agreement, as in all 
commercial transactions risks are part of business and international trade. It should, however, be 
noted that the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant such orders under appropriate business 
circumstances.
559
 
                                                 
555
 See Article 9 of the European Convention on the Establishment of 1955 signed in Paris on 13 December 1955. 
See Black’s Law Dictionary, (6th edit, St Paul Minnesota: West Publishing 1990) at 1357. 
556
 See EAA 1996 s.38 (2). 
557
Ibid s.39 (4). 
558
 See Coppee-Lavlin v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd [1995] 1 Ac 38. 
559
 The Power to grant such costs emanates from party autonomy as provided under s.38 (3) of the EAA 1996. See 
S.7 (2) of the Ireland Arbitration Act 1998. See Craig, Park &Paulsson’sAnnoted Guide to the 1998 ICC Arbitration 
Rules With Commentary (Ocean Publications,1998) at 139. 
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5.5.1 An order to provide security for costs 
This is payment to the court in the form of cash or a bond by an appellant to secure the payment 
of costs in case the person does not prevail.  It is to protect the adverse party by facilitating the 
recovery of any damages caused by the interim measures, if such measures are ultimately found 
to be unjustified in the final decision only apparent if the interim measures are capable of causing 
damage and if the amount of the required security does not exceed the maximum possible loss 
that could be sustained by the adverse party. The financial position of the requesting party is 
irrelevant for the purpose of fixing the amount of security.
560
 
Such an order covers all costs of arbitral tribunal proceedings for example; tribunal seating costs, 
travelling costs for arbitrators.
561
 Given the nature of tribunals compared to municipal courts 
such costs should be avoided,
562
 since contracting parties’ normally accepts risks when they enter 
into an arbitration agreement. It should be noted that in  all commercial transactions, risks are 
part of business and international trade. It should however, also be noted that arbitral tribunal has 
the power to grant such orders under appropriate business circumstances.
563
 
Most institutions rules contain specific rules about the deposit of security for costs. Thus for 
example, in the ICC Rules, Articles 31 and 30 make specific provisions for security for costs. In 
absence of such specific rules,
564
 S.38 (3) gives the arbitrators the power to order a claimant to 
provide security for costs. Given the decision at first instance by Judge Seymour QC in Wicketts 
and Sterndale v Brine Builders,it is clear that this power ought to be exercised with very 
considerable caution:
565
 
(a) the power is best exercised on the application by the respondent rather than by the tribunal of 
its own motion; 
                                                 
560
 See Arbitral Award of 25
th
 September 1997 in (2001) ASA Bull 745, see Arbitral Award 21
st
 December 1998 in 
(1999) ASA Bull.59.  
561
 See Article 9 of the European Convention on Establishment of 1955 signed in Paris on 13 December 1955. See 
Black’s Law Dictionary, (6th edit, St Paul Minnesota: West Publishing 1990) at 1357. 
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s.7 (2) of the Ireland Arbitration Act 1998. See Craig, Park &Paulsson’sAnnotated Guide to the 1998 ICC 
Arbitration Rules with Commentary (Ocean Publications 1998) 139. 
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See EAA s.39 (2) (b). 
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[2001] CILL 1805. 
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(b) the tribunal ought to require and assess evidence showing that there are serious grounds for 
doubting whether the claimant’s assets within accessible jurisdictions are sufficient to cover 
an eventual costs order; 
(c) the amount required in security ought to be proportionate; 
(d) such amount should not be sought exclusively to guarantee payment of the tribunal’s fees; 
(e) above all, an order cannot be based on the ground that the claimant is outside the 
jurisdiction.
566
 
Subject to all, an order cannot be based on the ground that the claimant is outside the 
jurisdiction.
567
 The arbitral tribunal may make peremptory orders setting a time limit for 
compliance,
568
 and the tribunal may then, if the claimant fails to provide security, make an award 
dismissing the claim.  It should be noted that s 39 has hardly ever been litigated, and one likely 
reason for this is that most institutions agreed to by arbitration parties will contain specific rules 
about the deposit for security for costs.
569
 The author argues that although most often the 
respondent requests an order requiring the adverse party to furnish security for costs to be 
incurred in the arbitral proceedings, including parties’ legal fees or other expenses under English 
Law, such request should only be ordered where there is a real risk of non-recovery by the other 
party. However, the extent of risk required varies from one decision to another. Indeed, security 
for costs should only be granted in very few exceptional circumstances, where the risk is clearly 
documented that the assets of a party would not cover a future award of costs; for the voluntary 
liquidation of a party during arbitration proceedings is a risk inherent to international trade and 
only manoeuvres contrary to good faith could justify an order for security for costs. 
                                                 
566
EAA 1996 s. 38 (3) (b). 
567
 Ibid   s.38 (3) ( b). 
568
Ibid s.41 (5). 
569
 See LMAA Rule 18 of the Gafta Arbitration Rules, ICC Articles 30 and 31. 
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5.5.2 An order to make an interim payment on account of costs 
This sort of order is designed to ensure that a party’s claim is well founded and not rendered 
nugatory
570
 because of deterioration in the financial condition of its counter-party or the 
deliberate diversion of assets. 
571
So long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that a 
party’s financial condition will deteriorate during the course of the arbitral proceedings, thereby 
putting its ability to satisfy the final award into jeopardy,
572
 a tribunal is justified in ordering 
security. 
The arbitral tribunal power is contained in s 39 (2) (b) of the 1996 Act, which refers to an order 
to make “an interim payment on account of the costs of the arbitration.”  It would appear, at any 
rate from the bland wording, that this section provides arbitrators with the power, if agreed to by 
the parties,
573
 to order a party to make an actual payment on account of costs. Four observations 
may be made here, subject to the caveat that this new power has not been the subject of litigation 
and to the observation that the DAC Report
574
 is somewhat laconic on this power. It should be 
recalled that the phrase “the costs of arbitration”,575must be taken to include legal costs,576and 
given the fact that these costs may come to considerable amounts, it is not likely that, if parties 
have agreed to grant arbitral tribunal powers listed in s 39,that their party may well make an 
application for the exercise of this power for interim payment. 
Although the English Arbitration Act 1996 refers to an order under a section heading the “power 
to make provisional awards,”577 the ambivalent terminology raises a problem. For a decision to 
direct an interim payment on account of costs an “award”, it needs to be issued in the appropriate 
form,
578
 in which case it is subject to an application for correction,
579
challenge
580
 and appeal.
581
 
                                                 
570
See Arbitration Act 1996 s. (2) (b), which grants the arbitral tribunal wide powers to grant orders   of interim 
payment on account of the costs of the arbitration. The tribunal powers are further evidenced in s.39 (3) which, 
provides that the arbitral tribunal’s final award will consider the order for costs. 
571
Ibids.38 (4). 
572
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573
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574
 SEE DAC Report Feb 1995. 
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Ibid s.52. 
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The author argues that section39 and the last sentence of s 39 (4) would seem to point in the 
latter direction, (that this an order not an award), and the question that then arises is why would 
the final award, on the merits or as to costs, need to take account of any such order? Moreover, 
the last line of section39 seems to leave awards on different issues to quite another section.
582
 It 
is incumbent on the tribunal to take into account the parties’ respective cases and not to order 
security more liberally with regard to claims that appear well grounded.
583
 It  is of great 
importance that section39 (2) (b) is taken to envisage a payment of an interim sum to the other 
party, given that orders for security, which would normally be lodged in an escrow account or 
with an agreed third party are specifically provided for.
584
 The order must appear that it is not 
only ordered against the claimant, but against the respondent; there is no limitation.
585
 
5.6 Orders for disposition of property 
The arbitral tribunal’s power to make such orders is provided firstly,  ins38 (2), which speaks of 
“directions in relation to any property” for a number of stipulated purpose; and secondly, s 39 (2) 
(a) refers to “a provisional order for payment of money or the disposition of property as between 
parties.” 
5.6.1 Orders for disposition of property 
The arbitral tribunal’s power to make such orders is envisaged in s 38 (4), which provides  
directions in relation to any property and the detention of property by a party. The first question 
that arises is whether this section is drawn in wide enough terms to allow the arbitral tribunal to 
make a direction ordering  party A to dispose of property to party B. 
Indeed, looking at the wording in section38 (2), it is clear that the tribunal can grant such orders 
in arbitral proceedings, even in the absence of a specific agreement by the parties: the arbitral 
tribunal has the authority to order  party A to make over property to B, an order attractive to B 
where A’s assets raise doubts as to enforcement.  
The author argues that a sensible reading of sections 38 and 39 together would, however, appear 
to lead in the opposite direction (that the disposition of property is a matter exclusively provided 
                                                 
582
EAA 1996s.47. 
583
Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration Vol. I  ( 2009) at 2002 
584
 See EAA 1996s.38 (3). 
585
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for by section39 and not in section38). A brief look at section38 (4) makes it clear that that its 
purpose is to preserve evidence. In addition, it provides among other things inspection, 
preservation and sample. The purpose of section39 (2) in regard to disposition of property is 
clearly geared to the preservation of assets rather than evidence. The provisional remedy here has 
an altogether different tenor and purpose and is one of which ought to require the express 
agreement of the parties, as required by section 39 but not by section 38. 
5.7 Ex parte orders 
Ex parte orders are orders
586
 granted without notification of the respondent by the tribunal,
587
 in 
order to avoid damage
588
 or dissipation of property or assets crucial to the arbitral proceedings.
589
 
The question is whether arbitrators should be able to grant interim measures on an ex parte basis 
without notice or hearing from the party against whom the order is sought. This is a contentious 
issue and has led to vigorous debate among UNCITRAL drafters.
590
 The proponents argue that 
interim measures become worthless if not ordered ex parte because otherwise the indispensable 
requirements to ensure their effectiveness – the elements of surprise and rapidity – are lost. On 
the other hand, the main argument against giving the arbitral tribunal the power to order such 
measures ex parte is the risk of inadmissibility, and that they should be ordered after hearing the 
parties.
591
 
 
                                                 
586
 See CAS Rules Article 32 limits the request for ex parte orders. 
587
See  Croatian Law on Arbitration Article 17 (2) which provides that “the parties shall have a right to respond to 
claims and allegations of their adversary.” Arbitrators’ ex parte orders are held admissible in Croatia. The Rules of 
International Arbitration of the Permanent Court at the Croatian Chamber of Commerce (Zagreb Rules) provide that 
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parte issuance is necessary to ensure that the measure is effective. In such cases, the applicant discloses all relevant 
information and submits a statement that he will cover any damages caused by the lack of proper disclosure under 
Article 26 (1) Zagreb Rules 2002. 
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exception? of ex parte orders, in order to prevent possible negative actions from the responding party in case he/she 
knows in advance that interim measures will be granted (for example; hides assets, destroys evidence etc). 
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International (2004) No.2 (1) at 85. 
591
 See Austrian Law 2005 S. 593 910 CPC 
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Provisional measures are usually granted through inter party proceedings;
592
 both the applicant 
and the respondent are heard in adversarial proceedings. An arbitral tribunal may actually 
convene and hear parties on a request for provisional measures.
593
 Alternatively, in cases where 
the convening tribunal cannot be waited because the arbitration parties and arbitrators are from 
different countries, the parties may be heard by telephone.
594
 The parties’ will is to seek 
protection of their rights,
595
 including ex parte measures from the arbitral tribunal.
596
 Many 
commentators conclude that ex parte provision relief is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
597
 
This argument is subject to debate on the basis that arbitrators are subject to the doctrine of 
impartiality and the separability clause
598
 in their proceedings, which provide autonomy in all the 
proceedings. 
 This type of measure is not common. However, it is used where there is a serious damage  
through  a single action by its counter party; for example, calling a letter of credit, transferring 
needed security to third parties, or destroying critical evidence.  The argument that the tribunal 
composition arises when a case arises, and that the courts are better equipped with such measures 
due to their composition is biased against the tribunal in granting ex part provisional measures. 
This argument is manifestly a challenge to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal has the power to grant ex parte provisional 
orders.
599
 
Indeed this position was highlighted by the UNCITAL working group in New York, when the 
question arose as to whether  arbitrators should be authorised in a draft revision of Article 17 of 
the Model  Law to grant interim measures on an ex parte basis. In the debate, the majority of the 
delegations were in favour of the arbitral tribunal granting ex parte provisional measures. The 
                                                 
592
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593
LCIA Article 22. 
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issue of the tribunal ex parte was first placed before the working group by the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat at the session, and explained why there may be a need for ex parte orders by the 
tribunal.  The Secretariat argued that  
Such measures may be appropriate where an element of surprise is necessary;( that is to 
say), where it is possible that the affected party may try to pre-empt the measure by 
taking action to make the measure moot or enforceable. For example, when an interim 
order is requested to prevent a party from removing assets from the jurisdiction, the party 
might remove the assets out of the jurisdiction between the time it learns of the request 
and the time the measure is issued.
600
 
In this quotation above, the Secretariat gave the most prominent example of an interim measure 
that could require an element of surprise; namely, preservation of assets to ensure the 
effectiveness of the final award or to preserve disputed goods before they are sold or moved 
beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction or the need to preserve crucial evidence. The Secretariat was in 
favour of the view that the courts should not interfere with the conditions or procedures under 
which an arbitral tribunal should be able to grant ex parte provisional measures. 
 On the other hand, the main argument against giving the arbitrators the power to grant ex parte 
measures is the risk of abuse. The measures may be so severe and damaging that payment 
required of the applicant party will turn out to be insufficient.  Indeed, one of the scholars of this 
topic, Hans Van Houtte argues that ex parte measures should be sought from the courts.
601
 He 
advances his point on different legal systems; for example, under Australian law, ex parte 
measures are inadmissible, and are ordered after hearing the parties.
602
  Another advanced 
argument is that most legislation worldwide makes no mention of ex parte orders from the 
arbitral tribunal. What most tribunals do provide is that parties shall be treated equally to present 
their case.
603
 Indeed, even the English Arbitration Act 1996, which is seen as the champion of 
arbitration, precludes ex parte orders to be made by arbitral tribunals instead of by courts. 
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The author affirms that there is no clear explicit provision in the current Arbitration Act 1996 
that provides this authority at all. The Arbitration enactment  needs to adopt the Poland model,
604
 
whereby the parties can insert a clause in their arbitration (exequatur), whereby it can be 
enforceable directly by the tribunal. It may further be argued that the courts are better in such 
situations than arbitration as over time they have developed powers to freeze bank accounts, to 
appoint liquidators or issue injunctions, to preserve the interest of justice.
605
 If they allow 
arbitrators to handle such a climate, the ultimate purpose of legal proceedings will be frustrated 
by evidence or assets disappearing or by the people taking the law into their own hands. The 
courts conduct a better cross examination in regard to ex parte measures than the arbitral 
tribunal; for example, the court has to be satisfied that if the measure is not granted, this will 
result in harm that cannot adequately be compensated by damages; secondly, that this harm must 
substantially outweigh any harm that will be caused to the party against whom the measure is 
directed; thirdly, that there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will ultimately 
prevail on the merits, to obtain an ex parte measures; and lastly, the court has to be  satisfied that 
it is necessary to proceed with the ex parte order to ensure that the purposes of the measure are 
not frustrated before it is granted. 
 This project raises some contention with Ali Yesilirmak in his book “Provisional Measures in 
International Commercial Law,”606 where he supports measures to be available in tribunal 
proceedings than courts. As he does not take into account that the arbitrators are not prepared 
until a crisis arises, so in case of any urgency to avoid the transfer of funds by the time the 
tribunal is set the funds or property have disappeared, the court assistance provide a better 
mechanism.  It should, however, be noted that the tribunal can grant urgent matters since it has 
the same powers as the court.
607
  The only limitation is that granting such orders will be contrary 
to the principle of impartiality, which provides that both parties should have the chances of 
                                                 
604
 See Polish Arbitration Act 2005 Article 1181 (2) CCP. 
605
See Denilauler v SNC Couchet Case C-125/79, [1980] ECR 1553, where the Court of Justice ruled that the respect 
of the rights of the defence dictates that the measure ordered on the claimant’s unilateral application, without notice 
to the defendant, cannot benefit the automatic recognition provided for in title II of the Brussels I Regulation. 
According to the Court in para 17 of the judgement, the condition imposed by Chapter III of the Brussels 
Convention in case of provisional measures, the party to whom the measure is against or has been summoned, has to 
appear in order to be enforced.  
606
(Kluwer  2005) 221. 
607
See s 48 which provides that an arbitrator can grant remedies subject to s 39 (1). 
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access to justice as enshrined in the Human Rights Convention.
608
 In this respect the author 
argues that ex parte orders are not proportionate in achieving their legitimate objective, since 
such orders are granted in the absence of the other party to defend his case. However, England 
can adopt Article 37 of the ICDR Rules 2006, which deals with ex parte applications for relief, 
where the application for emergency relief includes a statement certifying that all parties have 
been notified in writing or explaining the steps that were taken to notify the parties of the 
application for such a relief.
609
 
5.7.1 UNCITRAL support of arbitral ex parte measures 
Despite such clear lacunae in the law, the UNCITRAL Model Law report,
610
in its spring session 
2001,
611
 gave reasons in favour of the arbitral ex parte measures as follows: 
Firstly, a moving party may not yet have retained counsel acquainted with the facts of the case 
and thus can evaluate an urgent request for an interim measure more efficiently than the court 
confronting the dispute for the first time.
612
 
Secondly, the moving party may not speak the language of the relevant courts and thus can more 
rapidly put forward a substantive case in favour of the interim relief before the tribunal. 
Thirdly, there may be legal barriers to seeking ex parte orders in the courts of the relevant 
jurisdiction where interim measures should have effect. These legal barriers are illustrated by the 
so-called McCreay doctrine that is followed by some courts and which holds that an arbitration 
agreement pre-empts the courts' jurisdiction even to grant provisional measures. 
The moving party may be more confident in the speed and expertise and especially the 
impartiality of the tribunal than in the relevant national courts where most of the cases are 
subject to corruption due to political reasons. It would be appropriate for UNCITRAL to say that 
                                                 
608
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
609
  Rule 37 requires notice of the following: firstly the nature of the emergency sought, secondly the reasons why 
relief is required on an ex parte order is required in emergency, and lastly, reasons the applicant believes it is entitled 
to ex parte measures. 
610
 Model Law 2006 Article 17B. 
611
 See Lee Anna Tucker, Interim Measures Revised UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Comparison to Model Law 
Reflects both Greater Flexibility and Remaining Uncertainty, International Commercial Arbitration Brief Vol. No.1 
( 2011) at 15-23. 
612
 See annex 1 to The Report of the Working Group On Arbitration and Reconciliation On the Work of Its Forty-
Fourth Session ( New York, 23-27 January 2006, Revised Legislative Provisions on Interim Measures and 
Preliminary Orders. 
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parties should go to the courts to seek interim relief.
613
 
5.7.2   Objections advanced against arbitral ex parte provisional measures 
The first objection that has been raised and answered is the argument that allowing arbitrators to 
issue ex parte measures somehow violates the basic principles of due process. The fundamental 
flaw in this argument is that due process is an essential principle in almost every legal system, 
yet the courts in most of those systems have themselves developed a practice of granting ex parte 
relief in certain circumstances. Courts have viewed their ex parte orders as fully consistent with 
due process for two fundamental reasons; 
 The first one is fairness. It is recognised that in certain circumstances fairness requires that 
certain evidencebe preserved or that certain goods be kept within the courts’ jurisdiction, or that 
certain assets necessary to a final judgement be maintained, and that comports with due process 
is that such a procedure is confined with a structure of substantial safe guards that are, in fact 
very similar to the safeguards that are similar to the Model Law, Article 17. 
The second argument against arbitral tribunal exercising ex parte authority is that this may lead 
to prejudicing the merits of the dispute. This of course is an objection that can be and has been 
raised with respect to all interim measures precisely to forestall the risk of prejudgement.  For 
example, the present draft revised Article 17 provides that the tribunal need only to be satisfied 
that “there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits before 
issuing any interim measure.” 
 The author thinks therefore that the working group reduced  the danger that the tribunal that 
grants provisional measures would somehow bind itself to a prejudgement of the merits. 
Accordingly, those who invoke the argument against ex parte measures must be objecting to 
something slightly different; namely, the risk that a party  may abuse the ex parte proceedings by 
presenting a false impression of the dispute in order to obtain ex parte measures is actually 
greater if parties  seek that measure from the courts rather than from the tribunals. Indeed this is 
                                                 
613
 See The Report on UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration on the work of its fortieth session (New York 23-
27 February 2004) AC/CN9/54. The report by the delegation provided a full array of safeguards that are necessary to 
prevent any abuse of ex parte provisional measures.  The Report proposed that a party seeking an ex parte order 
would be permitted to apply to the arbitral tribunal for particular relief on an ex parte basis. Instead of acting on the 
request at that point, the tribunal would forward the application to another party and at the same time, it could order 
that party to preserve the status quo pending an the inter parties determination whether to grant the relief. 
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true for three reasons: firstly, to the extent that any party of the case has already been presented 
to the arbitral tribunal at the time of the ex parte relief requested, the tribunal is likely to have a 
better understanding of the background to the request and should therefore be less likely to be 
misled by a one-sided presentation of the request. Secondly, where if a party abuses the ex parte 
order by providing inaccurate information to the court and if the court subsequently learns of the 
misrepresentation, the worst that could happen is damages if such a measure is rescinded. By 
contrast, if the requesting party similarly abuses the ex parte process before an arbitral tribunal 
and the tribunal subsequently learns of the deception, the requesting party will have to live with a 
wary or hostile tribunal for the rest of the arbitral proceedings.
614
 
The third objection to the creating of an arbitral ex parte authority is that, since the parties have 
to go court in order to enforce such orders, there is no harm in requesting them from the court in 
the first place. This argument is not persuasive because practitioners know from experience that 
the vast majority of interim measures granted by the arbitral tribunal are adhered to by the parties 
subject to those measures, without any need for court enforcement. Thus, it is entirely possible 
that a party seeking a tribunal ex parte measure will be contented with obtaining such measure 
without taking the second step of seeking court enforcement. As the thesis has already shown 
some of the reasons why parties may prefer tribunals to national courts, including concerns about 
the partiality of certain national courts, there may be much greater scope for courts to display 
their partiality when viewing a request for ex parte measures rather than simply deciding whether 
to enforce a measure already granted by a tribunal. In sum, the fact that some parties may wish to 
seek court enforcement of an interim measure does not in author’s view justify a policy 
prohibiting parties from seeking provisional measures from arbitral tribunals. 
 Granting arbitrators ex parte authority is that it is inconsistent with the consensual nature of the 
arbitral process.
615
 Some arbitrators say that they would feel uncomfortable awarding any relief 
to one party without hearing from the other party, because the arbitral tribunal derives 
itsauthority solely from the consent of the parties in the arbitration.
616
  This argument has 
                                                 
614
 See  UNCITRAL pursuant to proposed  paragraph 7 (g) of the draft revised Article 17, whereby a party seeking  
ex parte measures will be obliged to inform the tribunal of all the relevant information,(including information that 
may not favour the request) whereas in normal courts there will be no such obligation. It seems likely that these 
combined factors will inhibit the abuse of the ex parte process more effectively in arbitration than in courts. 
615
 See Brussels 1 Regulation 44/2001. 
616
 See EAA s.30 and s.38. 
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prompted two rebuttals: firstly, it has been pointed out that, in at least the larger sense, an 
arbitrator acting ex parte will not be acting without the actual consent of both parties, since those 
parties usually have consented to that law either by choosing it to govern their agreement or by 
choosing a site of arbitration within the jurisdiction of that law and pursuant to that law, and thus 
both parties will have equal access to the ex parte mechanism. Secondly, and much more 
fundamentally, an arbitrator who refuses to act at the request of one party even for a short period 
of time before hearing from both parties may, in the author’s view, be acting against the spirit of 
arbitration in a much more basic sense.  In most cases, it is an essential principle of arbitration 
that the parties seek to achieve a fair and effective decision and resolution of their dispute.  
Indeed, a refusal to grant ex parte provisional measures can, in some instances, defeat those 
essential objectives. One can imagine that a tribunal that refuses to consider ex parte provisional 
measures may, at some point, be forced to tell a party something like the following, during 
arbitral proceedings: 
I am sorry to tell the claimant this but any amount the tribunal may grant you in its 
ultimate award in this case will not be worth the paper it is written on because your 
opponent quickly hid his assets as soon as it received notice that you were seeking an 
interim measure to prevent that. But you must understand that even though you had 
demonstrated that you would be irreparable harmed without the measure and that the 
harm would outweigh the harm of the measure to your opponent, and that you offered to 
put up potential security, and would be fully liable if this provision were wrongly 
granted, I could not enter an application for an ex parte provisional measure because this 
would destroy the atmosphere of trust that is a fundamental pillar to arbitration 
proceedings.
617
 
Indeed from the proposed quotation above, it would not be proportionate or consistent with the 
principles of an arbitral tribunal to place the tribunal in such an unwelcome position of having to 
deliver such a speech.
618
  It should however, be noted that when the UNCITRAL Working Group 
                                                 
617Author’s own suggestion. 
618
 In granting provisional measures, the tribunal should make sure that any ex parte order granted is communicated 
and recorded to the respondent later, prior to the inter parties hearing. The tribunal, in promoting natural justice, 
should clearly and explicitly indicate all the reasoning for granting such a measure in the context of the dispute. 
Indeed the doctrine of party autonomy suggests that the hearing be granted whenever requested by any party to 
arbitration. The tribunal is encouraged to consider Article 15 (2) of the ICC. Since the ethos of the tribunal emanates 
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Report was put forward  by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in advance of ex 
parte measures being granted by the tribunal, the ICC objected in favour of the courts. The ICC 
objection was based on its experience of 13,000 arbitral awards over the previous80 years.
619
 The 
ICC argued that in all the arbitral awards conducted or administered no party had ever sought ex 
parte relief from the arbitral tribunal and none had ever been granted. This would be a surprise to 
parties that have not sought ex parte orders under the ICC Rules,
620
 which are widely 
understood.
621
 The ICC proposed that a tribunal receiving a request for interim measures could, 
before hearing from the party against whom the measure is directed.
622
order that party to 
preserve the status quo. The ICC further proposes that the tribunal’s action for an order should 
only take place when the other party has been notified and measure has received notice
623
.  
 The author argues that although the ICC has not conducted any explicit research on the topic of 
ex parte measures,
624
 its proposal  can be seen as a viable solution to the problems the working 
Group
625
 tried to address during its four years of conducting  and debating ex parte reforms.
626
 
The author recommends that although the tribunal has wide powers
627
 in regard to the granting of 
provisional measures, unless arbitral laws in England or member states are amended, the tribunal 
is not in the best position to grant ex parte measures, In addition if such are granted, the courts 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the party autonomy, the ex parte contravenes with this doctrine as adduced in EAA s.38, and s.39. The author 
suggests that under extreme circumstances, such measures should not be granted by the tribunal, because the 
security costs would rarely cover the potential damage or where the subsequent amendment or withdrawal would not 
be sufficient to restore the status quo. 
619
 See US. Position paper to UNCITRAL Re Ex pate Interim Measures (September 2004).A Summary of the 
position of the US Delegation at the Meeting of the UNCITRAL Working Group New York February 23-27, 2004. 
620
 See ICC Arbitral Rules 1998 Article 23 (3) and Article 15 (4) which provides that all parties shall be entitled to 
be present at the hearing. Indeed this approves that the ICC Arbitral rules against the ex parte measures per se. 
621
 Presently, most legislation worldwide, even the English Arbitration Act 1996, does not mention the availability 
of ex parte orders from the arbitral tribunals. What most tribunals do provide is that parties should be given and 
treated equally to present their case or given the full opportunity to present their case, which is mostly supported by 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 18. Many countries in the European Union are against arbitral ex parte orders for 
example; Croatia Arbitration law article 17 92) which states that parties shall have their right to respond to claims 
and allegations of the adversary in order to be enforced. Since arbitral provisional measures are given without the 
other party being informed, the European directive on enforcement will not allow such a measure to be enforced. 
Hence, the ex parte measure without disclosure will be meaningless within the European member states. 
622
See  ICC Final Award 8893 of 1997 9 (Unpublished). 
623
 Ibid. 
624
See  Re Arbitration Union Stearlineriez& Wiener [1917] 1KB 558, where the court held that the arbitrators’ 
powers are limited to order security for costs, and emphasised that it has limitations. 
625
 See ICC Rules Article 15 (2) which provides that “at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.” See. s.30, 39 and 38 of EAA 1996, 
626
 See UNCITRAL Report 2004 AC/CN 9/54. 
627
 See UNCITRAL Article 26 (1) which provides that “the tribunal may grant the interim measures it deems 
necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute, including measures for the conservation of the goods 
forming subject-matter of the dispute or the sale of perishable goods.” 
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will not enforce
628
 them as they are contrary to the principles of natural justice and the Human 
Rights Acts, which are key factors in any due process. 
5.8 Security for payment orders 
 This is a kind of advance payment designed to guarantee the payment
629
 or the enforcement of 
an award where the applicant proves to be right on the merits of the case in dispute.
630
 This sort 
of order is designed to ensure that a party’s substantive claim is well founded and not rendered 
nugatory because of the deterioration in the financial condition of its counter party by diversion 
of assets.    Where it is clear that the applicant may suffer harm, for instance in the ICC case,
631
 
the tribunal may grant security for payment. In that case, where the applicant requested to attach 
the assets of the respondent, the tribunal ordered the respondent to refrain from disposing of the 
assets, since the power to attach assets would not be within the domain of the tribunal. 
The power to grant such order generally arises from the purposive interpretation of the 
arbitration agreement.
632
 For the tribunal to grant such a measure the party has to demonstrate 
that it is highly likely to be of urgency,
633
 or that the award may not be enforced if granted or that 
the claimant may not comply with the award that would be in his favour and that there are fewer 
chances to effect it or enforce it.
634
 The problem that may be faced is that those arbitration 
tribunals do not provide attachment orders which prevent a third party from transferring disputed 
property.
635
 The tribunal in England and Wales 
636
  has the power to grant such orders.
637
 In 
                                                 
628
 See Brussels I Regulation Title III, see ECJ ruling in Danilauler v SNC CouchetFreres, Case C-125/79 [1980] 
ECR 1553, where it was held that ex parte measures under the Enforcement Directive will not be enforced.  Such 
measures have a cross board effect, whereby they cease to have effect, upon the request of the defendant, if the 
applicant does not institute proceedings to a decision on the merits within a determined time. 
629
 See UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17D which allows the tribunal to require, from a party requesting an interim 
measure, appropriate security when the party seeks a preliminary order, unless the tribunal  decides that the security 
would be inappropriate. 
630
 SeeYesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Law ( Kluwer  2005) at 213 
631
 See ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021 (1999) Unpublished. 
632
 Although the arbitration agreement may be interpreted to give authority in regard to security for costs, many 
arbitral rules have not explicitly given effect to this notion, for example; Article 25 (1) (a) of the LCIA. See Interim 
Award No.1694 (21 Dec 1996), extracts printed in XXIII YCA 97 (1998). See ICC Partial award 8115 (1995) 
extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 65 (2000). See Supreme Court Ruling in the state of 
Massachusetts (USA) in Charles Construction Co. V Derderian, 586 NE 2d 1125  ( 3d Cir. 1972) , where  it was 
held that the power of the tribunal to grant security for costs is silent. 
633
 See ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021  ( 1999) Unpublished, where the tribunal refused to grant security 
for a payment order on the grounds that the applicant had failed to sufficiently substantiate the existence of reparable 
prejudice and that there was no urgency. 
634
 See ICC Interim award 8786 of 1996, extracts, published in 11 91) int’l Ct Arb Bull 81-84 ( 2000). 
635
 See ICC Rules Articles 30 & 31. 
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order for such an order to be rendered, the moving party has to demonstrate that it is highly 
likely that the award, if it were rendered in its favour, would not be enforced. 
In some states this is referred to as “cautiojudicatumsolvi”,638 the duty of an alien claimant to 
provide security for the costs of its defendant. 
639
 The power is derived from the Arbitration 
Act.
640
The main objective is to cover the likely amounts that would be awarded to the counter-
party
641
 in the event that it prevailed in the arbitration tribunal and was entitled to recover its 
legal costs.
642
 This provisional measure is only provided by the English arbitral tribunals
643
 or 
Commonwealth countries as in most states it is not available.
644
 
 The tribunal in such a case
645
 will have to consider the financial state of the party from whom 
security is requested,
646
 the extent to which third parties are funding the costs and the likely 
consequences in enforcing the award.
647
 The English courts
648
 will only entertain such 
application for costs in very limited circumstances.
649
 However, many states are in favour of 
national courts ordering such a remedy.
650
 
 
 
5.9 Enforcement of confidentiality obligations 
The question is to what extent is the confidential order enforced in arbitral proceedings? 
                                                                                                                                                             
636
 See LCIA  Article 25 (1) a, and EAA 1996s. 44 and 43. 
637
 English Arbitration Act 1996 s.39 ( 2) (b). 
638
Yaslimark, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Law at 216. 
639
 Arbitration Act 1996 s.38(3)  Tribunal (not the courts) can order security for costs; 
640
 See English Arbitration Act 1996, s.42 which provides that a court can only make such orders if it is satisfied that 
the person to whom the tribunal’s order was directed has had sufficient time to comply. 
641
 Arbitration Act 1996 S.41 Extension of a tribunal‘s powers. 
642
Ibid s.59-65. 
643
 LCIA article 25 (2) provides security for legal costs or other costs of any party. 
644
 See the model law Article 17 which does not grant the arbitral tribunal authority to order security for costs 
645
 See Ken Ren [1994] 2 WLR 631. This extended the power of the tribunal to grant security for costs under s.38 of 
the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
Blackaby, Paratasides and Hunter,
646
 on International Arbitration (5
th
Edition  2009) Oxford University Press at 324. 
647
 See Copper v Lavalin Sa v Ken –RenChem and Fertilizers Ltd[ 1994] 2 ALL ER 449. 
648
 See the power of courts provided under s.42, 44 and 45. 
649
 See s. 44 (5)of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
650
Frontier International Shipping Corp v The Owners and All Others, interested in the ship Tavors [200] F.C 427  
(Federal Court of Canada). 
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 As opposed to litigation, arbitration proceedings have always been considered to be private in 
nature. Indeed this has always been touted as one of its advantages. However, does the nature of 
arbitration translate into an obligation of confidentiality that binds the parties to the arbitration 
agreement? The answer to this question has a significant impact, only on whether documents 
used in one arbitration can later be disclosed in subsequent proceedings whether arbitral or 
litigious in nature, but also on the attractiveness of arbitration to potential disputants.
651
 
Under the English case law, courts have taken positive views on the matter in the leading 
authority of Dollington Baker v Merrett,
652
 where it was held that parties within arbitration 
agreement or proceedings were under an implied obligation to keep the proceedings and 
documents arising from  confidential. However, the Australian view in the Australian High Court 
in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman,
653
was centrally opposite, as the court held that 
parties are not owed a duty of care for confidential information or documents to the proceedings. 
It should be noted that the Australian view has been critiqued in common wealth states and is not 
followed by many states, for example; Singapore,
654
 one of the leading centres for arbitral 
disputes has adopted the English model. 
It is not uncommon for commercial agreements to include confidentiality provisions, aimed at 
safe guarding one or both parties’ commercial, financial, or other confidence. In practice, 
arbitration agreements and national laws impose confidentiality obligations on parties with 
regard to the materials produced in arbitration. Damages are seldom a satisfactory remedy for 
breach of confidentiality obligations, because of the difficulty in establishing causation and 
directness. It is therefore appropriate, and generally necessary, for tribunals to issue provisional 
measures ordering confidentiality. 
                                                 
651
 See case of Banco de Conception v Manfra, Tordella & Brooke  70 AD. 2d 840 ( 1
st
Dept 197), see International 
Components Corp v Klaiber 54 AD.2d 550,387 N.Y s.2d 253 ( 1
st
Dept 1976), where the appellate Division declined 
to require disclosure in aid of arbitration where the party seeking the disclosure had alleged that fraud was involved 
in the making of the underlying contract. This decision follows those cases that direct the question of fraudulent 
inducement which may be covered by arbitration.  See Holzman v Manhattan Bronx Surface Transit Operating 
Authority27 AD.2d 346, 347 (1st Dept 2000). 
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[1991] 2 ALL ER 890. 
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[1995] 128 ALR 391. 
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See Mynmayaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v Win Win Nu [2003] SGHC 124. 
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5.9.1 A Critical analysis of the English approach on the confidentiality interim order 
The traditional starting point in considering the English position is the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on Dolling-Baker v Merrett.
655
 In that case, the plaintiff had applied for the specific 
discovery, production and inspection of various documents in the defendants’ possession.  
Specifically, it wanted certain witness statements, transcripts of witness testimony and the 
arbitral award that arose from an earlier arbitration that the defendants had been involved in. The 
Court of Appeal held that parties to arbitration were under an implied obligation not to use or 
disclose, without the consent of the other party or with leave of court, all such documents. It 
further held that this implied obligation arose from the private nature of the arbitration. It was 
satisfied that despite the implied obligation, disclosure and inspection were necessary for the fair 
disposal of the action, so that consideration had to prevail.  It should be highlighted that the 
Court of Appeal applied a two-stage test. First, there was the preliminary question of whether 
there was in fact some form of obligation on arbitral parties not to disclose (confidentiality 
orders) arbitral documents. It was found that there was indeed such a confidential obligation. 
Secondly, in examining the confidential provisional measure, the court applied the usual test for 
determining the question of discovery of specific documents where it was necessary for the fair 
disposal of the action. 
Since the Court of Appeal ruling in support of the confidentiality, it has given precedent to many 
cases, for example; Hassneh Insurance Co of Israeli v Steuart Jew,
656
 where the English High 
Court considered the confidential obligation. The court examined the duty of secrecy owed by 
the bank to his customers and expectations to that duty and noted that a similar qualification 
must be implied as a matter of business efficacy in the duty of confidence arising under the 
arbitration agreement.  
The irony in regard to this ruling is that the court held that if there were conflicting interests, 
657
between the tribunal and the courts in regard to the order of confidentiality, it was for the 
courts to solve such conflicts. One may argue that the arbitral tribunal may not be the best way to 
handle confidential provisional measures given that the courts have such powers, and no clear 
                                                 
655
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656[1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 243. 
657
 See Re Application of Busch [2001] WLR 191. 
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explicit clause that adduces such power within the English Arbitration Act 1996.
658
 Indeed the 
ruling of the case above has been applied in progressive cases.
659
 
5.10 Measures for later enforcement of award 
There may be a need to avoid the dissipation of assets whereby the final judgment or award 
could be satisfied. This type of measure is apparently aimed at not leaving the winning party 
empty-handed with pyric victory, where all assets of the losing party were flown away. 
Examples in this category include; orders not to move assets or the subject matter of the dispute 
out of a jurisdiction; orders for depositing in a joint account the amount in dispute or for 
depositing movable property in dispute with a third party; orders to a party or parties to provide 
security or a guarantee for costs of arbitration or orders for all or part of the amount claimed 
from the party.
660
 Due to the nature of the rules, as a structural framework for parties agreeing to 
arbitration instead of legislative regime, the working Group agreed in its earlier meeting that the 
provisions of Model Law Chapter IVA regarding enforcement of arbitral awards would not be 
included in the revised Arbitral Rules.
661
 The difficulty in enforcing this order is that no clear 
provisions, in the English Arbitral Rules under LCIA or the English Arbitration Act 1996 
address this scenario.  
                                                 
658
  It should be noted that any court involvement in arbitral proceedings wrecks arbitration part autonomy, it should, 
however, be noted that no dispute mechanism can stand alone as an island. In order for arbitral confidentiality 
provisional measures to be enforced, there is a need for the courts, otherwise at times, the tribunal may not be able to 
grant such measures, even if a granted problem of enforcement may arise. 
659
 See Insurance Co v Lloyd’s Sundicate[1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271, where the Court accepted the test for 
confidentiality of an arbitral award established in Hassneh Insurance Co of Isleal v Mew[1993]2 Lloyd’s Rep 243. 
See London and Leeds estate Ltd Paribus Ltd (No.2), where an expert witness in the previous arbitration was also a 
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various statements made in the current arbitration that were inconsistent with those made by him in the various 
arbitrations. This held that parties in arbitration owed each other a duty of confidentiality. It also accepted that an 
expert witness owed a duty to the party instructing him to keep the evidence confidential from previous arbitration. 
From the case, the duty of keeping a confidential obligation was extended beyond of the early cases.  It should be 
noted that in order to enhance the confidential provisional measures, both the tribunal and courts need to work 
together given the complexity of the documents or the arbitral awards. See Highwater mark: Ali Shipping Corp v 
shipyard Trogir[19898] 2 ALL ER 136 or [19911 WLR 314.  
660
Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Arbitration. 
661
 See UNCITRAL Report of Working Group (Arbitration and Reconciliation) on the Work of its forty-fifth 
session, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.A?CN.9/614 (October 5, 2006) (2006 Working Group 
Report) Agreeing that the new version of Rules should be revised in light of Chapter IV of the Model Law at 104-
05. 
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 It should be noted that while the Model Law contains detailed provisions relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of provisional measures,
662
 the international arbitral rules are still 
silent. Model Law enforcement provisions require national courts to recognise arbitral interim 
measures as well as specifying grounds for refusing recognition,
663
and are outside the scope of 
any arbitral tribunal’s powers. Likewise, no independent agreement to abide by the decisions of 
an arbitral tribunal could dictate the scope of the national courts’ powers to issue interim 
measures concurrently, this is a matter solely within the purview of domestic legislatures.
664
   
Most of the arbitral enforcement orders granted by the tribunal are not adversely affected 
because of the rules which independent parties agree to abide by and could never encompass 
such measures. It is very unfortunate that few states have amended Model law by passing parallel 
legislature, to affect the powers of courts and tribunal. 
5.11 Form of provisional measures: order or award 
Assuming that an arbitral tribunal concludes that provisional measures are appropriate, questions 
arise as to what form such measures should take. In practice, provisional measures can be 
granted as either an award or an order. Additionally, a tribunal can invite or recommend that 
parties comply with specific directions. A tribunal has the discretion in deciding upon the form 
of its provisional measure, although that discretion must be guided by the objectives of achieving 
the ends aimed at by the provisional measures. An order can be granted more promptly than an 
award.  Provisional measures issued in the form of an interim award may enjoy greater 
enforceability in national courts, as compared to an order. There is no reason why a tribunal may 
not take this course, particularly when there are concerns regarding compliance with its 
provisional measures. The arbitral tribunal, before granting such measures, should ordinarily be 
addressed to the parties in mandatory, not optional terms, as an order or direction, rather than a 
recommendation.
665
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5.12 Measures concerning preservation of evidence 
Preservation of evidence 
666
on an interim basis is generally sought where there is a risk that the 
evidence will be harmed or destroyed,
667
 if an urgent measure is not taken.
668
 The main purpose 
is to facilitate arbitration proceedings,
669
whereby the evidence that would otherwise be 
unavailable at a later stage of the proceedings is preserved.
670
 The arbitral power to preserve 
evidence is recognized under all arbitration rules and governing laws containing provisions on 
provisional measures. It is necessary to have sufficient evidence to bring a valid claim against the 
defendant and sufficient assets against which a judgment can be enforced. Arbitration laws may 
grant specific powers to national courts to support arbitration through the granting of interim 
injunctions to preserve evidence,
671
 for example, the English Arbitration Act grants the courts, in 
cases of urgency, the same powers to order the preservation of evidence or preservation of 
property in arbitration as in court proceedings. The key issue is the need to protect the rights 
which would be the subject of the tribunal.
672
 It should be noted the powers of the judicial courts 
is an aid to support arbitral proceedings, but not in the context that the arbitral tribunal cannot 
grant such orders. 
5.13 Measures for later enforcement of award 
There may be a need to avoid the dissipation of assets for which the final judgment or award 
could be satisfied. This type of measure is apparently aimed at not leaving the winning party 
empty-handed with pyric victory, where all assets of the losing party were flown away. 
Examples of this category include; orders not to move assets or the subject matter of the dispute 
of a jurisdiction; orders for depositing in a joint account the amount in dispute or for depositing 
movable property in dispute with a third party; orders to a party or parties to provide security or a 
guarantee for costs of arbitration or orders for all or part of the amount claimed from the party.
673
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5.14 Emergency provisional measure 
The emergency arbitral tribunal is normally given broad powers in conducting proceedings in 
order to facilitate a smooth and rapid resolution of the case.
674
 This is because in any commercial 
dealing time is of the essence. Under the doctrine of competence-competence, this expressly 
provides that the referee deals with challenges to its jurisdiction.
675
 All emergency arbitral 
provisional measure rules aim at providing a speedy mechanism for obtaining a provisional 
measure.
676
 An arbitrator, in such circumstances, is selected from the permanent members of the 
committee. The party of an arbitration agreement, supporting documents or arguments can apply 
for a provisional measure to the permanent committee before the formation of the tribunal. The 
failure to abide by the decision may lead to the non-complying parties’ responsibility for the 
damages and costs of those interim measures. It should be noted that where the arbitral tribunal 
is unable to grant provisional measures, the court is the only forum to seek such measures. The 
arbitral tribunal has a long history of granting interim measures under rules and major 
institutions.
677
 But what if one desperately needs interim measures before the tribunal is 
constituted? Situations that cry out for instant relief might include the following; firstly, a current 
strategic partner has announced that it is leaving a long-running commercial relationship for a 
competitor and the other party is concerned about the use of proprietary information obtained by 
the departing partner. Secondly, a company has refused to make a critical contract progress 
payment, putting a fast track project at risk and lastly, a state or controlled entity has taken steps 
that require either abandonment or forfeiture of a private investor’s holdings.  The inability to 
provide urgent measures, before a tribunal is set to trigger doubt, of whether the tribunal has the 
ability to grant emergency provisional measures, without the support of municipal courts. 
However, in the author’s view, a request by a party to court or channelling a party to court is a 
breach of the original arbitration agreement or parties’ intention to refer commercial disputes to 
arbitration, a neutral party-determined authority. In other words, a provisional measure from a 
court infringes the parties’ initial will of neutrality opted out. Indeed, it may be further argued 
that this is an open invitation to abuse of the doctrine of confidentiality and a waiver of the rights 
                                                 
674
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to arbitrate. The courts will only be supportive(subdiarity model)
678
 where the arbitral has given 
reference to the dispute,
679
 for example; where the request to a court is made prior to an 
application for an emergency provisional measure to any arbitration institution, the court seizes 
the case. The logic in such a dilemma is to avoid a duplication of fora and unwanted 
contradictions between the decisions of the judicial court and the tribunal. In some 
circumstances, where the request is made to judicial courts after the commencement of the 
arbitral proceedings, an emergency arbitrator has the power in principle, to retain his emergency 
powers and his decision.
680
 The author further recommends that English arbitrators should set 
emergency arbitrators to handle urgent cases before the composition of the tribunal has been 
established, or challenged by a recalcitrant party, as a case in the USA, where the AAA,
681
 
developed option rules for emergency protection. The International Chamber of Commerce 
Rules have developed rules for Pre–Arbitral Referee Procedure.682 These options allow a party 
to request the appointment of a special arbitrator or referee by an administrator.
683
 Once 
assigned, the special arbitrator will hear the party’s request for an interim measure and decide 
whether to grant the measure prior to the formation of the tribunal. A different approach has been 
adopted in the statute of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
684
where the president of the Court himself may, at the 
request of a party, determine the amount and form of security for the claim. It should be noted 
that, at times, the court involvement prior to the constitution of the tribunal, will not be seen as a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate and may undermine the parties’ forum for the resolution of 
disputes or infringe the confidentiality doctrine, hence an open invitation for the abuse of the 
system. Therefore, in order to increase the effectiveness of arbitration during the early stages of 
the arbitral proceedings, several major permanent international arbitration institutions provided 
the possibility of obtaining interim measures prior to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal with 
                                                 
678
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the help of the emergency arbitrator specifically appointed for that purpose.
685
 Despite the fact 
that such efforts to keep as much power decision-making as possible under the aegis of the 
arbitral tribunal are positive, the author  strongly doubts the use of the possible inclusion of 
“emergency arbitrator” rules into the English Arbitration Act 1996. Emergency  arbitral rules 
would be of great value in strengthening the institute of arbitration in England if implemented. 
5.15 Injunction orders 
The word injunction means a temporary order to refrain from doing something, within the 
arbitral context where an applicant seeks an order, to stop the respondent from selling, engaging, 
hiding, or disposing of property to another jurisdiction or within the same jurisdiction pending 
the final award, and this type of injunction is referred to as Mareve injunctions or freezing orders. 
In some circumstances, injunctions may be an order stopping another party from commencing 
proceedings to another jurisdiction if such proceedings had already commenced in England or 
when a party commences proceedings to municipal courts in breach of the agreed dispute 
resolution mechanism, in fear of palliative conflicting decisions, which is termed as an “anti-suit 
injunction”. 
In this subsection, the thesis examines the two main forms of injunction, and the question is 
whether the arbitral tribunal can grant such arbitral measures effectively or whether the arbitral 
tribunal has the actual authority to deliver on these two types of arbitral provisional measures. 
5.15.1 Anti-suit Injunctions 
In England and Wales there is no explicit law or arbitral rules that provide authority to  
arbitrators to grant anti-suit injunctions or to stay proceedings, pending the decision of the 
arbitral tribunal. Such orders are granted by the courts as a supportive model to enhance arbitral 
proceedings. Indeed, English courts have traditionally exercised the power to enjoin foreign 
litigation which is brought in violation of an arbitration agreement.
686
Under English law, 
injunctions may ordinarily be granted against the prosecution of a foreign litigation if it is 
established that the forum has sufficient interest in or connection with the matter in 
question.
687
Many English decisions have affirmed the existence of this power in emphatic 
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terms.
688
 The fact that the mechanism of an anti-suit injunction originates from common law 
systems in no way means that the disruption of the arbitration process is an ambush. One of the 
biggest powers in support of arbitration during proceedings is the granting of anti-suit 
injunctions by English courts in order to halt any proceedings in a foreign state, in violation of 
the arbitration agreement, which was inaugurated Millet LJ in Angelic Grace.
689
 Despite many 
debates, the English power to issue an anti-suit as a provisional measure have not diminished.
690
 
The notion is that in issuing anti-suit injunctions, arbitrators are making use of the powers 
exclusively vested in them by national courts. This echoes past debates over the power of the 
arbitrators to ward punitive damages. Such power is rooted in the well-recognised principles of 
international arbitration law, namely the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to sanction all breaches of 
the arbitration agreement and the arbitrators’ power to any appropriate measure either to avoid 
aggravation of the dispute or to ensure the effectiveness of their future award. The UNCITRAL 
Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation stated in its report that there were reservations 
expressed about including clause (b) Part 2 of Article 17 into the amendments of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, given that such injunctions were unknown and that there was no 
uniformity in practice relating thereto. As well as this, it was said that anti-suit injunctions did 
not always have the provisional nature of interim measures.
691
Nonetheless, the working Group 
decided,
692
  that a party can bypass domestic an anti-suit injunction and simply apply for an anti-
suit injunction from the arbitral tribunal, and such an order would be enforceable in another 
                                                 
688
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country under UNCITRAL Model Law.
693
 In England, the success of this provision is still 
debatable, thus many anti-suit injunctions are sought from courts. 
5.15.2 Freezing orders 
The question that commonly arises is do arbitrators have the power to grant freezing orders? 
This provisional measure developed
694
 as a form of recourse against foreign based defendants 
with assets within the UK and consequently the early authorities assumed that the order was not 
available against English based defendants. In the same vain, an early judicial guideline for the 
granting of the order required claimants to establish a risk of the removal of assets from 
jurisdiction.  The power of arbitral power to order freezing orders has been debatable and many 
jurisdictions are in favour of municipal courts,
695
 on the grounds that arbitral tribunal has no 
coercive power to grant them or that they do not bind third parties. It should, however, be noted 
that an arbitral tribunal has implied authority to grant such measures.
696
 
The question of whether the arbitral tribunal can grant freezing orders was brought to attention 
by Rix LJ in the famous case of Kastener v Jason.
697
 In this case, two partners, Mr Ernest 
Kastner and Mr Marc Jason, agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration under Jewish law subject 
to the English Arbitration Act 1996. Mr Kastner invested in Marc Jason’s business, and later 
sought to recover his investment in arbitration before the Beth Din (Jewish arbitration tribunal or 
the Federation of Synagogues, a court of Jewish law). The parties agreed to comply with the 
orders of the tribunal or comply with any sanctions of the tribunal where an order was not 
complied with. In due process, Kastner complained that his investment in Jason’s business was 
procured by fraud in 2001, the Beth Din made an award in Mr Jason’s favour, on the basis that 
fraud had been established. 
 The arbitral tribunal granted a freezing order against Jackson, refraining him from selling his 
house in Helmsdale Gardens until he received permission from the Beth Din.  On application by 
                                                 
693
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Kastner on 27 February 2002 and pursuant to the powers invested in the tribunal by virtue of the 
Arbitration Act 1996,
698
it ordered Jason from taking any steps altering the status quo regarding 
ownership of the property until permission was granted. Later, he made an application of caution 
on the land registry to protect his interest in the property with the permission of the tribunal. 
Indeed, the respondent Jason agreed in March to comply with the arbitral order. However, on 11 
April 2002, in fragrant breach of the direction of the agreement, Jason entered into a contract of 
sale and completed the contract of sale of the property to Mr and Mrs Sherman and decamped to 
the USA.  Mr Sherman’s solicitor (Brian of famer? Millar) inexplicably failed, when he carried 
out his Land Registry search, to read the caution. In negligence of the caution, and with the 
constructive notice, Sherman proceeded to complete the purchase on 20 May 2002. They paid 
the full purchase price and Mr Jason executed the transferred his interest to them. Sherman 
financed the purchase in part with an HSBC mortgage. The balance was paid after two prior 
mortgages were discharged. The tribunal, after finding fraud on the property and profits of sale, 
awarded quantified damages payable to Kastner to the sum of £237,224.50.
699
 The purchasers in 
regard of this property found later that their property could not be registered. They commenced 
proceedings against Mr Kastner on the grounds that they were not party to the arbitration 
agreement as third parties.
700
 
 The Court of Appeal explicitly declined to make any final determination of this question and the 
central planks of the debate would seem to be of the following; 
(a) Section 39 (2) (a) envisages an order for the disposition of property “as between the 
parties.” And this might appear to exclude the making of freezing orders under s.39, 
despite an agreement opting into s.39. 
(b) On the other hand, the powers listed at s.39 (2) are mainly given by way of example; this 
includes the only limitations to s.39 which are (I) that parties have conferred the powers 
                                                 
698
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699
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to the tribunal,
701
 and that the provisional orders given under this section might be given 
in a final award.
702
 
5.16 Reform 
As a matter of urgency, the English Arbitration Act 1996 needs to be amended to address the 
issue of emergency provisional measures. The fact that s.45 of the Act provides some assistance 
by reference to courts is not a better solution.
703
 Equally when scanning the remedies requested 
by claimants in their submission, it is common or garden to be asked to award damages, interest 
and costs. However, if other remedies are perhaps requested for example; declarations, specific 
performance or injunctions, it is common that such measures are associated with the courts. The 
Arbitration Act 1996 deals with provisional measures relatively briefly in only three 
sections,
704
which are too brief and ambivalent, contrary to Model Law Article 17 which provides 
that; 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may at the request of a party to such 
interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of 
the subject matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide 
appropriate security with such measure.” 
From the above quotation, it is very clear that the Model Law is more openly textured than the 
current EAA 1996, and has no list of powers, such as is contained in the two EAA sections (38 
and 39). This indeed raises a question: is our list of arbitral power to grant provisional measures 
exhaustive? The power under Article 17 can only be exercised at the request of a party; no such 
trigger is mentioned in our sections which immediately raise the question of whether the arbitral 
tribunal acting under 1996 Act under s.38 and 39,cangrant all provisional measures?  s.39 and 
s.38 only explicitly deal with three matters; the costs of the arbitration, and orders regarding 
property and remedies. None of the three sections specifically deals with anti-suit injunctions or 
                                                 
701
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freezing orders. s.48 is open to arbitral tribunal to grant remedies, and the list is not exhaustive, 
hence presumably leaving it to the substantive law applicable to dictate which remedies can be 
granted. 
The author recommends that in order for the arbitral proceedings to run smoothly, parties need to 
expressly provide in their agreement to obtain an emergency measure or to contractually create 
their own emergency rules under party autonomy. In addition, the English arbitral rules and laws 
should create a standing panel approach. This is practised by international arbitral rules,
705
 and 
mainly in Italy which provides a mechanism for the arbitral handling of emergency measures 
under Italian arbitral rules. The Italian Rules provide or set a permanent committee mechanism 
that deals with any emergency provisional measures.
706
 The English arbitration court should 
further adopt the Pre-Arbitration Referee Procedure of the ICC,
707
 or WIPO Draft Emergency 
Rules,
708
 which provides that an emergency arbitrator shall conduct the procedure in such a 
manner as the emergency arbitrators considers appropriate under the doctrine of competence-
competence. 
Given the supervisory support of the judicial courts,
709
 the arbitral tribunal’s lack of coercive 
powers to order freezing orders and anti-suit injunctions should not be denied the opportunity to 
grant provisional measures, since those that it fails to enforce, it has a mutual relationship with 
the courts, to help where it has some short-comings. 
Further, the English Arbitration Act should adopt the German Model,
710
 which provides all 
powers exclusive to the arbitral tribunal to all commercial matters emanating out of the 
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arbitration agreement.
711
 Indeed this adduces that English law on freezing orders needs more 
changes if England is to be a better venue for arbitration and enforcement. The law in this case is 
not straight forward, and should provide a remedy especially to third parties.  Although the 
tribunal has a wide scope of power, under s.39(1), it does not confer powers to the tribunal to 
make freezing orders, even when the parties do give such powers to the tribunal as the case 
above.
712
 
The Report on the Arbitration Bill,
713
 which provides Mareva injunctions only to be judicial 
instruments, is misguiding and many arbitrators are unhappy with such powers. It would be 
desirable to give the arbitral tribunal power to make provisional orders where the parties have so 
agreed. The expert reports should be a key factor in regard to provisional remedies, and the 
expert report should be given consideration in cases of enforcement. If the law is not changed the 
role of the provisional measures will be irrelevant since at the time of the final award, the subject 
matter of the dispute will already be disposed and the defendant can even have a safe haven in 
another country. 
The author argues that although the tribunal has autonomy to grant any measures, its authority is 
limited, and on such a basis, it is paramount that courts are seen as hosts in arbitral proceedings, 
not as a disruption mechanism. The Supreme Court Act
714
 provides that the injunction may be 
granted to prevent a defendant from removing from the jurisdiction or otherwise dealing with the 
assets.
715
s.37 provides the basis of the jurisdiction for granting freezing orders in all cases as it 
appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so. The Court of Appeal held 
716
that the 
wording of sub section 3 did not restrict the scope, geographical or otherwise.
717
  Civil Procedure 
Rules
718
currently further provide that the injunctions may be granted in relation to assets whether 
located within the jurisdiction or not. Indeed, it would be disproportionate to deny such a chance 
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to parties in pretext of party autonomy,
719
 which is toothless and meaningless in regard to this 
type of provisional remedy. 
 
5.17 Conclusion 
Provisional measures assist in facilitating the effectiveness of arbitration in providing an 
effective means for the interim protection of rights at the pre-formation stage. Indeed, there is a 
growing recognition of provisional measures. When parties enter into an arbitration agreement 
which is a wide phrase, they usually intend to require that all their disputes (provisional 
measures) be settled under the arbitral contract. This may be an implied term or clause in the 
contract, for instance, applying the officious bystander test, where the parties submit to 
arbitration to exclude disputes over the validity of the agreement, thus the separability principle 
gives effect to the will of the parties. Simply by denying the parties that the main contract is 
valid, one party can deprive the arbitrator of competence to rule upon that allegation, so this 
provides a loophole for the parties to repudiate their obligation to arbitrate. With respect to the 
injunctions, all injunctions have the capacity to be abused and used as a vehicle for mischief 
making. If an injunction fails to reach its target, it will not be respected by another court and 
could be a source of a second litigation front, which the parties no doubt would have wished to 
avoid. There also exists the possibility that one injunction may led to a battle of injunctions.  
Under competence-competence, the tribunal can handle such problems to avoid abusive anti-
arbitration injunctions. 
It is a common phenomenon nowadays that parties to arbitration expressly empower the arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures, on the grounds that the arbitration agreement is a separate 
contract and that the arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to rule on any dispute in their domain. 
The two doctrines (Separability and Competence-Komptenz) are often called the corner stones of 
international arbitration as they are both derived from the arbitral agreement, that provide the 
arbitrators with tools of granting provisional measures, as they work hand in glove, to maximize 
the effectiveness of arbitration as an effective means of resolving international disputes and 
minimizing the temptation of delay tactics. 
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Since arbitral provisional measures are granted in inter parties’ proceedings in which both the 
applicant and the respondent are heard in adversarial proceedings, there is some debate in regard 
to ex parte provisional measures, on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal does not have set 
standards for such measures like courts. This criticism should not be borne in mind, since now 
the Arbitration Act, for example; s.44(5) provides a subsidiary mechanism in support of any 
lacunae in arbitral proceedings and the UNCITRAL 2006 revision.
720
 Further, the English 
Arbitration Act should adopt the German Model,
721
 which provides all powers exclusively to the 
arbitral tribunal to all commercial matters emanating out of the arbitration agreement.
722
 
 Although there some hurdles set up to keep provisional measures as much as possible in the 
realm of the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal is not in the best interest of the applicant seeking the 
freezing order.
723
 The issue is that freezing orders to be enforced need a court order.
724
 This 
argument is restricted since now the courts work in mutual respect of arbitral proceedings, the 
assistance of the courts to issue such a measure is not an indication of poor relations with the 
arbitral tribunal historically but a change in the way courts sees the arbitral tribunal as the best 
forum for any arbitral proceedings.
725
 The English courts convert the breach of an arbitral order 
into a contempt of court.
726
 
 Although the arbitral tribunal has the authority to grant provisional measures,
727
 which is 
supported internationally for example, the New York Convention, Hong Kong law,
728
 the LCIA 
and UNCITRAL. It is clear that the arbitral tribunal cannot grant some urgent measures, for 
example; ex parte orders or freezing orders and anti-suit injunctions without the support of the 
courts. Hence, in order to avoid commercial litigants losing their claims and avoiding the 
dissipation of assets by defendants, courts are invited to give a legal effect, to avoid making the 
award meaningless. 
                                                 
720
 UNCITRAL Model Law article 17 B. 
721
 See Berger,(1998) “The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany” Mealey’s International 
Arbitration Report,13 (1) at 38-54. 
722
 See Germany’s Code Civil Procedure (CCP) 1998 s.1033, s.916, s.1945, s.1041 (2), and Article 103 of the 
German Constitution. 
723
 See Hunter and Redfern, on International Commercial Arbitration.(5
th
 edition 2009) at 322. 
724
 Arbitration Act s.66 (1) and s.42 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
725
Ibid. s.39, 44 (5) and s.45. 
726
 Ibid s. 44 (2) (c) and 43 (2). 
727
 See Andrews,N (1994) Principles of Civil Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell) at 39. 
728
See  s.34 C (1) of Part 11A  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance 1997. 
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                                   CHAPTER SIX 
6 Powers of the courts in granting measures in support of arbitral proceedings 
6.1 Introduction 
Arbitration is a process carried out pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate (party autonomy).
729
 If 
the agreement is not to arbitrate, then the process cannot be said to be arbitration.
730
 Interim 
measures of arbitration are an interface between the settlements of private disputes.
731
 The 
interface between national courts and the arbitral tribunal,
732
 which is both complex and ever 
changing,
733
 is not the harmonious product of an agreement between the parties to an arbitration 
agreement.
734
 In many cases, the national courts are less suitable for the settlement of such 
complex international transactions, and arbitration is structured specifically to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes arising from transactions between parties from different states.
735
 The 
enactment of the English Arbitration Act was intended to mark a departure from the traditional 
                                                 
729
 See  Mavani v  Ralli Bros [1973] 1 WLR 468, which held that if the arbitration agreement expressly stipulates 
that a party shall not apply to a national court for an order of the type in question, the principle of party autonomy 
will almost always require the municipal courts to honour the agreement and abstain from exercising its powers.  
730
See Eketrim v Vivendi Universal, [The Episilon Rosa [2003] EWCA Civ 938 at 34-40., where the parties agreed 
to settle disputes under LCIA, to avoid conflicting decisions of Geneva. The court refused to grant an anti-suit 
injunction on the grounds that a stay would breach party autonomy. The powers which are granted by the parties or 
any set of rules are valid within the boundaries of the “lexarbitri”. In other words, while the arbitration derives their 
powers from the parties the courts derive their powers from the state. 
731
 See Strumpffabrik GmbH v Bentley Engineering Co.Ltd [1962] 2 QB 587, where Kerr LJ at 304, in reference to 
ICC at 304 said that “the rules provide a code that it intends to be self –sufficient, in the sense that it is capable of 
covering all aspects of arbitrations conducted under the rules, without a need for any recourse to any municipal 
system of law or any application to the courts of the forum.” In other words, English courts should be very slow in 
intervening in the arbitral process, due to party autonomy doctrine. See Bingham LJ in KS Bani v Korea Ship 
building and Engineering Corporation[1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 445. 
732
 See Article 1672 of the Belgian Judicial Code, which provides authority to competent courts to grant interim 
measures. The introduction of a case before the judicial authorities does not imply a renunciation of the arbitration 
agreement or clause. 
733
 See Lord Denning in David Taylor& Sons v Barnett Trading Company [1958] 1WLR 562 at 570, where he said 
that “there is not one law for arbitrators and another for the court”. The orthodox view was to ensure that the courts 
involvement is not a threat to the arbitration process. 
734
 See Chamber J in Auber v Maze [1801] 2 Bos. &Pul at 375, where he said that “there is no doubt that an 
arbitrator bound by the rules of law lie every judge, and if it appears on the face of record, that the arbitrator has 
acted contrary of law, his award may be set aside.” 
735
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration Art 17,UN Doc A /40/17,UN Sales No. E.08.V.4            
(2008),  athttp://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration.  
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courts and enforce the doctrine of party autonomy.
736
The question that arises is whether the 
parties may validly agree, in their arbitration agreement or elsewhere to exclude the possibility 
of recourse to courts for the purpose of obtaining provisional measures. 
 English law should be viewed through the prism of  s.1 (c) of the Arbitration  model, where 
interim measures in the first place are applied for before the arbitrator, and the court intervention 
is the last resort. This approach shifts interim measures as far as possible to the realm of the 
Arbitration Act 1996,
737
 which makes it clear that court should not intervene except as provided 
by the Act. In other words,  English law provides an approach that is usually  called a “court 
subsidiarity”. Since arbitration is the creation of the parties, it is important to establish its legal 
nature, in order to decide whether it is subject to any legal regulation or not. Arbitration is not 
purely a private matter of contract in which parties have given up all their rights to engage 
judicial power and it is not wholly divorced from the exercise of public authority.
738
 In spite of 
the protestation of party autonomy, arbitration wholly depends on the underlying support of the 
courts that alone have the power to rescue the system when one party seeks to sabotage 
it.
739
Courts are called upon to determine a question of arbitration jurisdiction, before or during 
the arbitral proceedings.
740
Today, most arbitration laws and rules assume that the court and 
arbitration have a concurrent jurisdiction to grant interim measures in international arbitration. 
There are however, variations among jurisdictions as to how and when each decision-maker 
should be involved.
741
 
                                                 
736
 See Lord Steyn in response to Model Law of Arbitration (1994) 10 Arbitration International 1 at 10, where he 
said that “the supervisory jurisdiction of English courts over arbitration is more extensive than in most countries, 
notably because of the limited appeal on question of law and the power to remit.” 
737
  In Nomihold Securities INC v Mobile Telesystems Finance SA,[2012] Bus LR 1289 at  26, Andrew Smith  found 
that s.1( c) does not limit the court’s jurisdiction, but provides statutory guidance about when it should be exercised 
in relation to arbitration to which Part 1 of the 1996 Act applies. He noted that parties in arbitration could not 
preclude the court’s jurisdiction by an agreement between them anymore than they could confer jurisdiction on the 
court. 
738
See EAA s. 12 (1) and (3). 
739
 See Robert Merkin Arbitration Act 1996 at 72, where he asserts that judicial courts are ordinarily called upon 
when pathological situations occur during the course of arbitration in a supervisory capacity. 
740
See EAA s. 9 (4) which provides that “on application of this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied 
that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”  
741741
See Kaminskiene Natalija, Application of Interim Measures in International Arbitration: Lithuanian Approach 
(1
st
February  2010) Jssn 2029-2058 at 243-260. 
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 Furthermore, it will enable one to decide whether a particular process is subject to the special 
relationship with municipal courts which is peculiar to private arbitration in England.
742
 The 
debate in international commercial arbitration is what scale of judicial intervention should be 
allowed. Parties in arbitration want a prompt, less expensive and final resolution of the dispute, 
whilst also parties want to ensure that the arbitral process is just and impartial.
743
 It should be 
noted that in arbitration, the preference is for a private resolution of provisional measures, 
therefore, it makes sense to insist that courts do not interfere in the arbitral process. However, 
being a private process, arbitration is not self-executing and has to rely on the coercive powers of 
the courts during and after the arbitral proceedings to ensure its efficacy.
744
While it is argued that 
arbitration must be free from the courts, in order to be effective, it is also accepted that 
arbitration needs the support of national courts to be effective.
745
 Following this contention, laws 
and rules have been formulated to balance the competing interests. Lord Mustill explained the 
matter lucidly in his foreword to the treatise on Indian arbitration law by OP Malhotra SC that: 
“First there is central importance of a harmonious relationship between the courts and the 
arbitral process. This has always involved a delicate balance since the urge of any judge 
is to see justice done, and not to put injustice wherever he or she finds it; and if it is found 
in an arbitration, why then the judges feel the need to intervene. On the other side, those 
active in the world of arbitration stress its voluntary nature, and argue that it is wrong in 
principle for the courts to concern themselves with disputes which the parties have 
formally chosen themselves with disputes which the parties have formally chosen to 
withdraw from them, quite apart from the waste of time and expense caused by gratuitous 
judicial interference. To a degree both views were right, and remain so; the problem has 
been to give proper weight to each of them. It was an unhappy feature of discourse 
arbitration in the century just past, the legitimate arguments which could be in favour of 
                                                 
742
 See Civil Procedure Rules CPR 25.1 (1) (a) – (f), which categorises the types of interim measures a court may 
order. 
743
 See Hunter and Redfern, International Commercial Arbitration, Jurisdiction Denied: The Pyramid Collapse 
(1986) JBL 15. 
744
 Ibid. 
745
 Ibid. 
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one or another to be expressed, in some instances at least, with quite unnecessary 
vigour.
746
 
  The involvement of the courts in modern commercial arbitration generally begins even before 
the arbitral tribunal is established,
747
 when the courts are used to protect evidence,
748
 to avoid 
damage.
749
 The courts enforce the arbitration agreement for the arbitral process to start; during 
the pendency of the arbitration itself, it grants provisional measures and at the end of arbitration, 
it either recognises and enforces or sets aside arbitral awards. The national courts involvement in 
international commercial arbitration is a fact of life, as prevalent as weather. Municipal court 
involvement is based on a host of reasons when a pathological situation occurs during the course 
of the arbitral proceeding. In other words, courts usually intervene within the framework of what 
is referred to as arbitral litigation in a supervisory capacity. This chapter is aimed at addressing 
the question, to what extent do English Courts support the grant of provisional measures? In 
order to address the set question, this chapter will be divided into four sections; firstly, the stages 
of court involvement in arbitral proceedings, secondly, the thesis examines the relationship 
between courts and arbitral tribunals; thirdly, the limitation of the municipal courts in arbitral 
proceedings, and lastly, the conclusion. 
6.2 Stages of court involvement in arbitral proceedings 
What happens in the most important phase of arbitration, when the arbitrators begin their task? 
The baton has been passed to them. Is there any need for national courts to be involved in the 
arbitral process? The answer in almost every case is “no”. Once the tribunal has been constituted 
most arbitrations are conducted without the need to refer to municipal courts, even if the parties 
fail to take part in the process. However, there are times when court involvement is needed in 
order to ensure the proper conduct of arbitration, for example; the preservation of evidence or 
property. 
                                                 
746
 See  OP Malhotra SC The Law  and Practice of Arbitration  and Conciliation ( New Delhi: Lexis Nexis, 2002) 
747
 See Article 28.8 of the ACICA Rules, which provides that such power shall not prejudice a party’s right to apply 
to any competent court for interim measures. 
748
 See Denning Mr in Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Yuval Insurance Co Ltd [1978] I Lloyd’s Rep 375 at 362, 
where he said that “…… it does not oust the jurisdiction of courts. It only outs the technicalities and strict 
constructions…” 
749
 See Lew Julian, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2003) 
at367. 
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Despite the autonomous nature of arbitration, it must be recognized that just as no man is an 
island, so no system of dispute resolution can exist in a vacuum. As Andrew Dickinson puts it, 
the 
“arbitration process cannot be said to be a small island in the sea of disputes resolution 
that enjoys total independency from national legal systems-at best they are semi-
autonomous.”750 
The fact that courts can be seized in parallel to arbitral proceedings where the validity of the 
arbitration agreement is challenged by one party as a principal or preliminary issue, clearly 
shows an interface between litigation and arbitration. Article II(3)  of the New York Convention 
allows the courts to examine the validity of an arbitration agreement while arbitral proceedings 
are already pending.
751
 
 Without prejudice to party autonomy, international arbitration does regularly interact with 
national jurisdictions for its existence to be legitimate and for support, help and effectiveness.
752
 
Provisional measures in international arbitration involve the intersection of national law and 
arbitral power, and a degree of conceptual uniformity is required if provisional measures are to 
complement arbitral effectiveness, as they are designed to do. In order to encourage 
harmonization regarding efficiency, the role of courts is an inevitable tool. UNCITRAL provides 
that 
 “it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or 
during arbitral proceedings, from a court, an interim measure of protection and for a court 
to grant such a measure.”753 
Lord Mustill considered in Coppee Lavalin v Ken-Ren Chemical Fertilizers (in Liquidation in 
Kenya) that: 
                                                 
750
See Dickson, Brussels 1  Review-Interface with Arbitration, Conflictoflaws.net, June 17 2009. 
751
 It provides that “the court of the contracting state, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the 
parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.” 
752
See William Parker, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT@L 
&Comp.L.Q.(1983) at 21 and 30. 
753
 See UNCITRAL Article 9. 
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 “there is the plain fact, palatable or not, that it is only a court possessing coercive powers 
which can rescue the arbitration if it is in danger of foundering, and that the only court 
which possesses these powers is the municipal courts of an individual state.”754 
This statement reflects the position that in choosing the seat of an international arbitration, those 
involved should not only look to the rules by which arbitration run but also the lex forum, which 
would play a vital role if the need for provisional measures arises.  Municipal courts provide 
essential support for the arbitral process, as professor Jan Paulson has noted, 
”the great paradox of arbitration is that it seeks the co-operation of the very public 
authorities from which it wants to free itself.”755 
Therefore, a harmonious relationship between the courts and the arbitral process is vital. Indeed, 
even the most enthusiastic proponents of party autonomy are bound to recognize that they must 
rely on the judicial arm of the state to ensure that the agreement to arbitrate is given at least some 
degree of effect, hence it is no good complaining that judges should keep right out of arbitration, 
for arbitration cannot flourish unless they are ready and waiting at the door, if only rarely 
allowed into the room.
756
 
This assistance of municipal courts takes different stages of the arbitration process.
757
 National 
laws are required to recognize and enforce the agreement, national laws are required to support 
the arbitration process.
758
 In this overall scheme, international commercial arbitration can be 
envisaged as a giant squid which seeks nourishment from the murky oceanic world where the 
domain of international arbitration and national jurisdiction meet. The author might speak of the 
international arbitration process as stretching its tentacles down from the domain of international 
arbitration to the municipal courts to forage for legitimacy, support, recognition and 
effectiveness.
759
It should however, be noted that courts are only allowed to intervene in urgency, 
                                                 
754
[1995] 1 Ac 38 at J14.20-03. 
755
 See J Paulson “Arbitration in Three Dimensions” (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper 
No.12.2010http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536093) at  accessed on 10 December 2012. 
756
 See Article 23 (2) of the ICC provides that an application to “any judicial authority for interim or conservatory 
measures will not be an infringement or a waiver of the arbitration agreement.” 
757
 See EAA 1996 s.44 (1), which provides as follows “unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court has for the 
purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of making orders…..” 
758
 See the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards Art.111, 
opened for signature, June 10 1958, 21 UST. 
759
 The role of the court is subject to s.44 (5) of the EAA. 
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and are requested to refer the case to arbitration, unless the contract is void.
760
  In this context, 
any other national courts’ involvement in the arbitral proceeding is arguably illegitimate, 
including actions to protect national commerce, and jurisdictional interests, simply because the 
courts think that it is better suited than an arbitral tribunal to decide or grant provisional 
measures.  
Municipal courts get involved in arbitral proceeding at different stages in order to enhance 
arbitral proceedings. The involvement has been classified into three stages, prior to the 
constitution of the tribunal, during and after the arbitral proceedings . The involvement of 
municipal courts in arbitral proceedings is supported by the Arbitration Act 1996,
761
the European 
convention,
762
 the New York Convention,
763
 the ICSID,
764
and  the UNCITRAL Model Law.
765
 
6.2.1 Prior to the constitution of the tribunal 
The conflict arises because of the legal system of most developed legal systems and arbitral rules 
as both the municipal courts and arbitration tribunal are empowered to order a wide range of 
interim measures.
766
 This in turn raises the question as to which state court and arbitral tribunal 
has jurisdiction to grant relief in the form of provisional measure.
767
 The other question that 
arises is whether national courts may (should) become involved in a dispute which is subject to 
arbitration, and if so, how far should this involvement extend? To put it more directly, when does 
intervention become interference in the arbitral process. This is not simply a philosophical 
question. It is one with important practical consequences; and it is one to which there is no 
                                                 
760
 See New York Convention Article II and III. 
761
EAA 1996 s. 45 & 44. 
762
 See European Convention Article VI (4), Council Regulation 4/2009, which contains Article 14 and 9 (4) which 
were applied in Van Uden to grant provisional measures, even when the substance of the case is dealt by arbitrators. 
763
 See Article II (3) given effect in McCreary v and Rubber Co v CEAT SPA 501 F.2d at 1032and CarolinePower& 
Light Co v Uranex 451 F. Supp. 1044 (ND Cal 1977). 
764
 See S. 39 of EAA which establishes the jurisdiction of the court to grant provisional measures in any arbitral 
proceedings, which the parties to the arbitration have agreed upon.  
765
 Ibid s. 9, which expressly provides that parties do not violate their agreement when they seek provisional 
measures from courts. 
766
Ibid EAA 1996 s.44 (5). 
767
  Parties request for interim measures is a common phenomenon in many European states for example; Article 12 
of the Lithuanian Law on Commercial Arbitration, 2 April 1996 No.1-1274, Vilnius Official translation, Article 
1166 of Polish CCP, Article 51 Serbian Law on arbitration, Article 71 of the Ukrainian Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, compatible to Article 17 J, which provides that “a court shall have the same power of 
issuing an interim measures in relation to arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether their places are in the 
territory state, as it has relation to proceedings in courts. The courts shall exercise such power in accordance with its 
own procedures in consideration of the specific features...” 
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simple answer. Indeed, under most legal systems,
768
 the basic rule is that, provided the dispute is 
covered by a valid arbitration clause or agreement, which is invoked in due time by one of the 
parties, the arbitration clause gives rise to an arbitration exception, which has the result that state 
courts no longer have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
769
 However, it has been recognized 
that the rule is not absolute and that with regard to provisional measures, there are circumstances 
where it is necessary or appropriate for courts to intervene, notwithstanding the existence of the 
arbitration clause. 
One of the problems facing a party to international arbitration is the threat of transferring assets, 
770
before the tribunal is established,
771
 in comparison with the municipal courts.
772
 The lengthy 
duration of the tribunal may not be a solution unless the courts intervene,
773
 for that period until 
the tribunal is established and the files can be transferred. The delay may even be longer,
774
 in 
circumstances where the appointed arbitrator is challenged
775
 or if the recalcitrant party refuses 
to appoint an arbitrator.
776
 It may further be contributed due to geographical locations or dilatory 
tactics by the party to which arbitration is immune.
777
 Arbitration is like a young bird that is 
trying to fly: it rises in the air from time to time and falls back to its nest. This means that since 
courts developed before arbitration, arbitral tribunals are young in dispute resolution; hence they 
                                                 
768
 See V. Cracium, A Lefter, Romania, The International Comparative Legal Guide to International Arbitration 
2007 London 2007 at 275. See Moscow Journal of International Law 2005 No.1, see Article 90 of Russian APC, 
which provides that a request from the court is incompatible with the arbitration agreement. 
769
 See for example Belgian Law Article 169 (1) of the Belgian Judicial Code, which provides that “the judge who is 
apprehended of a dispute that is covered by an arbitration clause declares himself to be without jurisdiction, at the 
request of any party, unless the clause in question is invalid or has ceased to have effect with regard to the dispute in 
question; the exception must be raised before all other exceptions and means of defence.” See EAA 1996 s.7. 
770
 See Redfern Hunter para 7.10, David St John Sutton Judith Gill, Russell (how many people is this? – add 
commas between them)on Arbitration (Twenty-Second Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, (2003) para 7-005.,where he 
states that at the beginning of arbitration a party may bring an action before the court instead of the tribunal.  As the 
New York Convention provides under Article II (3) and Article 8, the court in such a situation decides the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement at the request of the parties. In certain circumstances where the parties 
have failed to appoint the arbitrators and there are no applicable rules, they can apply the court to appoint arbitrators 
as provided under s. 18 of EAA 1996. At times, there may be a problem of jurisdiction in regard to the tribunal, 
which can only be settled by support of the court, hence intervention may be necessary. 
771
 See Robert Merkin at 109-103. 
772
 See ICC Rules Article 4 (4). 
773
 See LCIA Rules Article 25.3 which provides that “parties can apply  for interim measures before the formation of 
the tribunal, but they can only apply to a court for such relief after it is constituted in exceptional circumstances and 
must forward their application to the tribunal.” 
774
 The average duration of arbitral process is between one and two years. See Paulson, International Commercial 
Arbitration (1990) at 20-21. 
775
 See UNCITRAL 9-12. 
776
Ibid6-8. 
777
 The President of the ICC proposed that Arbitration should be amended to give the ICC Court the power to make 
urgent measures of protection, pending the appointment of an arbitral tribunal. 
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need the support of the courts especially before the tribunal is constituted.  In addition, Mustill 
LJ describes the involvement of courts in a similar manner: 
Ideally, the handling of arbitral disputes should resemble a relay-race in the initial stages, 
before the arbitrators are seized of the dispute, the bottom are in the grasp of the court, 
for at that stage there is no other organization which could take steps to prevent the 
arbitration agreement from being ineffectual. When the arbitrators take charge they take 
the bottom and retain it until they have made an award. At this point, having no longer a 
function to fulfil, the arbitrators hand back the bottom so that the court can in case of 
need lend its coercive powers to enforce the measure. But in real life the position is no 
clear cut.” 778 
He further stated that  
“This principle is an essential element in the balance of partnership which exists, under 
English law between the arbitral process and the court………..”779 
Prior to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal,
780
 courts become involved
781
 where a party 
initiates proceedings to challenge the validity of an arbitral agreement,
782
 where one party 
institutes court proceedings despite, and perhaps with the intention of avoiding, the agreement to 
arbitrate, and where one party needs urgent protection that cannot await the appointment of the 
tribunal.
783
  The tribunal may not have the powers, this is usually a result of historical domestic 
legislation hearkening back to a time when the power to grant measures was considered to be a 
prerogative of the national courts for public policy reasons.
784
 
                                                 
778
See Channel Tunnel group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction [1993] Ac 364 at 119. 
779
Ibid para 367. 
780
 See Sir John Donaldson in British Airways Board v Lake Airways Ltd [1984] QB 142. 
781
See English Arbitration Act 1996 s.42 (2) (e). 
782
See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd[1993] AC 334, where at the time, the 
distinction between the times before and after the arbitrators received the files shows what would in event be 
obvious; that if the order is made at a later stage it is more likely to infringe the spirit of the arbitration agreement 
than if it had been made at a time when the arbitrators were not yet in charge. 
783
 See EAA s.44 (5) is a useful weapon to the courts given that provisional measures will be needed many times at 
the start of the proceedings, for example, to secure one party’s assets, before the arbitral tribunal has been 
constituted and is therefore without power to act. 
784
 See Redfern Hunter, on International Arbitration ( 5
th
 edition  Oxford University Press, 2009) at 44. 
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In all cases,
785
 the courts’ duty is to uphold the agreement to arbitrate, as provided by s.44 (5). A 
good example; is the case of Belair LLC v Basel LLC
786
 where the commercial court granted an 
interim measure in order to preserve the assets in the case pending the outcome of an arbitral 
tribunal which had yet to be fully constituted. It was therefore, to use the language of s. 44 (5),
787
 
unable to act effectively and thus judicial assistance was permissible. In this case the courts fulfil 
the gap until the tribunal is established to protect the status quo.
788
  Many national laws and 
rules,
789
such as the English Arbitration Act1996 and Model Law by  allow courts to grant interim 
measures before the tribunal has been established or where the applicable arbitration rules do not 
allow arbitrators to grant interim measures of protection.re-write this sentence
790
 Indeed most 
would agree that, at this stage, the national courts’ involvement is not disruptive,791 and may be 
beneficial to the arbitration proceedings.
792
 As expressly reflected  in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, the courts use their authority to give effect to the parties’ agreement by establishing an 
appropriate tribunal to take over and deal with the dispute between the parties where the 
prescribed appointment mechanism does not work.
793
 
 Municipal courts have the authority to grant provisional measures prior to the constitution of the 
tribunal.
794
 LCIA Institutional Rules provide that parties may seek provisional measures from the 
                                                 
785
See SNE v Joc Oil (1990) XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 31, where the tribunal assumed jurisdiction on 
the basis of the competence-competence concept, which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Bermuda and 
enforced. 
786
[2009] EWHC 725 Comm. 
787
See s. 44  (5) provision is a case in point of the court’s powers being curtailed in comparison with the previous 
position under s. 12 of the 1950 Arbitration Act. The power to order security for costs is under tribunal competence. 
I do argue that this may leave the vulnerable potentially exposed where an experienced arbitrator over looks such an 
order. The corollary of such an oversight is that it would obviously be disadvantageous for the non-defaulting party 
left to cover costs incurred by the tribunal.  In cases of insolvency, it would only be the courts that help with 
compensation or take into account the costs for the proceedings. 
788
See Premium Nafta Prods Ltd v Fili Shipping Co. [2007] UKHL 40 at 19. 
789
 See ICC Rules Article 8 (5), which provides that: “before the file is transmitted to the arbitrator, and in 
exceptional circumstances even thereafter, the parties shall be at liberty to apply to any competent court for interim 
measures, and they shall not by so doing be held to infringe the agreement to arbitrate or to effect the relevant 
powers reserved to the arbitrator.” 
790
 See Yves Derains & Eric Schwartz, A guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd edition 2005) at 295-295. 
791
Motorola Credit Corp v Uzan No.2[2003] EWCA Civ 752 [2004] 1 WLR 113 
792
 See Lew QC, Achieving the Dream: autonomous Arbitration? In Arbitration Insight, (2007) at 472-73. 
793
 See UNCITRAL Un Doc A/40/17, UN Sales No.08 V.4 (2008), available at 
http://www.unictral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_ebook.pdf accessed 10 November 2012. 
 
794
 See ISCID Article 39 (6), which provides that “nothing in this rule shall prevent the parties, provided that they 
have stipulated in the agreement recording their consent, from requesting any judicial or other authority to order 
provisional measures, prior to or after the institution of the proceedings, for the preservation of their respective 
rights and interests.”  
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national courts before the formation of the arbitral tribunal in exceptional circumstances, 
thereafter.
795
 
 The Model Law provides that; 
“a request for interim measures addressed by any party to arbitration to a judicial 
authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate or 
waiver of that agreement.” 
Indeed, Article 5 of the Model Law was obviously an attempt to curb judicial excesses, and has 
created some difficulties of interpretation and application. There is now a considerable body of 
case law in Model Law jurisdiction on the fundamental question of whether this provision means 
that the inherent jurisdiction of municipal courts to curb related abuses? Of the process and to 
ensure arbitral fairness and efficiency has been removed.
796
 The DAC Report shared Lord 
Mustill’s concerns and it was therefore decided that the word “shall” in Article 5 should be 
replaced with word “should”. The differences were considered by Thomas LJ,797 who accepted 
that the use of “should” as opposed to “shall” showed an absolute prohibition on the intervention 
by courts in circumstances other than specified in Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 was not 
intended. 
This provision has been interpreted, in accordance with plain language as permitting parties to 
apply to municipal courts,
798
 for provisional measures without any hindrances or material 
qualifications. Indeed this is in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law
799
 and ISCID rules.
800
  
Model Law further provides that: 
                                                 
795
LCIA Article 25. 
796
 See a good example of Model Law in Mitsui Engineering & Shipping Co Ltd v Easton Graham Rush, [2004] 2 
SLR 14, [2004] SGHC 26,which illustrates  the “supportive rather than interventionist attitude of the Singapore 
Courts when called upon to exercise interventionist powers over arbitration. 
797
 See Vale Do Rio Doce Navegacao v Shanghai Bao Steel Ocean Shipping Co. [2000] EWHC 205. 
798
 See Lathan & Watkins, International Dispute Resolution, The English Court Continues to Support the Arbitral 
Process (July 2009). See Reynolds, Porter Chamberlain LLP, International Bulletin, (April 2011). See Ruth 
Hosking, Quadrant Chambers Forum, sharing leading experience in Commercial law, The Role of Courts and 
Experts in international arbitration (18 May 2010). 
799
 See UNCITRAL Article 5 and 9. 
800
 See ICC Rules Article 23 (2), which provides that “before files are transmitted to the tribunal in appropriate 
circumstances even after the parties may apply to a competent court for interim or conservatory measures…..the 
application is not a waiver or infringement of the arbitration agreement.” 
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“a national court shall have the same powers of issuing interim measures in relation to 
arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether their place is in the territory of this state, 
as it has in a request for interim measures addressed by a party to judicial authority shall 
not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate or waiver of that 
agreement.”801 
Arbitral tribunals are not established when parties seek provisional measures. It is the courts with 
a set mechanism that one has to seek such measures.
802
 The composition of the tribunal may take 
some time before it is established given that a short-coming of the courts is to get involved in 
order to avoid the dissipation of assets to other jurisdictions, which in the long run may make the 
arbitral proceedings of the final award meaningless unless the assets are protected.  Municipal 
courts have the power to grant freezing orders in order to safe guard assets before arbitral 
proceedings.
803
 A prominent scholar like Tweeddale argues that: 
 “the commencement of the arbitration is the first formal step that the claimant can take 
and in many regard this most important.”804 
This quotation highlights the significance attached to the modalities by which a dispute is 
commenced. It should be noted that the arbitral tribunal should proceed with the order requested 
when the tribunal is established, unless there is a danger for assets to be dissipated to other 
venues, given the new technology which has eased the transfer of assets by the click of the 
mouse.  
6.2.2 Courts involvement during the arbitral proceedings: 
During the arbitral process,
805
 courts are called upon to support arbitral proceedings.
806
 The 
involvement during the arbitration process comes in many forms and is rarely dealt with in 
                                                 
801
 See UNICITRAL 2006  Revised  Article 17J. 
802
 See C v D [2007] EWCA 1282. 
803
 See Kastenerv Jason, [2004] EWHC 92 Para 107-108, where the High Court held that parties can empower the 
tribunal to grant freezing orders on a provisional basis. Indeed the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High 
Court and stated that it was not violation of the arbitral order. 
804
 See Tweddale and Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 2005) at 262. 
805
  See EAA 1996 s.9, which provides that before or during the arbitral process or even if the ward is pronounced, 
but before it is enforced under s.36, it may apply to court, during the arbitral process as demonstrated in Dongwoo 
Mann Hummel Co Ltd v Man Hummel GMbh [2008] SDHC 67, [2008] 3 SLR 9 r) 87 at 55. 
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arbitration statutes.
807
 This involves the courts making procedural orders
808
 that cannot be 
ordered,
809
 or enforced by arbitrators, or orders for maintaining the status quo.
810
 These measures 
are generally helpful.
811
 There are also orders for the protecting and taking of evidence,
812
 or 
otherwise protecting the integrity of the arbitral proceedings.
813
 This type of intervention is 
generally unobjectionable and appropriate in the circumstances,
814
 where the arbitral tribunal 
cannot take measures sought and the intervention has the agreement of the tribunal.
815
 Under the 
English Arbitration Act, it expressly provides the ground in which the municipal courts should 
be involved during arbitral proceedings, under s. 44 (2) which details those matters in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                             
806
 See AesustKamengonogorks Hydro power Plant LLP v UstKamenogorsk Hydro power Plant JSC [2011] 
EWHCA Civ 647, [2012] 1 ALL ER Comm 845 at 100,where Rix LJ saw no reason why the court should not 
intervene where the safety of an arbitration agreement was threatened. In such cases the role of the courts is to 
support arbitration and not to interfere with it. 
807
See  Qingdao Ocean shipping co v Shipping Establishment (Here after the Xing Su Hai ) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
15. See Maritime Bulgare (NMB) Rustal Trading Ltd [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 106. 
808
 See Lathan & Watkins, International Dispute Resolution, The English Court Continues to Support the Arbitral 
Process (July 2009). 
809
 See China Ocean Shipping Co (owners of the MV Fu NingHai v Whistler International Ltd Chartersof MV Fu 
NingHai[199] HKCFI 693, where it was shown that a party had refused to disclose its place of business to avoid 
posting security for the costs of the arbitration and where the tribunal lacked the power to grant such orders, 
requiring compliance with such a fundamental requirement, and the court assisted the tribunal by making the 
appropriate provisional measures. Hence, Article 5 did not preclude the court from making orders because the issue 
for security for costs was not a matter governed by Model Law. See Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Genesis Power Ltd 
[2006] 3 NZLR 784 (HC). 
810Hunter at 87, where he states that “the tide is now turning,” and it is increasingly realized in international 
arbitration circles that the intervention of courts must not necessarily be disruptive.” 
811
 See  Celtelem Sa v Rust Holdings [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 294, where s.44 of the EAA 1996 was applied to protect 
the subject matter of arbitration, including preventing one party from breaking the substantive agreement to which 
arbitration relates.  There are two bases for the court jurisdiction; s.44 (2) (c) and s.37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. 
It remains to be decided whether s.37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is exercisable in arbitration cases or whether 
s.44 is exclusively to be used. 
812
 See Norwich Pharmacy v Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Customs & Excise [1974] AC 1322, Anton Piller 
A.G v Manufacturing Process [1973] Ch 55, [1972] WLR 162 and Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International 
lBulcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509. The Anton Piller relief authorizes the securing of evidence in the hands 
of the defendant, where evidence may be spoliated  to the detriment of the plaintiff’s cause. The Mareva injunction 
permits an injunction of assets belonging to a wrong-doer. Mareva prohibits defendants and certain third parties 
from removing assets from the jurisdiction or encumbering or dissipating them, thereby thwarting the effort to 
render the proceedings in which the defendant appears as null. 
813
See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redefern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (Student edition, Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 7.12.David John Sutton and Judith Grill, Russell on Arbitration (22nd edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003) Para 7-005 and 7-097. As a general rule, evidence should be preserved as soon as possible, because 
destroyed evidence cannot indicate the truths. If the tribunal is not established or the evidence is related to third 
parties, judicial assistance is needed. The assistance of the court covers all types of evidence such as documentary, 
photographic, and magnetic, as provided by s.44 of EAA 1996 and Article 27 of the Model Law. 
814
See Starlight Shipping Co Ltd v Tai Ping insurance Co. Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 525. 
815
 See Lew Supra note 6 at 369-70, noting the lack of coercive powers held by the arbitration tribunals and the need 
to use courts in the compelling of witnesses and evidence. See Permimasteelisa Japan KK v Bouyguesstroi [2007] 
EWHC 3508 
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which the court which has the power to make orders during the arbitral proceedings.
816
 
Municipal courts help in taking evidence,
817
and it should be noted that in order for any 
proceedings to take process under due process, evidence is a prima facie factor. Although the 
tribunal can grant provisional measures under s. 38 and s.39 of the Arbitration Act 1996, its 
scope in taking evidence is only limited to the parties to the agreement,
818
and it cannot compel 
third parties
819
 for example banks that issue letters of credit, to provide witness statements to 
support such arbitral proceedings, since they are not party to the arbitration agreement.
820
 Courts 
can compel a witness to attend proceedings
821
and failure to do so can be turned into contempt of 
court.
822
In addition, they have the power to freeze all assets during the proceedings,
823
 as a 
mechanism of preserving the evidence,
824
 or the sale of any goods subject to the 
proceedings,
825
to avoid tactics of delay of proceedings or even appoint a receiver in cases of 
liquidation of companies,
826
where power is not enshrined to the tribunal.
827
  Indeed s. 42 details 
the relationship between the courts and arbitral tribunals with regard to provisional measures. In 
addition, the tribunal cannot grant all the provisional measures that are needed to protect the 
                                                 
816
See OT Africa line Ltd v Magic Sports Wear Corp [2005] EWCA 710. The main aim of such orders is to prevent a 
proliferation of litigation on procedural matters, and act with compliance with arbitral tribunals as demonstrated in 
Commerce and Industry Insurance Co of Canada v Lloyds Underwriters [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 219. 
817
 See Sabmiller Africa v East African Breweries Ltd [2009] EWHC 3508 , where Christopher LJ had to consider an 
application for a temporary injunction under s.44 
818
 See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws, Vol2 (14
th
 edition Sweet & Maxwell 2010) at 25. 
819
 In cases of the disclosure of documents important to the proceedings, the tribunal has no coercive powers, to 
order documentary disclosure from other parties. However, if the party does not disclose the document of the 
relevant documents in possession of a third party, the tribunal has no power to compel them. 
820
See Hiscox Underwriting  V Dickson Manchester & Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 479, where the Court made an order 
requesting the respondent’s underwriting agents to hand over details of insurance policies which they had written on 
behalf of the claimant insurers, as the issue in arbitration was whether the respondent was seeking to place a renewal 
business with their own parent company rather than the claimant’s and it was a matter of urgency for the claimant’s 
to know how pending renewals were being treated. 
821
 In general, the arbitral tribunal has no power to compel the attendance of the witness. Thus, the judicial assistance 
of the courts is needed. The English courts have this power under s.44 and also under Model Law article 27. 
822
 See Supreme Court Act 1981 s.37. 
823
 This helps to preserve the status quo, because sometimes, monetary compensation is not an adequate remedy for 
parties, for instance, the subject matter of the dispute may be about patents and this dispute may damage the 
reputation of the companies. In these circumstances, the specific performance of other parties may be the best 
remedy, as illustrated in Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beaty Construction Ltd [1993] Ac 334. 
824
See EAA 1996s.44 (2) (b). 
825
Ibid 2 (d). 
826
 See Sir Robert Megarry VC in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] 417 ChD( CA and HL 
) at 423. 
827
Ibid (2) (e). 
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status quo,
828
 for example,anti-suit injunctions,
829
 as a remedial device to restrain a party from 
instituting proceedings in a foreign court.
830
 Municipal courts order the defendant of the 
arbitration agreement to discontinue with the proceedings in another country in order to protect 
arbitration or to have matters referred to the tribunal.
831
 The English approach in granting  the 
anti-suit in protection of the arbitration has been developed in the USA, in the case of XL V 
Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning,
832
 where Owens commenced proceedings against XL in 
Delaware seeking a declaration that it was liable to indemnify Owens for certain costs.  Xl then 
applied for an anti-suit injunction in England, although the arbitration clause did not expressly, 
on face value, provide that English law governed, and the court held that since the parties had 
chosen English law as the law governing the arbitration clause which was valid under English 
law, Toulson J, granted  the anti-suit injunction order, pending arbitral proceedings.
833
  An 
English court cannot, in the true sense, stop foreign proceedings as an anti-suit operating in 
persona against the respondent.
834
 Hence English courts have no power over foreign courts but it 
may make orders against individuals who are subject to its jurisdiction. Hence, the main aim of 
the municipal courts, in granting an anti-suit injunction as a provisional remedy,
835
 is to facilitate 
                                                 
828
 See Lawrence Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins The Conflicts of Laws (14th edit 2006) at 500-511. See 
Andrew Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (2003) at 170-246., see Nygh and Martin 
Davies, Conflict of Laws in Australia (7th edition 20020 at 136-137. 
829
See Welex AG v Rosa Maritime Ltd ( The Episilon Rosa) [2003] EWCA 938 at para 46, where the Court of 
Appeal held that even though the arbitration did not give an express power to the High Court to grant injunctions, it 
has the general power to grant such injunctions. See Angelic Grace (The Golden Anne) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 640 at 
para 667, where the Court of Appeal held that; “where an injunction was sought to restrain a party from proceedings 
in a foreign court on breach of the arbitration agreement governed by English law, the English court ought not feel 
any different in granting the injunction provided it was sought promptly and before the foreign proceedings were too 
for advanced.”  Although an anti-suit injunction is a useful remedy, granted in common law states, where a failure to 
comply with a measure could potentially result in a finding of contempt of the Court under s.37 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981, this has been considered as an indirect interference, since West Tankers.  With the process of the 
foreign court by the European Court of Justice an anti-suit leads to conflicts of competentence-compence, where the 
courts and tribunals are often cautious when ordering anti-suit injunctions because such interfere with parties’ 
fundamental rights to free access to courts and in certain circumstances are necessary toll. 
830
 See David Sutton, Russell on Arbitration (23 rd. edition 2007) at 105. See Thomas Raphael, The Anti -suit 
Injunction, Oxford Press (2009) at 5. 
831
 See Shell v Coral Oil, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep  640 at 667.where Moore Bick J granted an injunction in order to 
strive to give effect to the intentions of the parties to the arbitration proceedings (party autonomy). 
832
[2001] 1 ALL ER Comm 530. 
833
 See Bankers Trust v Jakarta [1999] ALL ER 314 where Creswell LJ Citing Angelic Grace, granted an anti-suit 
injunction on the grounds that there was a real risk or urgency that the developments and maintenance of an 
effective and productive world-wide market in derivatives and swaps might be undermined. See Deutz AG v General 
Electric Company 270 F.3d 144 at 161 (3rd Cir 2001). 
834
 See Adrian Briggs and Peter Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements (2nd edition LLP London 1997). 
835
 See Professor Jonathan Harris, The European Legal Forum, Private International Law and International Civil 
Procedure, The Brussels 1 Regulation and the Re-Emergence of the English Common Law 8
th
 July/August 2008. 
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arbitral proceedings, not to dominate, and this can be evidenced in the comments of Atkins LJ, 
where he said that:  
“the principle upon which an English Court acts in granting injunctions it is not that it 
seeks to assume jurisdiction over foreign courts, or that it seeks to criticise the foreign 
court or its procedure; the English court has regard to the personal attitude of the person 
subject to its jurisdiction has committed a breach of the covenant or acted in breach of 
some fiduciary or has in any way violated the principle of equity and conscience, and that 
it would be inequitable on his part to seek to enforce a judgement obtained in such breach 
of such obligations, it will restrain him, not by issuing an edict to the foreign court, by 
saying that he is conscience bound not to enforce the judgement.”836 
  The author however, argues that seeking provisional measures under s.44 does not specifically 
include a provision to the effect that seeking recourse to the municipal court for provisional 
measures does not constitute a waiver of the arbitration agreement, however, it is recognised that 
the very existence of the section protects a party pursuant to this section from such an accusation. 
Furthermore, there are limits on the courts powers; for example s.44 (4) which provides that; 
” if the case is not of urgency, the courts shall act only on the application of a party to the 
arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) made with the 
permission of the tribunal or the agreement in writing of the other parties.” 
Indeed pursuant to s.44 (4), therefore, unless the applicant party can prove urgency, the court can 
only act if either the arbitral tribunal or all the parties have agreed. In such circumstances, 
therefore, it is not possible for one party to apply without notice to the other party. This can be 
contrasted by s. 44 (3) which provides that: 
“if the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party or proposed 
party to the arbitral proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose 
of preserving evidence or assets.”  
 It should be noted that the scope of the tribunal in granting provisional measures is limited as 
provided in s.39, which provides that parties  are free to agree that the tribunal shall have the 
                                                 
836
See Ellerman Lines Ltd v Reed and Others [1928] 2 Kb at 155. 
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power to order, on a provisional basis, any relief which it would have power to grant in a final 
award, namely the interim payment on account and costs. This limited scope hinders the arbitral 
process, in order to widen the scope of provisional measures,
837
the courts become involved
838
 to 
grant provisional measures for example; freezing orders restraining a party from removing assets 
located within the jurisdiction
839
 out of the country or from dealing with assets where they are 
within the jurisdiction or not.
840
 The main purpose of such measures is to guard against the 
injustice of a defendant salting away or concealing his assets so as to deprive the claimant from 
being able to execute judgment if successful at a trial, quite simply there may no longer be any 
assets left to satisfy the judgement debt,
841
 whilst the order is a powerful litigation tool, regarded 
by the courts as draconian in nature and will only be granted once the number of onerous 
conditions have been fulfilled.
842
 With the rapid growth in economy, in technology and public 
policy, courts are called upon as international instruments to support the arbitral regime, and are 
relevant to award or grant provisional measures in support of prospective arbitration.  The author 
further argues that most advanced economies have developed a sophisticated set of rules and 
mechanics for the identification and enforcement of promises in course of commerce, without a 
high level of assurance that such rules and mechanisms will operate effectively and efficiently, 
and the global market that has enhanced the welfare of so many people would simply not be 
possible. A successful market is the product of good government and the law implemented by 
municipal courts. A prominent scholar in economics said that: 
“commerce and manufacturing can seldom flourish long in any state which does not 
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves 
secure in the possession of property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported to be 
                                                 
837
 See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 198 (Interim Relief) Order 1997 No.302. See Supreme Court Act 1983 
s. 37 (3), see Regulation 2-3 of the County Court Remedies Regulations 1991 and CPR R.25.1 (f).  
838
 See Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techiniki SA [1984] QB 291, where it recourse to national courts was prohibited, for 
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839
 See American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, which sets the legal test for any injunction to be granted 
by any court. 
840
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841
See Software Core Ltd v Pathan (2005) LTL 1/8/ 2005. See Ninemia Corp v Travel [1993] 1 WLR 1412, where 
Mustill J said that for any freezing orders to be granted there must be 50% chance of success. 
842
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regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay 
in which there is a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”843 
Adam Smith supports the notion that all forms of economic interaction are impeded by the 
degree to which personal property or assets’ rights are subject to unpredictable and arbitrary 
incursion so that people act on the basis of fear and suspicion rather than on the basis that others 
will act in a foreseeable manner and honour their promises. What the law delivers is a level of 
predictability or an enforcement mechanism so that economic actors can precede with confidence 
that their reasonable expectations will be met. Indeed it is on this assertion that the courts may 
grant freezing orders
844
 as an aid to claimants who would be at a loss and this would jeopardise 
arbitral agreement due to a lack of trust or a lack of coercive powers to grant certain measures.
845
 
6.2.2Courts involvement after the arbitral proceedings 
Finally, after an award has been rendered,
846
 the courts may become involved in two places; 
firstly at the place of arbitration, when a party challenges and seeks to set aside the award or 
lodges an appeal against the award under the applicable arbitral laws or regime; and secondly, at 
the place of enforcement,
847
 where the successful party seeks the recognition and enforcement of 
an award or provisional measures.
848
 Although the principles as outlined above are normal and 
desirable, one should be aware that when a national court is asked to deal with any of these 
issues, it is in its simplest form a negation of the arbitration agreement, more particularly, a 
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 See Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, (1952) Encyclopaedia 
Britannica In at 43. 
844
 See Denning Judgement MR in Siskina (owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v Distos Compania Naviera 
SA [1979] AC 2 at para 258 G-H and 260 para Lord Diplock. 
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for this section in Abuja International hotels Ltd v Meridien SAS [2012] EWHC 87 ( Comm). The problem with s.68 
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apply in deciding whether or not it has been proved. See Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Emmott[2011] EWHC 
1441, Soeximex SA v Agrocorp International PTE Ltd [2011] EWHC 2748. 
847
 See s. 66 of EAA 1996. 
848
  See s.726 of the Companies Act 1985 (1), the court has the jurisdiction to grant security for costs if it appears by 
credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the company will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if 
successful in his defence. 
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national court will inevitably and unsurprisingly take a particular approach and determine these 
issues in accordance with its own national law procedures.
849
 More controversially, it may also 
be influenced by its parochial, legal, cultural, economic and political systems. The aspect of 
judicial intervention represents the most contestable interference in arbitral procedure. From a 
critical perspective, court interference at this stage necessarily entails an undermining of the 
meaning of arbitral awards, whereby parties are able to challenge, appeal or overturn the 
outcome of arbitration, with the finality and currency that such an award is a compromise.  
In general, arbitrators are enjoined to be independent and impartial in the performance of their 
duties. Parties in arbitration therefore can challenge arbitrators who fail to observe this duty. 
Hence, municipal courts are called upon to set aside arbitral awards or provisional measures on 
the grounds that the tribunal was partial or biased. The court serves as a check on arbitrators, 
thereby preserving the integrity and confidence in the arbitral process. The author argues that the 
courts generally exercise this supervisory power on good grounds only. 
The fact that arbitration is binding and final can only be affirmed by the courts. The recognition 
and enforcement of awards by courts creates res judicata issue estoppel. If a losing party fails to 
satisfy the award, the victorious party would invoke the powers of the court to enforce the award 
just like a court judgement.  With the signing of the New York Convention, courts are generally 
inclined to enforce arbitral awards subject only to procedural errors and issues of public policy, 
particularly where the contract culminating in the award is founded on criminality.
850
 For 
example; in the case of Soleimany v Soleimany,
851
 the English court refused to enforce an award 
on the grounds of public policy because the contract of the parties was found on tax evasion 
under Iranian laws. This research reveals that with regard to the scope of the courts intervention 
in arbitration, there is universal consensus supporting the courts’ role in the recognition and 
enforcing of provisional measures or arbitral awards, without which arbitration will lack 
efficacy. The courts also preserve the integrity of the arbitral process, by setting aside awards on 
certain grounds, when such awards are challenged  for example, where a party was not given 
equal opportunity to advance its case. Arbitration is private in nature, as such parties will need to 
                                                 
849
 See DAC Report 1996 at 273. 
850
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SDNY 19730 AND Ghirados v Minister of High ways (BC) 1996 DLR at 469. 
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enforce the arbitration agreement and also to enforce arbitral awards. The reality therefore, is that 
without the courts’ support, the arbitral process cannot be effective. This explains why some 
countries are not attracted to international arbitration, for the simple reason that their courts are 
not supportive to arbitration. It was for this reason that compelled Belgium to review its policy 
on court intervention in arbitral proceedings in 1998. The fact that without the courts, arbitration 
will be ineffective is buttressed by the example from Pakistan, which is less developed in 
international arbitration.
852
 The increasing growth in international trade and investments among 
states and private companies, demanded international commercial arbitration to be more 
effective, a way out is reforming national courts statutes on arbitration and sensitizing national 
courts to support the arbitral process, without which arbitration will remain ineffective, 
particularly in developing economies. Indeed the role of courts was addressed by Justice 
Sundaresh MenonSc, then Attorney-General for Singapore at the opening Plenary session of the 
ICCA conference in Singapore June 2012, in his  masterly paper “International Arbitration; The 
Coming of New Age for Asia and Elsewhere.”853 It should, however, be noted that English 
courts have supported arbitration and they have limited their historical involvement, as 
demonstrated by the leading case for arbitral jurisdiction to grant provisional measures in 
Channel Tunnel v Balfour Construction Ltd.
854
  The author argues that judicial interference 
should be kept at a minimum and should only get involved where the order is necessary and 
appropriate, in order to maintain the doctrine of party autonomy. 
6.2.3 Relationship between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals 
The relationship between courts and arbitral tribunals is termed as concurrent jurisdiction. Under 
the concurrent jurisdiction, if there is a request to a court for a provisional measure, the case 
remains with the tribunal in order to be compatible with the arbitration agreement.  
                                                 
852
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853
 Where he said; “that the switch from initial judicial scepticism to the establishment of an entire framework built 
upon supporting international arbitration and its enforcement has been nothing short of remarkable. We have come a 
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Justice Menon identified  a few recent problems, including the decisions of the Supreme Court of India for example; 
Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA (2002) 4 SCC, PT Prim International developments v Kempinski Hotels SA 
[2011] 4 SLR 633. 
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Arbitration is an interface between arbitral tribunals and municipal courts. The relationship 
between courts and tribunals does not depend on a simple link, but depends on a number of 
relationships arising from theories, arbitration enactments and common law. The relationship 
mainly promotes the doctrine of party autonomy and is given the utmost significance. In most 
circumstances, for the court to order any provisional measures in support of the process, it has to 
make sure all arbitral means of granting a particular measure are exhausted.
855
  Due to comity 
which refers to mutual courtesy or civility, in private international law, there is a family 
relationship between courts and tribunals. Hence, each owe each other reciprocal respect,
856
 
sympathy and reference where appropriate,
857
 in order to facilitate arbitral proceedings.
858
 The 
effectiveness and good administration of justice are the determining balancing factors for 
reconciling tension between courts and tribunals. 
 Doctrines have been advanced in support of concurrent powers of courts and arbitral tribunals, 
namely the doctrine of co-operation and coordination, the doctrine of freedom of choice 
approach, the doctrine of complimentary and subsidiarity, and the doctrine of compatibility. 
6.2.3.1 The doctrine of co-operation 
The role allocated to courts under the concept of co-operation is one of assistance.
859
 
International conventions and national laws generally provide circumstances when or where the 
courts intervene in arbitral proceedings, in order to make the process effective. For example, 
courts intervene insetting aside an award and refusal of recognition and enforcement.  
Furthermore, international legislation specifies, in most cases, circumstances where the 
assistance of the courts could lend to arbitration. The grant of interim measures by courts is 
among those circumstances.
860
 Once judicial involvement in support of arbitration is accepted, a 
need to regulate the co-existence of jurisdictions of judicial authorities and arbitrators arises. 
This is because both jurisdictions are generally similar or identical, and they sometimes overlap 
and may even be in conflict. Due to such overlapping and the possibility of conflict of concurrent 
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jurisdiction, the coordination of the powers of courts and arbitrators is felt necessary. It should 
however, be noted that in practice, there is no effective communication to the arbitral tribunal to 
promote that cooperation, and to make it worse, arbitral rules and enactments are silent on this 
subject. Hence, this sets flames for reconciliation between the two jurisdictions in dealing with 
provisional measures, instead of the good administration of justice. 
6.2.3.2 The doctrine of coordination 
The concept of coordination recognizes the overwhelming need for cooperation and is in line 
with the principles of legal certainty and protection. Coordination contributes to the effectiveness 
of arbitration and the effectiveness of justice. It should be noted that national laws do not 
regulate this principle of coordination between the arbitration and judicial jurisdiction. 
Only a few national laws and arbitral rules deal with methods of coordination. Under some of 
those laws, parties are free to either apply to courts or the tribunal, the choice is open. This 
freedom of choice approach is, however, against the doctrine of party autonomy and is a free 
invitation for abuse. Thus, such an approach hinders the effectiveness of arbitration. So, in order 
to make arbitration more effective and to avoid any such invitation, some other laws and rules 
are envisaged for restricted access to courts. Under the restricted approach, the grant of interim 
measures by courts is only allowed in appropriate circumstances.  The courts’ role is described as 
complementary, prior to the appointment of the tribunal and subsidiary after. The courts, in 
exercising this authority, must take utmost caution when the balance plainly favours the grant of 
relief.  The grant of security for costs and provisional payment should at all times be left to the 
arbitral tribunal, as there is no immediate urgency in regard of such measures and assessment of 
the likelihood of success on the merits and the need for those measures are better made by the 
tribunal. It should, however, be noted that courts should endeavour to do everything in their 
power to prevent the abuse of either coordination methods. The parties have the power to 
exclude the courts’ jurisdiction. 
6.2.3.3 The freedom of choice approach 
 Under this doctrine, the party is at liberty or will to choose a mechanism for the dispute 
resolution, either the tribunal or the courts. Under the free choice approach, there are no 
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restrictions imposed on court access.
861
The general approach in many states,
862
 which accepts 
concurrent jurisdiction, is that parties are, unless otherwise agreed, given both given a free 
choice prior to the appointment of the arbitrators or during arbitral proceedings.  Parties are free 
to make an application to either the arbitral tribunal or the courts’ jurisdiction with no hindrances 
at any given time.  The freedom of choice approach should be approached with great care, when 
a party is given a free choice to determine the forum to apply for any provisional measures, and 
such a freedom may be susceptible to abuse. A request for such a measure could be used as a 
procedural weapon. Courts should be aware of the possibility of abuse, and they should not 
accept any request where the courts find that the request is not genuine  or urgent, and that its 
aim is at gaining tactical advantage over a respondent. The freedom of choice approach, if 
accepted in full, intervenes with the principle of party autonomy and the parties choice of 
arbitration over litigation. The party autonomy doctrine demands prejudice towards arbitral 
jurisdiction when parties agree that their disputes will be solved according to the arbitration 
agreement, and such an agreement must be respected. Parties can opt in, by agreement, to have 
judicial authorities’ assistance in regard to provisional measures. The parties are at liberty to 
exclude the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal in that regard. Otherwise the prejudice should be in 
favour of the arbitral jurisdiction.   In fact, the degree of equilibrium between party autonomy 
and the judicial courts’ involvement in arbitral proceedings should be on the side of the former. 
The  intervention of judicial courts, should only be accepted where the exercise of the arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures is ineffective or such power is not or has exhaustively 
been used by the party in the arbitration agreement.  The principle of priority is very much taken 
into account by international arbitral rules, for example; the ICC Rules Article 23 (2) permits 
court support where necessary, however, it is not explicitly clear how the power should be 
limited or how it should be used. 
The intervention of the courts is justifiable for maintaining effective legal protection, and thus 
the effective distribution of justice.  Parties are advised to follow the common law approach in 
choosing a forum to make their provisional measures’ applications. The freedom of choice 
should not be abused by the parties otherwise they might be held liable for damages arising from 
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such abuse.  It should, however, be noted that the ICC Rules favour or allocate jurisdiction to 
only the tribunal. Thus, the arrangement is valid where there is exclusion or limitation of the 
courts, on the grounds that once the arbitrators have seized the file, applications for interim 
measures should be addressed to them.  The principle of choice needs re-addressing by giving 
the party autonomy to choose what or where to go when they have disputes, which shows a 
negative manner.  The author recommends that the mechanism should explicitly state that the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal should grant provisional measures, be very limited and that an 
application to a court for a provisional remedy should be addressed to an arbitral tribunal in order 
to maintain the doctrine of party autonomy. In addition, the freedom of choice approach is an 
open invitation for abuse and against the doctrine of party autonomy, hence the approach should 
not be adopted. 
6.2.3.4 The doctrine of complimentary approach 
Under the doctrine of complimentary approach, national laws or even arbitral rules, support or 
accept the support of the courts in arbitral proceedings, especially prior to the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal.  The role of the courts, in this regard, is complimentary. This means that the 
courts’ role is to support the arbitral process by adding some powers to enforce the proceedings.  
An arbitrator has no direct powers to invoke the process by which a court enforces compliance 
with its own orders, and accordingly a number of remedies, which are unavailable to the 
arbitrators, are left vested in the courts to be used in aid of the arbitral proceedings. The courts 
need to consider the objectives and aims of the parties when coming to arbitration, in order to 
strike a balance of justice.  
The powers which support arbitral proceedings, for example, injunctive relief, such as freezing 
orders, anti-suit injunctions, and freezing orders to preserve the status-quo and the power to 
secure attendance of a witness. The question of whether to resort to the supplementary powers of 
the English courts can be excluded by an agreement between the parties which presents fewer 
difficulties than in the case of coercive remedies. If the judicial courts have jurisdiction over the 
respondent, in accordance with the conflict of the rules of the laws, then the jurisdiction of the 
courts’ provisional measures cannot be excluded by the arbitral agreement. The courts’ 
discretion of whether or not to exercise these remedies will rarely, if ever, be exercised if the 
parties have agreed not to invoke the powers. The courts’ role should be advanced or permitted 
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only at the pre-formation stage, where it is urgent and the power of the arbitral tribunal is limited 
in scope or paralysed. Hence, there should not be a total exclusion of the courts, since it 
maintains the party autonomy doctrine, where after the formation, the tribunal takes over the 
proceedings, and the courts’ decision is not binding to the tribunal at this stage. 
6.2.3.5 The doctrine of subsidiarity 
After the appointment of the tribunal, the role of the court is subsidiary. The court subsidiarity 
model, in which interim measures should, in the first place, be applied for before the arbitrator, 
and court intervention is the last resort, from the English Arbitration Act 1996, it is not presented 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Arbitrators have the priority to deal with provisional measure 
requests and where the circumstances are not appropriate for them to grant the sought orders, 
then only the national courts step in and provide assistance.  The role of the courts in the arbitral 
proceedings remains subsidiary if arbitrating parties previously agreed for one of the emergency 
measure mechanisms. In such a case, a measure could be made to a party determined authority, 
and there is generally no need for courts to compliment. It should be noted that England has 
enumerated both tribunal and court provisional measures, however, court ordered measures 
appear to be broader than those granted by the tribunal, for example; only courts have the power 
to grant ex parte mareva injunctions. It should be noted also the arbitral power has over turned 
the court’s powers in regard to the granting of security for costs.  All judicial powers, in regard to 
any sought measures, are limited by the tribunal as provided by s. 44 (4) and court powers can 
cease under s.44 (6). 
The English Arbitration Act needs to be interpreted purposively, for example s.44 contains the 
most elaborate rule on court assistance out of the laws surveyed. In the author’s view, s.44 (5) 
provides assistance to the courts which can be appropriate where the arbitral powers are used 
exhaustively or unable to perform, for example, prior to the formation of the tribunal. Courts also 
have to consider the urgency of a case in order to provide their assistance, for example, in case of 
Anton Pillar orders, where a search is required to get evidence of the case in question. Where 
there is no clear urgency, even if the courts have jurisdiction, they may decline to order any 
remedy sought by the party to the arbitration agreement as demonstrated by Mustill LJ in 
Channel Tunnel v Balfour. Where there is no urgency, in accordance with s. 44(4), a party can 
apply to a court upon the notice of other parties and the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, permission must 
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be provided by the parties for the court to intervene, which means that this section was enacted in 
order to prevent courts from interfering with or usurping the arbitral proceedings.  According to 
s.44 (5), the courts shall grant an interim measure only if or to the extent that the tribunal or the 
person vested by the power is unable, for the time being, to act effectively. This provision and 
reference to a complementary mechanism should be seen as a change to the role of the courts in 
the pre-formation stage from the subsidiary to complimentary.  
6.2.3.6 The doctrine of compatibility 
A request for a judicial provisional measure before, during or after the proceedings of the arbitral 
proceedings is compatible with the arbitration agreement. One aspect of the doctrine of 
compatibility  reflects dual principles,
863
  which are, in  fact, a logical conclusion of acceptance 
of concurrent jurisdictions, meaning that tribunals and courts work together in order to effect the 
arbitral process. This is demonstrated by the revised edition of UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, 
Article 17 (J) which provides that: 
 
“national courts shall have the same power of issuing interim measures in relation to 
arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether their place is in a territory of this state, as 
it has in relation to proceedings, in courts. The courts shall exercise such powers in 
accordance with its own procedures in consideration of the specific features of 
international arbitration.” 
The powers of the court may not be exclusive; however, the Model Law goes on to provide that 
arbitrators may also grant interim measures of protection.  The irony is that the Model Law does 
not specify explicitly in any way what these may be, for example Article 17 of the Model Law 
provides that: 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a 
party, order any party to take such interim measures of protection as the arbitral tribunal 
may consider necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The arbitral 
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tribunal may require any part to provide appropriate security in connection with such 
measures.” 
Thus, there may be a choice; both the arbitrators and the courts may be empowered to grant 
interim measures of protection. In this situation, it is not always easy for a party to go to 
arbitration to determine which to approach- the arbitrators or the courts.  The party may wish to 
approach the tribunal but finds it pointless, either because the tribunal is not in existence, or 
because it does not possesses coercive powers to affect an enforcement order in regard to the 
contemplated measure. 
Any request by a party to arbitration does not waive the rights of a party subject to an arbitration 
agreement, nor does the existence of an arbitration agreement prevent a judicial authority from 
granting provisional measures.  It should be noted that despite the initiation of judicial 
proceedings or a request, the merits of the case in question remains within the arbitration 
domain. This is supported by the Model Law, which championed the English Arbitration Act 
1996, which provides that: 
“ a court before which an action is brought in a matter  which is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first 
statement of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
As to the judicial grant of provisional measures, national laws and arbitral rules generally grant 
or accept that an arbitration agreement does not hinder the granting of provisional measures by 
judicial courts. Court intervention in arbitral proceedings does not hinder the granting of 
provisional measures but aids the effectiveness of the arbitral process.  The unavailability of 
judicial courts in the arbitral process would normally be one of the most significant reasons for 
parties not to choose arbitration as a dispute mechanism on the grounds that when they face the 
need for coercive powers they have no back up for supporting the process, for example where 
there is the dissipation of property or where there are parallel proceedings. It should, however, be 
noted that there is some criticism in the issue of judicial courts’ intervention, mainly 
demonstrated by New York Convention Article II(3), which  provides that: 
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“The court of a contracting state, when seized of an action in a matter respect of which 
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall at the request 
of the parties refer parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
The New York Convention contains both an explicit obligation and an implied prohibition: an 
explicit obligation directing courts to refer to arbitration of the parties to an arbitration 
agreement; an implied prohibition for courts to take measures incompatible with the said 
obligation. This prohibition marks the maximum degree of legitimate court intervention.  It 
should, however, be noted that it is not a precise limit. Whether a court measure is or is not 
compatible with the obligation to refer the parties to arbitration depends on the interpretation of 
the quoted provision, which may vary considerably among the courts before one can assert 
where the maximum degree of court intervention on a particular jurisdiction lies. Still, even 
within one jurisdiction, courts may disagree on which court measure is contrary to their duty 
under the New York Convention to refer the parties to arbitration.  
6.3 Limitations of court involvement in arbitral proceedings 
The relationship between the courts and the arbitral tribunals is based on forced cohabitation; in 
the end this creates tension,
864
 which is unavoidable.
865
 Due to the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
courts and tribunals over interim measures, there is a risk of conflicting decisions for interim 
measures, where a party may be tempted to file a simultaneous application for interim measures 
before the court and the tribunal, or after failing to obtain an interim measure from the court, a 
party may apply the same relief from the tribunal in the hope of securing a more favourable 
ruling or vice-versa.
866
 
Mustill LJ in Coppe Levalin v Ken fertilizers and Chemicals said that: 
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“There is plainly a tension here, on the one hand the concept of arbitration as a 
consensual process reinforced by the ideas of transnational leans against the involvement 
of the mechanism of the state through a medium of municipal court. On the other side, 
there is a plain fact, palatable or not, that this is only a court possessing coercive powers 
which would rescue the arbitration if it is in danger of foundering.”867 
 6.3.1 Limitation under the New  York Convention 1958 
 On an international perspective, some jurisdictions have given their view that court involvement 
in arbitral proceedings is precluded.
868
 For example, the USA courts take the view that the courts 
have a ‘duty to refer the parties’ to arbitration under the New York Convention. Article II (3) of 
the Convention provides that: 
“the court of a contracting state, when seized of an action in a matter respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall at the request of 
the parties to refer parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and 
void, or inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
The New York Convention contains both explicit obligation and an implied prohibition. An 
explicit obligation is an order directing courts to refer parties to an arbitration agreement, while 
as an implied prohibition, courts take measures incompatible with the said obligation. This 
prohibition to some lawyers provides the maximum degree of court intervention.
869
 It should, 
however, be noted that it is not a precise limit. On such grounds, the author discusses whether a 
court measures is or is not compatible with the obligation to refer the parties to arbitration 
depending on the interpretation of the quoted provision, which may vary considerably among the 
courts before one can assert where the maximum degree of court intervention on a particular 
section lies. Still, even within one jurisdiction, courts may disagree on which court measures are 
central to their duty under the New York Convention, and refer the parties to arbitration.   
The ambiguity of this provision was given effect in two leading American cases namely; 
McCreary Tire Rubber Co V CEAT SPA,
870
 and Caroline Power & Light Co v Uranex,
871
which 
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was followed by the House of Lords in the leading case of the Channel Tunnel V Balfour Beaty 
Construction Ltd.
872
 
In McCreary, a dispute arose which related to a breach of an exclusive distribution agreement 
subject to arbitration agreement, between McCreary, a Pennsylvanian Corporation and CEAT, an 
Italian Corporation under the ICC Rules in Brussels ( Belgium). McCreary attempted to frustrate 
the arbitration agreement and imitated??a suit.  The court of Appeal for the Third Circuit in 
Philadelphia was called to rule on the compatibility of a pre-trial attachment under the New York 
Convention Article.
873
 The court declared that quite possibly a foreign attachment might be 
available for the enforcement of an arbitration award. This does not seek to enforce an arbitration 
award by foreign attachments. It seeks to bypass the agreed upon method of settling disputes. 
Such a bypass is prohibited by the New York Convention, if one party in the agreement objects 
to it. The court further interpreted the New York Convention as referring parties to arbitration, 
rather than stay the trial of the action. The court also held that the New York Convention forbids 
the courts of contracting states from entering a suit which violates an agreement to arbitrate. 
Further, the Court of Appeal provided that the obvious purpose of the enactment was permitting 
the removal of all cases falling within the terms of the treaty, to prevent the vagaries of state law 
from impeding its full implementation. Permitting a continued resort to foreign attachment in 
breach of the agreement is inconsistent with the purpose. 
The second case that was brought to the attention of interpretation of the New York convention 
(Article11 93) is Carolina Power which gave a contrasting decision to McCreary. In the 
Carolina case, there was contract between Carolina power, a North Carolina public utility 
company and Uranex, a French company selling uranium concentrates. With an increase in 
uranium, a French company ceased delivering uranium according to the agreed arbitration 
agreement. Carolina power attached a debt owed to Uranex, for the satisfaction of a future award 
in its favour. The Federal District Court of the Northern District of California had to determine 
the same issue as the court in McCreary, and it ruled exactly the opposite; the Convention and 
implementation statutes contained no reference to a prejudgment attachment, and provided little 
guidance in this controversy. Article II of the Convention states only that: 
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 “a court of a contracting state, ‘shall at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration.’”  
To implement this aspect of the Convention, s. 206 of title 9 provides that: 
 “a court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in 
accordance with the agreement at any place between therein provided for, whether that 
place is within or without the United States.” 
The language of this provision provides little apparent support for defendant’s argument. This 
case does not find McCreary convincing, as the convention does not exclude pre-judgment 
attachments. The analysis of these two cases created a relay race, tension and a suggestion that 
arbitration is private and courts should keep out. 
From these two cases, the minimum degree of court intervention under the New York 
Convention is established both by the explicit order of Article II (3) and by Article III. 
According to those provisions, courts are under the following obligations; 
To refer the parties to arbitration at the request of one of them as provided by Article II (3) or to 
recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award as provided by Article III of the convention. In 
between the maximum and minimum degree of court intervention, the New York Convention 
remains silent, except for some rules concerning setting aside the award.  
From these two cases the minimum degree of court intervention under the New York Convention 
is established both by the explicit order of Article II (3) and by Article III. According to those 
provisions, courts are under the obligation; to refer the parties to arbitration at the request of one 
of them as provided by Article II (3) or to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award as 
provided by Article III of the convention. In between the maximum and minimum degree of 
court intervention, the New York Convention remains silent, except for some rules concerning 
setting aside the award. 
The English courts have interpreted the New York Convention, Article II (3) and the two 
American cases above in Channel Tunnel v Balfour Beaty,
874
 where a contract contained twelve 
contractors, all French and British. The contract contained an arbitration clause, to refer disputes 
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to an arbitral tribunal when a dispute arises. A dispute arose, about variation order on payment 
regarding a cooling system. Upon the contractors’ threat not to perform, the Channel tunnel 
made a request for an injunction to prevent the contractors from suspending work. The case went 
to House of Lords on the issue of whether a court had the power to order interim measures when 
the case fell within the New York convention and arbitration.  Mustill LJ, with other Lords was 
in agreement and expressly disagreed with the Court of Appeal interpretation of Article II (3) of 
the New York Convention.  Mustill LJ stated that: 
 “the purpose is not to encroach on the procedure powers of the arbitrators but to 
reinforce them and to render a more effective decision at which the arbitration will 
ultimately arrive on the substance of the case of dispute.”875 
 Furthermore,  Raymond, an experienced lawyer in international arbitration, has expressed his 
view on Channel Tunnel and said that: 
“Over the last 120 years  the development of international arbitration has been marked by 
an obvious tendency to limit the possibilities of court intervention in the course of 
arbitration. Thus England abolished the special case and curtailed the powers of the 
courts even in support of arbitration. It may be that the tide is now turning; it is 
increasingly realised in international arbitration circles that the intervention of the judicial 
courts is not necessarily disruptive of the arbitration. It may be equally being definitely 
supportive, in the best English tradition.”876 
In such circumstances as the case above, this case may be interpreted, to limit any judicial 
intervention in arbitral proceedings even in cases of urgency. It seems that where there is an 
agreement to arbitrate, and particularly where there is an arbitration clause, judges will often be 
reluctant to interfere in arbitral proceedings, in order to respect the doctrine of party autonomy, 
which sets the foundation of arbitration.   It should be noted that although tension exists at times, 
it promotes the process effectively for example; in cases of electronic transfer,
877
 done by third 
parties, such as banks, who issue the letters of credit or bank guarantees, which may legally hold 
goods in dispute or under subcontracts, and the courts are called upon to save the arbitral 
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process, however, such power should be exercised cautiously and carefully by judges  to avoid 
the effect. 
6.3.2  The Brussels 1 Regulation and Arbitration Provisional Measures 
Since the accession of England to the European Union,
878
 the power of the English courts to 
grant provisional measures became limited.
879
 The Brussels convention on Jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters (The Brussels Convention) was 
agreed on  27 September 1968.
880
 In compliance with  the Directive, England originally, enacted 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement Act,
881
to support proceedings pending Brussels or Lugano 
contracting state. The applicability of the provision was later extended to proceedings outside the 
scope of the convention.
882
 It has become increasingly common in recent years for claimants to 
use worldwide freezing orders for the purpose of attempting to block assets being hidden or 
dissipated. However, with the replacement of the Lugano convention with Brussels 1 Regulation 
which ushered in Council regulation 44/2001 On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters,
883
 the English power to order 
provisional measures, mainly freezing, ex parte
884
 and anti-suit injunctions, in support of arbitral 
proceedings was ambushed.
885
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6.3.2.1 The Domicile  Technicalities under Brussels 
 Imagine that a Swedish Company is contemplating suing a company domiciled in Germany-
Berlin for the payment of some goods delivered in Germany, under a contract between the two 
companies. As the defendant is domiciled in Germany, which is also the place of performance of 
the contract, there is barely any doubt that the German courts would have a jurisdiction pursuant 
to the Brussels Regulation,
886
 at least in the absence of a valid choice of court clause in the 
contract providing otherwise. In fact, German courts are probably the only courts in the EU that 
are competent to make decisions on the substance of the dispute. However, let us assume  the 
assets of the German defendant company consist mainly of a bank account with an English bank 
in London. In accordance with Brussels 1, the forthcoming German judgement on the substance 
of the dispute will almost certainly be recognized and enforceable within the whole of the EU, 
including England, yet the Swedish company fears that by the time the final judgement has been 
made, the account may be empty, and all the money has been consumed or dissipated to an 
offshore account in an exotic country where German judgements are neither recognised, nor 
enforced. In view of this risk, the German court can grant provisional measures pursuant to 
German law., such as freezing the account and the measures will be enforced in England. 
 The Brussels Regulation only applies where the defendant is domiciled,
887
 in an EU member 
state.
888
 One  of the adversaries of the Regulation is Article 27, which requires a member state 
court to stay its proceedings if another state court has been first seized of proceedings involving 
the same cause of action and between the same parties and to allow the court first seized to 
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.
889
 The ability of the parties to determine the court 
that shall decide disputes arising between them is of considerable  importance to the international 
commercial community however, the current relationship between Article 23, which gives effect 
to parties choice of court agreement and Article 27, which contains “lispendens rule”, 
undermines the efficacy of the choice of court agreements in an EU context. This allows a party 
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to obstruct the bringing of proceedings in the chosen member state court by bringing torpedo 
action to another member state (albeit in violation of the choice court agreement). This problem 
is magnified where such violating procedures are brought in a member state court whose 
procedural rules do not provide for the determination of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue or in a 
speedy manner. 
 It should be noted that a difficulty arises as to the relationship between Article 27 and 22.  The 
CJEU in Overseas Union Insurance v New Hampshire Insurance,
890
left open the question of 
whether the lispendens rule also applied where the court first seized had exclusive jurisdiction.
891
 
It was further decided in GAT v Luk,
892
that where a party in a patent action raises the issue of 
validity of the patent by way of defence, this will trigger the exclusive jurisdiction.
893
 The two 
cases raise the question of whether there is an exception to the lispendens rule where the court 
first seized has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22 (4). This would mean that a defendant in 
an infringement action could divert any proceedings to the courts of the member states in which 
the patent right was registered by simply raising the validity defence. Indeed, the way Brussels 
operates theirs has too much scope for prospective defendants to manipulate it and obstruct any 
infringement action against them.  
6.3.2.2  Interface between Brussels 1 Regulation and Arbitration 
Although Article 1 (2) (d) provides for the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of Brussels, 
the delineation of this exclusion has recently become blurred as a result of the CJEU decision in 
Allianz SPA v West Tankers.
894
 This decision has been criticised in England and widely in the 
international arbitration community and has significantly undermined the efficacy of arbitration 
agreements which had, until then, been considered to be less vulnerable to torpedo actions than 
the choice of court agreements. The decision raised uncertainty as to how far arbitration is or 
should in fact be excluded from the scope of Brussels Regulation. West Tankers determined that 
a member state court has jurisdiction to decide upon the existence, validity and scope of an 
                                                 
890
 See CJEU C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1991] ECR 1-3317. 
891
 See Brussels Regulation Article24. 
892
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893
 Ibid Article 24 (4). 
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arbitration agreement by way of incidental or preliminary issue where otherwise the substance of 
the dispute falls within the scope of Brussels 1.  
Consequently,  the CJEU considered it to be underpinning the Brussels 1 Regime for the member 
state court at the seat of the arbitration to grant an anti-suit injunction restraining a party from 
commencing or continuing court proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.
895
 Following 
on from West Tankers, the English Court of Appeal in  Endesa Generaction,
896
was compelled to 
decide that the judgement of a member state court dealing with the incidental question of 
whether an arbitration clause had been validly incorporated into an agreement was covered by 
the Brussels Regulation and therefore binding on the member states’ court at the seat of the 
arbitration proceedings dealing with the same issue in normal arbitration proceedings. Indeed, 
this leads to a peculiar result that a judgement dealing with the efficacy of an arbitration 
agreement as an incidental issue in normal court proceedings is binding on the court at the seat of 
arbitration, where a similar judgement obtained from a court in context of arbitration (which falls 
outside of the Brussels Regulation) would not need to be recognized by other member states 
under Brussels. The author argues that the decision in West Tankers gives rise to an increased 
risk of a parallel court and arbitration proceedings and, consequently, of inconsistent judgements 
and arbitration awards. 
6.3.2.4 Brussels  42/2001 and arbitral provisional measures 
There are only two provisions under the Council Regulation 42/2201, which address the issue of 
provisional measures, which are Article 31 and 47. 
Article 31 provides that; 
“application may be made to the courts of member states for such provisional measures, 
including protective measures as may be available under the law of that state, even if, 
under this Regulation, the courts of other members state have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter.”897 
                                                 
895
See Robert Merkin, the Anti-suit Relief foreign Proceedings Disregarding  an Arbitration Clause, Arbitration Law 
Monthly,  May 2007,Vol.7 No.5  
896
 See National Navigation v Endesa Generaction  SA  [2009] EWCA Civ 1397. 
897
See  ReichertKockler v Dresdner Bank [1992] ECR 1-2149 para 34. 
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Article 31 of the Regulation reproduces the test of Article 24 of the Convention of 27 September 
1968 on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial matters,
898
 
and most of the case law of the ECJ is based on the convention.
899
 It should be noted that the 
above cited provisions are not only the ones regulating measures. Other provisions regarding the 
rules on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements also apply to the jurisdiction on granting 
provisional measures and their enforcement. Article 31 provides exclusive powers to the courts 
of contracting states to order provisional measures “as maybe available under the law of that 
state”even if the courts of another state have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.  Thus, 
the ECJ held  in Van Uden
900
 that Article 31 can be used for the purpose of obtaining provisional 
measures even where proceedings on the substance of the dispute have already been or may be, 
commenced before the arbitrators, apparently irrespective of whether the arbitration proceedings 
take place in a member state or elsewhere. One of the problems in regards to such provisional 
measures is that they do not concern arbitration as such and are parallel rather than ancillary to 
arbitration proceedings. 
901
 Their place in the scope of the Convention is thus determined not by 
their own nature but by the nature of the rights which they serve to protect.
902
 
The Van Uden judgement has been criticised,interlia, for blurring the distinction between 
arbitration and judicial proceedings. The wording of the text points out that the types of 
provisional measures determined by the national law of the court to which the application is 
made have to meet all the requirements for the admission of such measures provided by national 
law.
903
The definition of the notion is given by ECJ.
904
 The expression provision, including 
protective measures within Article 31 must therefore be understood as referring to measures 
which, in matters within the scope of the convention are “intended to preserve a factual or legal 
situation so as to safeguard rights and the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the 
court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. The fact that a measures is considered 
as provisional does not automatically bring it within the purview of the current Article 31 and the 
                                                 
898
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899
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900
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901
Ibid para 33. 
902
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903
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line [1999] QB 1225. 
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proposed Article 36. According to  Rechert,
905
 the main feature of provisional measures within 
Article 31 is that they are intended to protect a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights, 
the recognition of which is sought from another court having jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter. 
 Brussels 1 under Article 31 does not consider the important measure of hearing a witness. 
906
The 
starting point of the ECJ’s argument is the aforesaid concept of provisional measures which are 
intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights, the recognition of which 
is otherwise sought from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the dispute and are 
incumbent on ordering the court to take “particular care, “and detailed knowledge of the actual 
circumstances in which the measures are to take effect. “The principle of legal certainty, which 
constitutes one of the aims of the Brussels regime, requires the defendant reasonably be able to 
foresee before, which courts, other than those of the state in which he is domiciled, he may sue. 
The court pointed out that such a hearing measure, before a court of the contracting state, of a 
witness resident in the territory of that state, is intended to establish facts on which the resolution 
of future proceedings could depend and in respect of which a court in another contracting state 
has jurisdiction. Its only aim is to enable the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, 
determine whether it would be well founded and assess the relevance of evidence which might 
be adduced in that regard. On these grounds, the ECJ rules that: 
“measures ordering the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to 
decide whether to bring a case, determine whether it would be well founded and assess 
the relevance of evidence which might be adduced in that regard is not covered by the 
notion of “provisional, including protective measures.”907 
Indeed, this quotation adduces the dilemma English counterparts are facing when they are 
granting measures within the EU, however, the limitation does not apply to commonwealth 
states, which is the biggest market for English common law, hence the ability to grant such 
measures in international arbitration. 
                                                 
905
 Ibid. 
906
See Case C- 104/03. case C-104/03 St.Paul Dairy Industries  NV v UnibleExser BVBA [2005] ECR 1-467 
907
  Ibid. 
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In the cases of Mietz,
908
 the ECJ ruled that; 
“it is important to ensure that enforcement, in the state where it is sought, of provisional 
or protective measures allegedly founded on the jurisdiction laid down in Article 31 (24) 
of the Convention, but which go beyond the limits of that jurisdiction, does not result in 
circumstances of the rules on jurisdiction as to the substance set out in Article 2 and 5 
to18 of the convention.” 
Indeed the ECJ made it clear that the ordering of an interim payment to the plaintiff does not 
constitute a provisional measure capable of being granted under article 31,unless the payment to 
the defendant is guaranteed if the plaintiff is ultimately unsuccessful as regards the substance of 
the dispute and  secondly, the measure relates only to specific assets of the defendant located, or 
to be located, within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which the 
application is made.
909
 
There must exist a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measures sought and 
the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting state of the court before which those measures are 
sought.
910
 Indeed, this contradicts the England Arbitration Act which avails that the arbitrators 
have the power to grant interim payment on account.
911
 It is not quite clear what the ECJ meant 
by guarantee; obviously, the mere duty of the unsuccessful plaintiff to return the money does not 
constitute a real guarantee of repayment. On the other hand, the requirement of bank guarantee, 
or similar security arrangements, would make interim payments very difficult and expensive to 
use. The problem was mentioned by the European Commission in its Green Paper in the review 
of Brussels 1 Regulation,
912
but the proposal does not address it. The ECJ held that provisional 
measures under Brussels 1 Regulation, 
“are not in principle ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are ordered in parallel to such 
proceedings and are intended as measures of support. They concern is not  arbitration as 
such but protection of a wide variety of rights. Their place in the scope of the Convention 
                                                 
908
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is thus determined not by their own nature but by the nature of the rights which they 
serve to protect.”913 
 
 Under Brussels 1,
914
 a court with jurisdiction over merits is not impeded by EU law from 
making an order for the examination of an individual who held office in defendant’s company, 
even where they are domiciled in another member state,
915
on the basis that the court has 
jurisdiction over the merits which may make an order ancillary to the exercise of substantial 
jurisdiction.
916
 However, under English law such an order will not be granted if a person is 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the UK courts, when the application is made and the effect 
of the EU law does not exist. 
It is submitted that the ECJ judgement should  be interpreted to mean that there are measures for 
the purpose of preserving known evidence in civil or commercial matters under Article 31, but 
the search for potential evidence (evidence fishing) is not. The last mentioned type of evidence 
collecting can, instead, often be carried out using the Regulation on co-operation between  the 
courts of member states in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters.
917
 This 
dichotomy is maintained and confirmed  explicitly with the Proposal in Article 2 (b), and even 
more clearly in recital 22, which clarifies that the notion of provisional measures, including, in 
particular, protective orders aimed at seizure orders referred to in Article 6 and 7 of  the 
Enforcement  of the Intellectual Property Rights Directive,
918
 but does not include non-protective 
measures, such as ordering the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to 
decide whether to bring a case. 
 The Brussels 1 jurisdiction provides for any measure to be granted, and such a measure is 
required to undertake a preliminary assessment for example; the measure has to have a 
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connecting link,
919
 to the substance, and the court has to have jurisdiction to grant such an order 
sought by the party. However, even if the court has passed the Brussels Criteria set in Article 
31,
920
  an ex parte order  may not be granted.  This raises the question “should judicial decisions 
authorizing provisional measures which are delivered without a party against which they are 
directed having been summoned to appear and which are intended to be enforced without prior 
service come within the system of recognition provided by Title III of the Convention.” 
 The exorbitant jurisdiction grounds such as the nationality of the plaintiff applicant are certainly 
not acceptable. As the ECJ pointed out in the case of Daniel,
921
: 
“ the courts of the place or, in any event, of the contracting state where the assets subject 
to the measures sought are located are those best able to assess the circumstances which 
may lead to the grant or refusal of the measures sought or to the laying down of 
procedure and conditions which the plaintiff must observe in order to guarantee the 
provisional and protective character of the measure authorised.”922 
 The rationale underlying this requirement in relation to Article 31 is that the courts of the 
country/place, where the assets subject to the provisional measure sought are located, are the 
ones best able to assess the circumstances, which may lead to the granting or refusal of the 
measure in question. According to the  ECJ in the case of Van Uden, the presence of the 
defendants assets is particularly important in cases of interim payment, which cannot constitute 
provisional measures under Article 31,unless they relate to the specific assets of the defendant 
located or to be located within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which the 
application is made. 
Under Brussels, the order is granted against specific assets, not the defendant,
923
to appear, which 
in turn destroys their objective of being enforced without trial. For such an order to be effective, 
it has to be sought from the court of the place where the assets are located. This  may create 
                                                 
919
 See van Uden par40.-41 see  Case C-393/96 Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997] ECR 1-441 para 37. 
920
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irreconcilable decision of the local court leading to the opposite effect. The exposition of this 
effect demonstrated in Daniel,
924
 where the ECJ decided that the respect of the rights of defence 
dictates that the measure ordered on claimant’s unilateral application, without a notice to the 
defendant, cannot benefit from automatic recognition provided in article III of the Brussels 1 
Regulation. According to the ECJ,  
“the conditions imposed by Chapter III of the Brussels Convention.... are not fulfilled in 
the case of provisional or protective measures which are ordered or authorised  by a court 
without the party against whom they are intended to be enforced without prior service on 
that defendant.”925 
It should be noted that the specific objective of such protective measures is thought to produce a 
surprise effect intended to safeguard the threatened rights of the party seeking them by 
preventing the party against whom they are directed from moving the assets in possession, 
whether they be the subject matter of the dispute or constitute the creditors security. To stipulate  
that the recognition of such types of judgements must be subject to prior service on the other 
party and from the stage of the proceedings in the contracting state of origin would make them 
totally meaningless. The policy argument in Danilauler, creates the question of whether it is 
appropriate for a court remote from the assets to be seized to order their seizure or whether such 
orders should be a matter for a court local to the asset concerned. 
926
 
The  ECJ judgement in Danilauler reflected both textual and general policy consideration. The 
textural argument  concentrated  on the question of whether the word judgement, as used in 
article 27 and 6, included a judgement ordering provisional measures and whether a judgement 
given in default included a judgement delivered after an ex parte hearing or whether it was by 
definition limited to a judgement delivered after the defendant had been  summoned but had 
failed to appear.
927
  According to Article 2 (a) of the Brussels Proposal, even ex parte orders will 
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be recognised and enforced, provided the defendant has the right to subsequently challenge the 
measure under the national law of the member state of origin (in case of such a challenge, the 
enforcement of the measure may be suspended pursuant to Article 44 (3) of the proposal). 
6.3.3.5 Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council on Jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters of 
12
th
December 2012. 
Due to  short comings in Brussels 42/2001,
928
  and many recommendations,
929
 especially after 
West Tankers,
930
the European Council of Europe at Brussels on 11 December 2009, adopted a 
new Regulation,
931
in order to protect European member states or citizens.
932
 The question that 
arises is to what extent has the new Regulation become a turning point and a landmark in the 
granting and enforcement of cross border arbitral provisional measures in European member 
states? This question can only be answered by analysing the Article of this Regulation in the 
ambit of arbitration. 
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 It should be noted that even after the  adoption of the new Regulation No.1215/2012,which is to 
have effect in 2015, the position of provisional measures has not drastically changed much,
933
 for 
example Article 42 (2) (c), provides that “where a measure was ordered without the defendant 
being summoned to appear, proof of service of judgement.” In other words an ex parte order will 
not be granted  as provided under Article 31 in the case of Daniuler.  Furthermore, Article 33 
provides that ex parte measures  are not enforceable.. 
The problem of parallel proceedings under Article 33 is unsolved, since the issue of  jurisdiction 
is still the same as provided  by Van Uden under Article 31 ( Article 24) of the Brussels 
Regulation. Although, Article 25 of the new Regulation provides harmonious administration to 
minimize the possibility of concurrent proceedings. Since the regulation does not address the 
issue of time in regard to concurrent proceedings , its success is still debatable. 
In addition, a measure may not be granted by a competent court due to public policy, and this is 
provided under the new Regulation Article 45 (1). 
There is a limitation to the selection of a protective measure under Brussels 1 and even the new 
Regulation does not provide any remedy under Article 25, where any order for a witness for 
evidence is not classified as a provisional measure. The Regulation does not address the issue of 
the European Convention on Human rights, especially when  ex parte measures are granted 
without the defendant being summoned, which violates Article 6 of the Convention rights. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In relation to the question of whether the national courts’ involvement undermines the arbitral 
process, the answer is that it depends on the nature and circumstances of the involvement at any 
given stage. However, notwithstanding the above, there are a number of principles that ought to 
inform the way in which national courts approach the issue of involvement with international 
arbitration. First, despite its autonomous character, international arbitration depends on 
municipal courts to provide effectiveness, support and assistance for the process. Secondly, 
arbitration does not depend on municipal courts for legitimacy; this exists as aright, based on the 
                                                 
933
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agreement of the parties (party autonomy). The limitations of the tribunal should also be taken 
into account, that without the supportive role of courts, arbitration will be meaningless, on the 
grounds that assets will be sold before the tribunal is established.
934
 
Accordingly, municipal courts should become involved where they asked to give effect to the 
arbitration agreement or to grant measures only in urgent circumstances and support the agreed 
mechanism between parties, including assisting with the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the 
protection and collection of evidence for use in arbitration proceedings, and if need be, 
preservation of the status quo.  
 The examination discussed the doctrines advanced in support of this relationship which is 
referred to as concurrent jurisdiction. This chapter examined the doctrine of co-operation, which 
adduces that courts and tribunals have a mutual respect that promotes this co-operation for 
assistance and support when the tribunal calls it upon it for help, in emergencies. In addition, the 
thesis examined the concept or doctrine of coordination, which demonstrates the over whelming 
need for cooperation. The thesis also examined the freedom of choice concept; which adduces 
that a party is at liberty to choose which mechanism is needed for a dispute resolution, either the 
courts or the arbitral tribunal. Under this concept, the doctrine of party autonomy is enshrined, 
and due to this fact, courts may only get involved on consultation of the tribunal, and they should 
be cautious not to open doors for abuse, by those who have agreed that their disputes be settled 
by arbitration agreement. The principle of complementary, examined the role of courts as 
complementary not as intervenient. The role of the courts, in this concept, is rarely excluded by 
the parties. The role of the courts is mostly subsidiary, in other words to provide support where 
the tribunal cannot provide such relief to the party affected. The thesis examined the doctrine of 
compatibility, which means that a request for provisional measures from courts is compatible 
with an arbitration tribunal. In other words, the courts and tribunals work together in order to 
affect the arbitral process. The party can approach the court if he finds it meaningless to 
approach a tribunal, where it may not have the coercive powers against the measures sought. 
In cases of insolvency it would be impossible for the tribunal to grant orders for security for 
costs as demonstrated in Bank Mellat
935
 and Ken Chemicals
936
where if the proceeding is 
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unsuccessful, the respondent will almost certainly have sufficient means to pay costs. The 
English courts, to exercise their undoubted jurisdiction to intervene and order security for costs 
in this situation, avoid a risk of third party, while financing what would prove to be unfounded 
litigation,
937
 sheltering behind an impoverished party so as to escape what would be otherwise a 
normal consequence of being unsuccessful in the arbitration. 
  The thesis examined the limitation of court jurisdiction to the arbitral proceedings, mainly the 
Brussels Regulation 44/2001, and Article 31, which sets draconian procedures for provisional 
measures to be granted. The Brussels 1 Regulation should adopt a directive, specifically on 
provisional measures,
938
 and allow member states to implement it in their jurisdictions, in order 
to avoid conflicts or directory tactics that arise under the doctrine of first seized court, without 
assessing the court at the commencement of the arbitral proceedings. This will prevent applicants 
seeking measures from other venues, for example; Hong Kong, USA, and Dubai, which provide 
guarantees of their assets. 
  The author argues that the  court’s involvement939 should be supported with a degree of 
limitation,
940
 to avoid the tension and collision between the two systems of dispute resolution in 
order to maintain the doctrine of party autonomy,
941
 and also to adhere to the New York 
Convention, and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Since parties enter into arbitration with the 
expectation of respect for their agreement, they may be disappointed if a dispute arose and they 
may be constrained to fight against their will on the public battlefield of the courts.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 The enforcement of provisional measures (tribunals &courts) 
7.1 Introduction 
The jurisdiction of international arbitrators to order provisional measures is generally recognized 
in national legislations, international conventions and arbitral rules. This jurisdiction is without 
prejudice to the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts to grant interim measures despite the 
existence of an arbitration agreement.
942
 Since the jurisdiction of arbitrators is universally 
recognized, the next debatable question is the issue of recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures ordered by the arbitral tribunal; no uniformity of opinion existed in that 
respect. The absence of a virtually universal international instrument such as the 1958 New York 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of foreign awards led to the adoption of different 
legislative and jurisprudential solutions by national courts and legislators. Commentators and  
surveys are in agreement when they point out that interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunals 
are frequently complied with spontaneously by the parties.
943
 
 International transactions concern the movement or organization of assets across the borders of 
two or more countries, and might involve the entities of different countries. In the case of 
disputes regarding international transactions, it is important to ensure that provisional measures 
are enforceable in all countries affected by the transaction, preferably in all countries where the 
losing party has assets that can be attached to satisfy the credit of the winning party.
944
  The 
enforceability of provisional measures differs depending upon the forum. The arbitral provisional 
measures are not self-executing whereas judicial provisional measures are directly enforceable 
because they have state authority and parliamentary mandates under the arbitral enactment.  
                                                 
942
  It is only the Italian law that prohibits the arbitral tribunal from ordering an attachment or other provisional 
measures, as provided under Article 818 of the Italian Civil Code. 
943
A survey concerning arbitrators under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, concluding that interim 
measures are spontaneously complied with in 90% of the cases observed. See Naimark, Keer, Analysis of 
UNCITRAL Questionnaires on Interim relief, in Mealey’s March 2001 at 26; for a similar survey concerning 
arbitration administered by the Cairo Regional centre for International Arbitration, pointing out that all 5 orders 
adopted in the year 2000 were wilfully complied with by the parties, see Abu-Enein, Issuing Interim Relief 
Measures in International Arbitration in Arab States, in the Journal of World Investment, 2002, at 81. See Berger, 
International Economic Arbitration, Deventer, Boston 1993 at 334. 
944
See Adrian Briggs & Peter Rees, Civil Jurisdiction & Judgements (5
th
 edition, British Library 2009) at 658-659. 
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Since international arbitration is used all over the world, it is considered more flexible, speedier 
and enforceable.  
 Provisional measures are enforceable if the country where the award is to be enforced is  party 
to the New York Convention 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards for 
example; for countries with a long history of arbitration such as England, USA, Germany and  
France. Judicial provisional measures for example; in the UK are directly enforceable.
945
 An 
arbitral tribunal or a court of competent jurisdiction takes proper, timely and compulsory 
provisional measures, and such measures can serve the purpose to maintain the status quo, 
preserve evidence and prevent the malicious transfer of assets. Therefore, such measures are 
widely enforced in international arbitration. Normally, the party to whom the provisional 
measure are applied against is inclined to carry out the provisional measure as directed and show 
deterrence to the arbitral tribunal or court in order to avoid bearing unfavourable consequences in 
arbitral proceedings. Under such circumstances, the enforcement of provisional measures 
becomes critical. 
Parties need enforcement nowadays, more than before, because of the ease or technological 
advancement which make the transfer of assets possible by the click of a button, to another 
jurisdiction state as a safe heaven. This may be a problem when a party has successfully been 
victorious in proceedings but no asset is left to enforce the award. Arbitrating parties nowadays, 
have too great an expectation of their ability to enforce their rights. The rise of higher 
expectations is due to the predictability and speed required in international commerce and advice 
or counselling that is provided by lawyers and barristers in the resolution of international 
disputes. The involvement of legal expertise or solicitors, who have an international office, 
almost in all venues or seats of arbitration, are familiar with all available tools for structuring a 
strategy for the resolution of a dispute that is most suitable for their client’s interest. 
The thesis, in this chapter, aims to address the question; to what extent are provisional measures 
enforced by the arbitral tribunal and municipal courts. This section will be divided into sections 
in order to examine the question set in this chapter,. Firstly, the enforcement of provisional 
measures by the arbitral tribunal, in other words the tools of arbitral compliance. Secondly, the 
                                                 
945
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threaten compliance of its order with contempt of court of huge fines. 
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recognition and enforcement of arbitral measures by municipal courts. It should be noted that 
when parties to an arbitration agreement vehemently refuse to comply with an interim measure 
voluntarily, the intervention of municipal courts becomes necessary in order to obtain its judicial 
recognition and enforcement by giving coercive powers. 
Thirdly, the applicability of the New York Convention to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral interim measures, in other words these sections examine whether interim measures can 
be enforced like arbitral wards, internationally or whether arbitral measures which are breached 
by a defendant, who escapes to another jurisdiction or venue, can be enforced by the New York 
Convention?  Fourthly, this chapter aims to examine the enforcement of interim measures under 
the Brussels regime. It is of great importance that the Brussels 1 Regulation is examined since 
England is a member of the European Union, and any rulings or European enactments affect its 
jurisdiction among member states. Lastly the role of Model Law or the work of Model Law in 
regard to enforcement will further be examined. 
7.2 Tools of arbitral enforcement of provisional measures 
Tools of arbitral enforcement are subdivided into subsections, namely;(a) voluntary 
compliance,(b)sanctions of compliance, and (c) arbitral damages. If the measure is not complied 
with, (d)Adverse Inference, and varying need for enforcement. Such tools assist enforcing and 
recognizing any arbitral provisional measures that are granted by the arbitral tribunal.  Indeed, 
these tools adduce that the arbitral tribunals have several remedies at their disposal to ensure 
compliance with their own orders for interim measures. It should, however, be noted that the 
chances of such success for these legal instruments are highly uncertain, for they only aim, as a 
last resort, to pressurize the recalcitrant party to abide by the arbitral tribunals’ decisions and 
therefore, to obtain wilful compliance. These do not replace interventions by municipal courts, to 
which the parties will have recourse whenever these remedies are not complied with or prove to 
be unsuccessful. The wilful compliance with orders from the tribunal should not be 
overestimated, since it largely depends on the parties intentions to not negatively influence the 
arbitration pending the decision on the merits. Furthermore, the availability of effective sanctions 
for the case of non-compliance represents the best deterrent and guarantee of the measures’ 
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effectiveness.
946
 Therefore, provisional measures granted by the tribunal cannot be effective 
unless the interested party can obtain its enforcement. The remedies for ensuring compliance 
with arbitral provisional measures and strengthening their effectiveness, can take the form of 
sanctions imposed by the arbitrators on the basis of either the law or the will of parties or 
mechanisms involving  the co-operation of municipal courts.
947
 
7.2.1 Voluntary compliance 
None of the established set of arbitral rules and enactments expressly provides a mechanism for 
the arbitral tribunal to enforce provisional measures. This silence has been filled with the 
voluntary mechanism of enforcement. An increase in international trade and investment, coupled 
with the reluctance on behalf of the parties to bring their disputes before courts’ system, has 
created a growing market for the resolution of arbitral disputes by the arbitration mechanism.
948
 
As a result, experienced institutions have emerged providing an impartial arbitration service, 
time tested rules for the conduct of arbitral proceedings, and most importantly, an effective 
network guaranteeing the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures or arbitral agreements. 
Those who are familiar with the industry are aware that the growth of arbitration would not be 
possible without the voluntary support of the parties.
949
 Considering the voluminous literature on 
international judicial and arbitral settlement, it may at first seem surprising that there has been 
relatively little interest shown by international lawyers on the problem of enforcement of 
provisional measures rendered a matter that the author regards crucial in international arbitration. 
The reasons for lack of attention are not difficult to discern. Mainly, it has been the voluntary 
mechanism to submit to arbitration, with the main purpose of voluntarily complying with arbitral 
tribunal orders and not preparing to run the risk of adverse decision; the parties would not have 
submitted to arbitration in the first place if they were not ready to voluntarily enforce orders of 
the tribunal. Most orders direct a party to perform or refrain from performing a specific act. Such 
                                                 
946
See Besson, Arbitrage International etmesuresprovisioires, Zurich, 1998) at 315. 
947
 See Tommaeo, Lexfori e tutelacautelarene’ll’arbitrato commercial internazionale,Rivarb,(1999) at 28. See 
Poudret, Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, London (2007) at 540. Knoepfler Les 
MeasuresProvisoiresetl’arbitrage international, in Kellerhals (edn), Sciedsgerichtbarkeit, Zurich, (1997) at 
307.Reiner,LesMeasures provisoires et conservatoires et l’arbitrage international, notammentl’arbitrage CCI, 
Journal du droit international ( 1998) at 861. 
948
 See Michael  Mustill and Stewart Boyd, Mustill& Boyd: Commercial Arbitration (2
nd
 Edition London 
Butterworts, 1989 ) at 47. 
949
 See Italian Arbitration Association rules 1994 Article 19 and Arbitral Rules of European fund Article 27(1). 
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orders by the tribunals are “lex imperfect”, as the tribunal lack the power to enforce their orders 
directly against the parties. It should, however, be noted that many orders are voluntarily 
complied with,
950
because they are conscious of their obligation to mitigate damages and refrain 
from aggravating the dispute. Indeed, no compliance with orders for interim measures may have 
an adverse effect on a tribunals’ assessment of damages. Parties willing to comply with such 
orders may be justified with the concern of not antagonizing the arbitral process.
951
  It is 
expected that parties who comply voluntarily with arbitrators’ orders tend to because arbitrators 
will be deciding their case. Hence, a failure may be taken into account by the arbitral tribunal’s 
final decision. Thus, parties want to look favourably in the eyes of the arbitrators. They do not 
want the arbitrators to draw any adverse inference and hold them responsible for any costs 
caused by neglecting to abide by the order.
952
 
 Some commentators have suggested that, although the tribunal may lack explicit powers to 
enforce interim measures,
953
 the tribunal’s power as the ultimate decision maker of the dispute 
itself, serve to encourage most parties to comply with arbitral orders.
954
 Ultimately, of course, the 
arbitrators greatest source of power resides in their position as arbiters of the merits of the 
dispute between the parties. Parties seeking to appear before the arbitrators as good citizens who 
have been wronged by their adversary will generally not wish to defy the instructions given to 
them by those whom they wish to convince of the justice of their claims. Although there is no 
international vehicle to enforce provisional measures, according to many surveys, most of the 
arbitral provisional measures are voluntarily, wilfully and spontaneously complied with by the 
parties.
955
 Since the arbitrators, under the “lex arbitri,”956are allowed to grant provisional 
                                                 
950
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measures,
957
their enforcement is not a surprise both domestic and internationally.
958
 It should be 
noted that although the tribunal’s provisional orders can be complied with, at times there is a risk 
when a defendant refuses to comply with the order, and the tribunal is left with no remedy.
959
 
Where the order was not voluntarily complied with,
960
 and there is substantial risk, the tribunal 
has the power to take all issues in an award.  Parties to arbitration agreement usually tend to 
comply with the arbitral orders, in order  to win the battle for the final awards as they would not 
like to put themselves in a disadvantageous position through wrongful conduct. When a party 
does not comply with such an order, there is assistance from the courts.
961
 According to a survey 
of corporate attitudes and practices on international arbitration conducted by Price water house 
Coopers and the School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary, University of London 
(QMUL) in 2008, it was adduced that most of the arbitral provisional measures  are voluntary 
performed by the parties without going to municipal courts.
962
 
7.2.2 Sanctions imposed by the arbitrators for non-compliance 
International arbitrators have several remedies at their disposal to ensure compliance with their 
own orders for interim measures. However, the chances of success for these legal instruments are 
highly uncertain, for they only aim, as a last resort, to pressurize the recalcitrant party to abide 
with the arbitrators’ decision and, therefore, to obtain wilful compliance. These do not replace 
the intervention of the courts, to which the parties will have recourse whenever these remedies 
prove unsuccessful. The sanctions of non-compliance are divided into two categories; namely 
damages or costs for non-compliance and the ability to draw adverse consequences on the merits 
of the dispute against a recalcitrant party. 
                                                                                                                                                             
956
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957
 See EAA1996 s.38, 39 and 48. 
958
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959
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960
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7.2.2.1 Arbitral damages or costs for non-compliance 
Interim measures have an undeniable contractual value deriving from the power conferred by the 
parties to the arbitral tribunal though an arbitral agreement; under the doctrine of party 
autonomy. The power to hold the recalcitrant party liable for costs and damages is derived from 
the broad interpretation of the arbitration contractual proximity. An arbitrator may hold a 
recalcitrant party liable for damages and costs arising from or related to a failure to comply with 
the measure ordered by the tribunal.
963
  The power to hold a party for costs or damages is an 
implied duty.
964
 The tribunal, in regard to such a breach, can award punitive or multiple damages 
in proportion to a given case in question, with no bias.
965
 
 Arbitrators have the power to rule for damages,
966
 resulting from non-compliance with the 
interim measure orders.
967
  This is drawn from the conclusion that an arbitration agreement is a 
contract and such damages are connected to the contract.  Interim measures have a undeniable 
contractual value deriving from the power conferred by the parties to the arbitrators though the 
arbitration agreement.  This contractual obligation is strengthened by the obligation of good faith 
incumbent on all parties subscribing to arbitration, so as not to frustrate the smooth settlement of 
dispute through arbitration. As a consequence of a breach of this contractual obligation,
968
 the 
tribunal has the power to sanction for non-compliance by ordering the recalcitrant party to 
compensate for any damage incurred by the other party as a consequence of non-compliance.
969
 
Compliance with the order specifically under agreement does not necessarily lead to 
compensation for damages. In the absence of any damages, the beneficially could only obtain an 
award ordering the specific performance of the obligation, which per se is incompatible with the 
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urgency of most cases of interim relief. Compensation for damages is not an adequate remedy 
and is incompatible with the need to protect a party’s right against harm which is by definition 
deemed irreparable.  This remedy however, is not entirely satisfactory for several reasons.
970
 
Firstly, the  jurisdiction of the tribunal to grant or award damages for the non-respect of interim 
measures is far from certain and should be established on a case-by-case basis regarding the 
scope of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration rules, to see if any are applicable on basis 
thereof. Secondly, non-compliance with sanctions does not necessarily lead to compensation for 
damage. Lastly, even where theoretically possible, compensation for the damage suffered as a 
consequence of non-compliance with the arbitrators’ order is generally not an adequate remedy 
for the protection of a party’s right against harm, which by definition is irreparable. 
Some scholars argue that the power to rule on damages is implied within the power of the 
arbitrators to issue provisional measures. 
971
 Since arbitrators have the power to grant provisional 
measures,
972
 they should also have the power to ensure compliance or enforcement with these 
orders to calculate the amount of damages resulting from non-compliance. Despite the 
availability of damages for non-compliance, there are some circumstances where a party 
disregarding the sanction may refuse to comply with an interim measure issued by the tribunal, 
as demonstrated in the famous case of Kastener v Jason.
973
In this case, two partners Mr Ernest 
Kastner and Mr Marc Jason agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration under Jewish law subject 
to the English Arbitration Act 1996. Mr Kastner invested in Marc Jason’s business, and later 
sought to recover his investment in arbitration before the Beth Din (Jewish arbitration tribunal or 
the Federation of Synagogues, a court of the Jewish law. The parties agreed to comply with the 
orders of the tribunal or comply with any sanctions of the tribunal where an order was not 
complied with. In due process, Kastner complained that his investment in Jason’s business was 
procured by fraud in 2001, the arbitral tribunal (Beth din) made an award in Mr Jason’s favour, 
on the basis that fraud had been established. The arbitral tribunal granted a freezing order against 
Jackson, refraining him from selling his house on Helmsdale Gardens until he has received 
permission from the tribunal (Beth Din).  On application of Kastner on 27 February 2002 and 
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pursuant to the powers invested in the tribunal by virtue of Arbitration Act 1996, ordered Jason 
from refraining taking any steps altering the status quo regarding ownership of the property until 
permission is granted. Later he made an application of the caution on the land registry to protect 
his interest in property with permission of the tribunal. Indeed the respondent Jason agreed in 
March to comply with the arbitral order. However, on 11 April 2002, in fragrant breach of the 
direction of the agreement, Jason entered into a contract of sale and completed the contract of 
sale of the property to Mr and Mrs Sherman and decamped to USA.  Mr Sherman’s solicitor 
(Brian of famer Millar) inexplicably failed, when he carried out his Land Registry search, to read 
the caution. In negligence of the caution, with constructive notice, Sherman proceeded to 
complete the purchase on 20 May 2002. They paid full purchase price and Mr Jason executed   
transferred interest of them. Sherman financed the purchase in part with HSBC mortgage. The 
balance was paid after two prior mortgages were discharged. The tribunal after finding fraud on 
property and profits of sale awarded quantified damages payable to Kastner in the sum of £ 
237,224.50.  The purchasers in regard of this property found later that their property could not be 
registered. They commended proceedings against Mr Kastner on the grounds that they were not 
party to the arbitration agreement as third parties. This case was mentioned earlier. 
 Although the arbitrator had the power to grant orders and provide sanctions of compliance, 
subject to the powers of the tribunal under s.39 (4), and s. 48 (5), it was held by Rix LJ that it did 
not have the power to grant attachment orders, in order to protect the property disposition. The 
irony in this case is that the arbitration mechanism lacks protection, even when there is a 
sanction or damages to the defendant, which can defraud the system without any adverse 
influence. The Court’s power exercised under s.44 (2) (e), in granting interim measures should 
only be to protect the party who has proprietary rights, and who has acted on the conscience of 
the other party. Indeed, this adduces that English law on enforcement needs more changes if 
England is to be a better venue for arbitration and enforcement. The law in this case is not 
straight forward, and should provide a remedy especially to third parties.  Although the tribunal 
has wide scope of power, under s. 39(1), it does not confer powers to the tribunal to make 
freezing orders, even when the parties do give such powers to the tribunal as in the case above.  
The Report on the Arbitration Bill, which provides Mareva injunctions to be only judicial 
instruments, is misguiding and many arbitrators are unhappy with such powers. It would be 
desirable to give the arbitral tribunal the power to make provisional orders where the parties have 
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so agreed. The expert reports should be a key factor in regard to provisional remedies, and an 
expert report should be given consideration in cases of enforcement. If the law is not changed, 
the role of provisional measures will be meaningless since at the time of the final award, the 
subject matter of the dispute is already disposed and the defendant can even have a safe haven in 
another country. 
 
7.2.2.2 The ability to draw adverse consequences 
Amore effective remedy to ensure the respect of the tribunal’s provisional measures is the ability 
to draw adverse consequences on the merits the dispute against the recalcitrant party in the 
tribunal’s final award, so as not to negatively influence the arbitrators, pending a decision on the 
merits. The tribunal may draw adverse inference for non–compliance with a measure, where a 
party may be held liable on the substance of the dispute in question due to a lack of co-operation. 
The most obvious example is the case of the dissipation of assets. If a party is to dissipate all of 
his or her assets then it may have no fear of the consequences of sanctions of being unsuccessful 
in the arbitration or the threat of being held liable for costs or damages.  In addition,  with an 
increased means of technology, by the time a sanction is granted the assets are transferred with a 
twinkle of an eye. An award will be meaningless since the subject matter of the dispute will not 
be available. The arbitrators should consider whether the provisional measure relief is 
unnecessary on the basis that the  damages at the end of the case will be a sufficient remedy if 
the claimant or applicant is found to be right and whether an undertaking to pay damages, from 
the party seeking the provisional relief to compensate for any damage done in the event of 
providing unjustified effects on the respondent of any proposed order.
974
 
The adverse remedy enhances the efficiency of arbitral provisional measures against the non-
compliant party concerning the merits of the dispute. Parties will obviously be reluctant to 
disregard such an order to avoid negatively influencing the arbitrators, pending a decision on the 
merits and the psychological effects might prove decisive.  
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An arbitral tribunal may draw an adverse inference for not complying with its ruling on key 
issues like the preservation of evidence.
975
 Where the arbitral tribunal considers that such 
evidence supports the case of the applicant, and the evidence is or ought to be in the recalcitrant 
party’s possession, the tribunal will draw adverse inference to the defendant if he/she has not 
complied with the order.
976
 In reality, the tribunal has no enforcement mechanism in regard to 
the preservation of evidence, and drawing adverse inference from the failure will not make any 
impact.  Due to the failure to preserve or enforce the evidence, it is felt that the arbitral tribunal 
lacks coercive powers to enforce its orders. 
Arbitrators’ decisions on the merits are totally different. A negative attitude from the arbitrator in 
the final decision would be therefore unjustified in most cases.  Unless there is a casual link 
between the party’s failure to comply and the outcome of the arbitration, the tribunal may not 
penalize the recalcitrant party in the final award as sanctions for failure to respect the procedure 
decisions.
977
 The tribunal, in dealing with such matters has to be impartial so as not to cause 
injustice to either party to the arbitration agreement.
978
 Given the composition of the tribunal and 
the subsidiary approach, such cases of non-compliance may occur but are not something that in 
England’s jurisdiction, would be a serious issue to deal with since the Arbitration Act 1996 
provides a lot of remedies and authority to the tribunal in regard to any matters subject to 
arbitration,
979
and also the backup of the courts is another weapon if there is a demand for urgent 
compliance.  
 It should however, be noted that the tribunal’s decision on the request for interim measures and 
its decision on the merits are founded on entirely different bases and scope. There is, however, 
an exception to the above principle, which is manifested in the English Arbitration Act 1996,
980
 
which provides dismissal of the claims of the claimant of the party which do not comply with an 
Order for security for costs. The tribunal power, in regard to the ordering of security for costs, is 
one of the golden goals of the Act, and a refusal may even be subject to contempt of court. 
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Furthermore, the EAA 1996
981
 provides general powers of the arbitral tribunal to “draw such 
adverse inference from the Act of non-compliance to the circumstances as may justify.”  Nothing 
in the Act prevents the tribunal from sanctioning the non-respect of an order in its decision on 
the costs of the proceedings, in respect of which it is generally recognized that arbitrators can 
take circumstances other than the outcome of the case on the merits into account. In some 
European states, for example, England, France, Belgium, and Dutch, there is a coercive 
“astringes”982 remedy that is available to arbitrators to ensure that the payment of a pre-
determined sum of money every day or month is respected where the decision is not complied 
with.  Unless the tribunal is put on the same footing as the courts,
983
 there is a grey area between 
the merits and enforcement of such orders.
984
 The English arbitral tribunals should adopt a 
system where the tribunals and courts are put on the same footing,
985
 in the enforcement of 
provisional measures, as in other European states, where the national legal system expressly 
provides for the arbitrators powers to issue” astreintes” for example, the 
Netherlands,
986
Belgium,
987
 and Sweden.
988
In France, doctrine and case law tend to permit the 
powers of the arbitrators to enforce both decisions on the merits and procedural orders by 
astreinte, on the assumption that arbitral jurisdiction can be assimilated to the jurisdiction of the 
state courts.
989
 It has been denied however, that arbitrators have the power to liquidate the 
astreinte, as this power is reserved for state courts and subject to the previous exequatur of an 
award incorporating the arbitral order.
990
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One of the most powerful weapons of the arbitral tribunal in England in regard to the 
enforcement of its orders is the power to order costs.  This power is derived from s.38 (3) of the 
EAA 1996. The tribunal, under this section, has the power to provide security for the costs of the 
arbitration, and secondly, the power to make interim payments on account of the costs of the 
arbitration.  The term ‘costs’ means all fees and costs of the arbitral tribunal. In other words, the 
claimant has to provide security for costs. This power is provided by the parties, and it is only 
exclusive to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  It should, however, be noted that this power is best 
exercised on application by the respondent rather than by the tribunal of its own motion. The 
tribunal has to assess evidence showing that there is a serious ground for doubting whether the 
claimant’s assets within jurisdiction are sufficient to cover an eventual costs’ order. The amount 
required ought to be proportionate and should not be sought exclusively to guarantee the 
payment of the tribunal fees. Where a claimant fails to comply by such an order of costs, the 
tribunal may make a peremptory order setting a time limit for compliance, and if the claimant 
fails to provide security for costs, the tribunal can make an award dismissing the claim.  Indeed, 
the above section is backed up by s. 39, which provides that the tribunal has the power to make 
provisional awards, which it would have the power to grant in the final award, for example the 
provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property between parties or an 
order for payment on account of the costs of the arbitration. The tribunal, in exercising its power, 
has the same power as the court to make a declaration to any matter of the proceedings, to order 
a party to do so or refrain from doing anything; it can order a specific performance of a contract. 
However, unlike the USA,
991
 Holland,
992
 France and Belgian,
993
 which provides the tribunal with 
the power to make an ancillary order for a payment of a pre-determined sum of the money every 
day or monthly where an provisional measure is not complied with,
994
tribunals in England have 
no power to compel the enforcement of their orders for example, imposing time lights to make 
psychological effects to disobedience. 
                                                 
991
 AA Article 2, authorizes the tribunal at a party’s request to take whatever measure for protection. Article 21 
further provides that a request from the court to enforce the measure shall not be deemed incompatible with the 
agreement to arbitrate. 
992
Article 1056 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
993
 Article 1709 puts the courts on the same footing to enforce provisional measures. 
994
 See Thomas selected issues: Interim Measures in International Arbitration; Finding the best answer 
Craot.ArbitNo.12 , 2005 at 218. 
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Arbitral sanctions are mainly drawing adverse inferences and holding the recalcitrant party liable 
for damages and costs.
995
 Drawing adverse inferences concerning the preservation of evidence 
against the recalcitrant party could provide full protection. However, the threat of holding such a 
party liable for damages may not always be sufficient for measures related to the conduct of 
arbitration and the relation between parties during proceedings.
996
 Where there is an issue of 
dissipation of assets, the tribunal has no power to temporarily freeze the assets to prevent them 
from dissipation.  The non-enforceability influences the effectiveness of the arbitral provisional 
measures, that is because the sanctions for non-compliance with an arbitral provisional measure 
may not always, and are potentially not sufficient to protect arbitrating parties’ rights on an 
interim basis. Any provisional relief to be effective must be enforced at the time it is granted, not 
after a final award.  
 
7.3 Enforcement and recognition through national courts 
Courts are considered in resolving the conflict,
997
 apart from the question of jurisdiction, they 
help in  enforcement of interim measures and final awards. There is little point in an arbitration 
tribunal ordering interim measures if the measures in question are not capable of being rapidly 
and efficiently enforced. In this respect, it is often required to enforce in a jurisdiction which is 
not the jurisdiction where the tribunal is situated, for instance, the interim measures may order 
the conservation of assets or evidence which is located in a third party jurisdiction, which is not  
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In such circumstances, in order to ensure the rapid and effective 
enforcement of the interim measures in question, it may be required to obtain such measures in 
question from the state court of the jurisdiction where the assets are located.
998
Indeed  
                                                 
995
The scope and interpretation of Brussels Regulation Article 1 (2) (d), in cases like C-190/89 March Rich &Co AG 
v Societa Italian Impianti. See Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, OJ No L12 16.1 2001, where a breach of an arbitration agreement may not be subject to 
damages even when the contracts provided that any disputes that may arise between the buyer and seller shall be 
referred to in arbitration. See the Scholer Report on the application of the Brussels Regulation in member states, 
Heidelberg; 2007 available from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/whatnewen.thm accessed 10 February 2012. 
996
See Kastner v Jason and others [2004] EWHC 592 para 35. 
997
 See Redfern& Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3
rd
 edition Sweet & Maxwell 
1999) at 448. 
998
See the fact that the agreement of the parties is the foundation of arbitration which has led to willingness on the 
part of the state to recognize the binding effect of an arbitral award and employ their enforcement machinery to 
enforce arbitral awards, as provided in s.58, and 66 of the EAA 1996. 
  
 219  
 
provisional measures are enforced where possible, otherwise this could undermine the efficiency 
of arbitration proceedings. 
When the parties do not voluntarily comply with an interim measure, intervention of state courts 
becomes necessary,
999
 in order to obtain its judicial recognition and enforcement.
1000
The courts’ 
involvement in enforcement is based on the territorial principle,
1001
which means that a 
judgement delivered in one country cannot, in absence of international agreement, have a direct 
operation of its own force in another.
1002
Nevertheless English courts have enforced foreign 
judgements since the seventeenth century.
1003
  Slade LJ said that “the society of nations will 
work together if some foreign judgements are taken to create rights which supersede the 
underlying cause of action, and which may be directly enforced in countries where the defendant 
or his assets are to be found.”1004 
Another principle that supports enforcement by the courts is obligation theory, which is based on 
the notion that if the original court assumed jurisdiction on a proper basis, the court judgement 
should be regarded prima facie as creating an obligation between the parties to the foreign 
proceedings which the English courts ought to recognize and, where appropriate, enforce.
1005
 
This theory is adopted by English courts and forms a basis of recognition for judgements and 
enforcement.
1006
 
                                                 
999
 See Thomas Muller, Switzerland, the Supreme Court declares the UK Worldwide freezing Order Enforceable, 
International Litigation News October 2004. 
1000
 See Teradyne Inc v Mostek Corp,797 F.2d 43,51 ( 1
st
 Cir 1986), where it was held that a court can grant 
injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute pending arbitration. see Rose-Lino Bev v Coca-Cola Bottling Co,749 F.2d 
124,125 ( 2
nd
 Cir 1984), Albatross S.S Company Bros,95 F.Supp 459,436 (SDNY 1951), where it was held that 
courts are not limited in their equity powers to the specific function of enforcing arbitration agreements to preserve 
status quo. 
1001
 Foreign judgements may be entitled to recognition and enforcement under a number of different legal regimes. 
These include Common law rules, The Administration of Justice Act 1920, the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act 1933 and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982. 
1002
 See Peter Noth and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (13th edn Butterworth’s London 
1999) at 405. 
1003
 See Dicey and Morris, The Conflicts of Laws, (13
th
  edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) at 469. 
1004
See Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch. 433 at 552. 
1005
 See Clarkson & Hill, Jaffrey on Conflicts of Laws, (Butterworth’s 1997) at 146. 
1006
 See Blackburn LJ Schibsby v Westenholz, [1870] LR 6 QB 155 at 159, where he said that “the judgement of a 
court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum for which 
judgement is given, which the courts in this country are bound to enforce. “See Scott LJ in Adams v Cape Industries 
[1990] Ch.33, who accepted Blackburn’s view. 
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Another theory based on reciprocity is provided by the English rules of conflict of laws. 
According to English court judgement is conclusive, provided that the foreign court had 
jurisdiction to give a judgement.
1007
 It should be noted that this is now limited by many defences 
which may invoke the party wishing to resist the enforcement of the judgement, for example, 
where the foreign judgement is obtained by fraud
1008
 or is at odds with English public policy, or 
natural justice, such judgements will not be enforced and recognized by English courts or if the 
judgement contravenes the arbitration agreement or party autonomy.
1009
 
Interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal do not, by definition, finally resolve any point in 
the dispute. An award or order of interim measure is therefore unlikely to satisfy the 
requirements of finality under the New York Convention, which may render it unenforceable 
internationally. As a consequence, where there may be a need for international enforcement of 
interim measures, parties should consider applying for such measures before the courts of the 
place of execution provided that this is not incompatible with the arbitration agreement.  Non-
compliance of the order could also expose the non-complying party to an action for breach of the 
an arbitration agreement, which invites the courts as a host for enforcement.
1010
 If a party to 
arbitration refuses to comply with the arbitral order for interim relief, the party seeking to 
enforce the award is left only with the option of seeking redress from the municipal courts.
1011
   
The concept of recognition applies in the case where a party seeks to introduce an interim 
measure in the national legal order without actually having it enforced,
1012
 as in the case of 
measures of a merely declaratory or constitutive nature or content, or in the event that the 
measure does not require any form of co-operation by the party against which it is issued and is, 
so to say, self-executing. The concept of enforcement comes into play when the order must be 
given that the particular effect consists of the possibility to obtain compulsory enforcement 
through the co-operation of the state authorities or courts. However, this distinction does not 
have any specific consequences on the procedural regime, which is the same for both recognition 
                                                 
1007
See United Sates of America v Inkley [1988] 3 WLR 304. 
1008
See Jet Holdings Inc v Patel [1990] 1 QB 335. 
1009
See ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd v Haryanto [1911] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 249. 
1010
See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v Toysir US INC 126 F.3d 15 20-23 ( 2
nd
 Cir 1997) applying Chapter 1 of the 
FAA 1925. 
1011
See EAA 1996 s.9. 
1012
 See Ninth Circuit in Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp v Ohio reinsurance Corp 935 F.2d at 1023., where 
the court enforced provisional measures to preserve the integrity of the parties. See Southern Sea Navigation Ltd of 
Monrovia v Petroleos Mexican city 606 F. supp 692.694 (SDN 1985). 
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and enforcement. It should be noted that the recognition and enforcement of protective measures 
are outside of the control of party autonomy and arbitration rules, and are only governed, through 
legislative provisions in particular, by the law of the state, in which the measures produce their 
effects. It should be noted that for a long period of time,
1013
 the issue of enforcing arbitral 
provisional measures was not even raised in national legislation, as priority was given to other 
aspects of the legal regime of interim measures. Debate characteristically focused on the possible 
application of recognition and enforcement arbitral awards to provisional measures. Recently, 
numerous national legislators have turned their attention to this issue, and have consequently 
adopted specific rules. However, most legal systems still do not tackle this problem, as a result 
jurisprudence solutions have been sought to deal with them.
1014
 There is still an evident lack of 
uniformity among countries that have adopted specific rules on the recognition of provisional 
measures. 
 Recourse to municipal courts with a view to obtaining the enforcement of provisional measures 
ordered by the arbitral tribunal may take two distinctive forms.
1015
 The first approach consists of 
applying for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions, based 
on the assumption that the latter can be assimilated to an award. The second approach consists of 
a particular procedure leading to the court order confirming the arbitral tribunal’s decision of 
compelling a recalcitrant party to comply with. It is of great imperative note, that in jurisdictions 
following the exequatur model,
1016
 the intervention of the courts is limited to ensuring that the 
arbitral decision meets certain basic requirements and declares it enforceable, without 
reproducing or modifying it. This approach is followed in numerous jurisdictions for example, 
England has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, by means of the extension of provisions 
                                                 
1013
 Andrea Carlevaris, The Enforcement of Interim Measures ordered by International Arbitrators: Different 
Legislative Approaches and Recent Developments in the Amendment of the UNCITRAL Model, Antwerp  :Maklu 
2007 at 13-26. 
1014
 See Andreas, Enforcement of Provisional measures at 19-22. See Professor Franco Ferrari, Andrea Carlevaris, 
George Berman and Massimo Benedette, Centre for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and Commercial Law, 
New York University, Law School, a seminar addressing Interim measures, (October 7 2013). 
1015TijanaKojović, “Court Enforcement of Arbitral Decisions on Provisional Relief: How Final is Provisional?”, 
Journal of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 18. No. 5 October 2001, pp. 511-532   
1016
Defined as a procedure by which a party requires of a national tribunal to confer the execution on a foreign legal 
decision. Exequatur is a concept specific to the private international law and refers to the decision by a court 
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dealing with the recognition and enforcement of awards,
1017
to provisional measures.
1018
 In some 
cases, this extension is subject to a specific agreement between the parties. This approach 
presupposes the characterization of the arbitral decision as an award, but not necessarily its 
adoption in the form of an award; while certain jurisdictions provide what the measures must 
take from an award,
1019
others simply put provisional measures on the same footing as awards, 
irrespective of their form.
1020
 The exequatur of the provisional measures only produces its effect 
in the jurisdiction in which it is granted. The author argues that exequatur approach is not 
entirely satisfactory, applying the legal regime of arbitral awards to provisional measures only 
transforms them into factious awards, whose legal nature is recognized within the same legal 
order, but does not allow recognition and enforcement abroad. 
 A significantly different approach is followed in jurisdictions providing a specific court support 
mechanism. This consists of the adoption of a self-standing order in support of the arbitral 
measure by municipal courts, which is sometimes initiated on the initiative of the 
arbitrators,
1021
contrary to the exequatur model, and the judge makes his own autonomous order 
with a view to pursuing the aim of the arbitration measures and ensuring effectiveness. The 
content of the order may vary, and the judge generally has the power to adapt the measures to its 
own procedural law. The court’s order in support of the arbitral measures is no different from 
any ordinary judicial decision, and may calculate it on the basis of the applicable rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial decisions. The power of the courts to assist in the 
enforcement of a provisional measure must not be confused with its autonomous power to grant 
provisional measures on the basis of concurrent jurisdiction. When they exercise their own 
power to order provisional measures, judges do not merely give assistance in enforcing the 
arbitrators decisions, and their discretion is therefore unlimited both in respect of the assessment 
of the requirements for granting interim measures and in respect of the content of the order.
1022
 
                                                 
1017
 Model Law article 35 and 36. 
1018
 See Binder, International commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, 
London ( 2005) at 154. 
1019
 See Arbitration Act of Scotland Article 17 (2). 
1020
 See Article 1051 para 3 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 23 para 2 of the 2003 Spanish Ley de 
Arbitraje. 
1021
 See EAA 1996 s. 44, Article 183 para 2 of the Swiss Arbitration Act. 
1022
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for enforcement under the court support model, which allows the court to modify the order, see s. 1041 para 3 ZPO. 
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Furthermore, provisional measures may be enforced by municipal courts under the principle of 
territorial sovereignty. The principle of territorial sovereignty means that a judgement delivered 
in the country cannot, in the absence of international agreement, have a direct operation on its 
own force.
1023
Nevertheless, English courts ought to recognize and, where appropriate, enforce 
the provisional measures granted by the tribunal.
1024
 The theory of obligation supports the notion 
of enforcement of provisional measures. It is based on the notion that if the original court 
assumed jurisdiction on a proper basis, the court’s judgement should be prima facie as creating 
an obligation between the parties to the foreign proceedings which English courts ought to 
recognize and, where appropriate enforce it. The theory was adopted by Blackburn LJ in 
nineteenth century in Schibsy v Westnholz,
1025
 where he said that: 
 “the judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or 
obligation on him to pay the sum of which judgement is given, which the courts in this 
country are bound to enforce.” 
This theory is still a powerful weapon for the enforcement of interim measures in England. 
Another different legislative model that exists is where the judge makes an autonomous interim 
measure on the basis of the factual and legal assessment already made by the arbitral tribunal. 
This approach, which presupposes a duplication of proceedings, is extremely restrictive in 
respect of the arbitrators’ powers, and is generally not provided in isolation, but rather in 
combination with the exequatur mechanism.
1026
 
 A different approach from all the above mechanisms of arbitral provisional measures is provided 
under English law. This approach combines all most all the above mechanisms but mainly the 
exequatur model, together with elements of the court subsidiary mechanism. Unlike the 
jurisdictions following exequatur, the Arbitration Act 1996 does not put provisional orders on 
the same footing as awards,
1027
and provides for a different specific mechanism for the former.
1028
 
However, unlike court support mechanisms, English courts do not have their own orders, but 
                                                 
1023
 See Redfern Hunter at 446-470. See Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, (13th edition Sweet & 
Maxwell (2000) at 469. 
1024
 See Clarkson & Hill Jaffey on Conflict of Laws, Butterworth’s London (1997) at 146. 
1025
[1879] QB 155. 
1026
 See Article 7 para 2 of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995, see Article 9 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act. 
1027
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1028
See EAA 1996 s. 42. 
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only give the arbitral order a legal force that it originally lacked. They are also totally deprived of 
any power to revise or modify the arbitral measures. The court makes an order requiring a party 
to comply with a peremptory order,
1029
 that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to make only after 
the party has failed to comply with a previous order without showing sufficient cause.
1030
In order 
for the interested party to be able to have recourse to the courts to obtain assistance in the 
enforcement of provisional measures, a double refusal by the other party is therefore necessary; 
first, in respect of the original arbitral order, and then in respect of the more coercive peremptory 
order.
1031
 Furthermore, under English Arbitral rules, recourse to national courts is only made 
subject to the previous exhaustion of all available remedies for non-compliance before the 
arbitral tribunal,
1032
 and to the expiry of any deadlines set by the arbitrators to abide by the order.  
The English courts have more powers, which are not provided in the Arbitration Act 1996, for 
example, the courts can convert a breach of an arbitration order into contempt of court, subject to 
judicial procedure.
1033
 Although arbitration orders can be enforced by courts,
1034
 such judicial 
intervention often effectively nullifies many of the traditional advantages of arbitration, for 
example, the need to seek enforcement from courts can protract the dispute, create jurisdictional 
problems and increase the expense. The difficulties inherent in jurisdiction in the current 
enforcement system have encouraged many to seek to amend the arbitral rules and Arbitration 
Act 1996, and to provide arbitral tribunals with the power to enforce their own orders.
1035
It is not 
axiomatic that courts should have the competence to enforce such provisional 
measures.
1036
Indeed, there is the obligation to support the arbitral process by upholding the 
arbitration agreement by referring parties to arbitration, and by  recognition and enforcement of 
                                                 
1029
Ibid s.42 (1). 
1030
Ibid s.41 (5). 
1031
 See Kojovic at 518. 
1032
EAA 1996 s.41 (3). 
1033
 See s.37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
1034
  It should be noted that even the court enforcement mechanism is limited  by Public policy, whereby a court will 
enforce any award subject to fraud even if the arbitration agreement is separable from normal contract procedures, 
due to public policy. See Regazzoni v Sethia [1857] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289, see Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470, 
1035
 See Ferguson, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Arbitration by UNCITRAL 32 session para 120 
UNDOc A/CN 9/460 (1999). 
1036
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arbitral decisions made in other Signatories to the New York Convention.
1037
 Any suit should be 
referred to arbitration to maintain party autonomy.
1038
 
 
7.4 The applicability of the New York Convention to the recognition and 
enforcement of provisional measures 
With globalization and privatization, the volume of arbitration disputes has increased,
1039
 which 
makes both a numerical and geographical increase in qualified arbitrators and it is very important 
to ensure that arbitral provisional measures are enforced under international conventions,
1040
 so 
that the claimants do not lose out, especially when the parties have no assets at the seat of 
arbitration.
1041
 Since England is signatory to the New York Convention,
1042
it  is of great 
importance that this thesis examines
1043
 how provisional measures can be enforced under the 
New York Convention.
1044
 The convention requires signatories
1045
 to recognize and enforce 
commercial arbitration awards involving foreign interests.
1046
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 contains 
two definitions of foreign awards. The first  definition, set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 
1 is an award made in the territory state other than the state where recognition and enforcement 
are sought. Accordingly, paragraph 1 applies to awards made in any other state. However, a 
state, when becoming party to the convention, can limit this field of application by using the first 
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 See Article IV-V of the New York Convention 1958. 
1038
 EAA s. 2 (2), s.42, s.45 (1) and s.1 
1039
 See Albert Jan Van, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, published in Yearbook Vol. XXVIII 
(2003) also available on line at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com, accessed on 12 December 2012. 
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to the interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for judges at 6. 
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 See Jan Van Berg’s thesis “The Judicial Interpretation of and Application of the New York Convention, (1981) 
at 200. 
1042
 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards, in New York, 10 June 
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Convention of 1958. 
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settled. Indeed this sets the motion that in enforcing interim measures, the Convention is compatible with the 
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 See Albert Van den Berg, available on line at: http://www.kluwerarbitration.com,accessed Jan 2013. 
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 For a list of signatories to the New York 
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 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards 19 Jun 1958. 
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reservation of Article 1(3). The state making that reservation will  apply the convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting state.
1047
 The 
main genesis of the definition as discussed  at the New York Convention, was to see that arbitral 
awards recognized in member states are enforceable.
1048
 The convention contains no provisions 
on the matter of conservatory, provisional, protective or interim measures issued by a court in aid 
of arbitration. Hence, their availability and procedure depend on the law of the court before 
which the measure is sought.
1049
 National courts can indeed assist international arbitration in an 
effective manner in this respect.
1050
 No court in the reported cases has doubted that an attachment 
in connection with the enforcement of an arbitral award, or post award attachment, in order to 
secure payment under the award, is compatible with the convention. Reported cases also leave no 
doubt as to the possibility of a pre-award attachment.  
 The convention is known as the fundamental treaty of international arbitration.
1051
 It regulates 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by contracting states’ courts. The convention 
applies to awards that are not domestic in nature.
1052
 The question of the applicability of the 
convention to the recognition and enforcement of provisional measures has given rise to wide 
theoretical debate,
1053
 the main difficulty in giving an ambiguous answer derives from the 
absence in the convention of an explicit expressed definition of its main objective namely the 
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concept of “arbitral awards”.1054 Despite the opinion expressed by eminent authors, the form of 
the measures should be considered irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether it can be 
enforced under the New York Convention. A court  whose recourse is made for the enforcement 
of an interim measure would, in fact, be free to characterize the measure as it deems appropriate, 
and even to re-characterize it if it considered that the arbitral tribunal had erroneously chosen the 
form of an award. Furthermore, it is not open to the parties to influence the regime of the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral decision by jointly requesting that the measure be 
issued in the form of an award.
1055
 Many theories have been advanced in favour of the 
applicability of the New York Convention to arbitral provisional measures generally aimed at 
ensuring that the measure be fully effective,
1056
 and that it circulates in the jurisdictions of all 
contracting states.
1057
 
 Some commentators refer to the final nature of provisional measures in respect to their own 
objective, although only for the limited duration of the arbitral proceedings. Other scholars 
generally emphasize that the New York Convention sets forth the principle for enforcement of 
arbitral awards not the provisional orders, and that such principles do not apply to court orders. 
To this end, it should be noted that neither the test of the Convention nor the preparatory 
materials on it explicitly deal with the Convention application of enforcement of provisional 
measures.
1058
In a much known and thoroughly motivated ruling, the Supreme Court of 
Queensland had to examine whether a decision labelled “Interim arbitration order and award” 
made by an arbitrator to protect the contractual rights of a party during the proceedings, was 
capable of recognition and enforcement in Australia under the New York Convention. The court 
came to a negative conclusion on the basis of an interlocutory, rather than final, nature of the 
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prepared to consider an award as domestic for the purpose of the New York Convention only if the parties (or at 
least one of them) comes from the contracting states. 
1056
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decision.
1059
 According to the Australian judges the reference to arbitral awards in the 
Convention does not include an interlocutory order made by an arbitral tribunal, but only an 
award which finally determines the rights of the parties. 
 The author argues that the Queensland court should have considered enforcing the provisional 
measures, even though by nature an interim award is not final. The word final used by the court 
is ambiguous and misleading to the application or enforcement of provisional measures, since the 
New York Convention does not expressly provide that an award has to pass the test of binding 
and final.
1060
 On a preliminary basis, it should be stressed that the specific objective of the 
Convention are, on one hand, the recognition and enforcement made pursuant thereto. It would 
be inconsistent to consider interim measures excluded from the scope of the Convention in 
respect of the former covered by it in respect of the latter. In order for the Convention to benefit 
the applicants, it should provide adequate mechanisms for the modification of the exequatur.
1061
 
This contrasts to Kastner v Jason,
1062
 where a defendant breached the arbitral sanction and 
disposed of property to a third party without the consent from the tribunal, and escaped to the 
USA with the proceeds of sale, thereby evading enforcement in England of the eventual final 
award. The provisional award was enforced under the New York Convention. This case 
classically adduces the application of the New York Convention to English cases.
1063
 
 Arguments against the applicability of the New York Convention to provisional measures are 
mainly based on a systematic interpretation of the provisions of the Convention,
1064
 and form an 
analysis of the requirements,
1065
 of the recognition and enforcement of awards there under based 
on the rationale in McCreary’s doctrine and its progeny has faced harsh criticism by 
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 See the Supreme Court of Queensland, Resort CondominumsInternational, Inc v Ray Bowlwell and Resort 
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1062[2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep para 20. 
1063
 See EAA 1996 s.103 which restates Article V (1) of the New York Convention 1858. 
1064
 See Article V of the New York convention on grounds for refusal for recognition. 
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 See Speryy International trade Inc v Government of Israel, F, 2d 301 ( Cir 1989), where it was held that 
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commentators and courts. One commentator summed up the alleged flaws in logic of McCreary 
stating that the 
“McCreary decision is based on the wrong presumption that Article II (3) of the New 
York Convention completely diverts the courts of contracting states of their jurisdiction. 
The effect of Article II (3) is merely that the courts have no jurisdiction to hear the merits 
of the dispute. No contrary inference can be drawn from the use of the word refers in 
Article II (3) rather than stay the court action. The word refer is used for historical 
reasons and its technical procedure sense must be deemed as court directives staying the 
court proceedings on merits.”1066 
Furthermore, Gaja has concluded that the New York Convention permits the enforcement of 
provisional measures on the grounds that the pre –award attachments are consistent with the 
convention goals, by stating that: 
“The fact that courts cannot continue proceedings on the merits does not mean that they 
should also dismiss any request for interim measures of protection. These are generally 
outside the scope of the arbitrators’ competence, and foreign decisions on such matters 
are seldom recognised. If the convention did not allow the courts to grant any provisional 
remedy in the presence of an arbitral agreement covered by the convention, the arbitral 
award might be prevented from reaching any practical effect. The purpose of the 
convention seems to better served if an obligation not to grant interim measures is not 
considered as having been set in Article II (3).”1067 
The New York Convention Article II (3), which is seen as draconian provides that: 
“a court of a contracting state when seized of  an action in matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall at the request of 
one  of the parties refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the said agreement is 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
                                                 
1066
 See A. J Van Berg, recent Enforcement Problems in New York and ICSID Convention, Arb Int’l No.1, London, 
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Based on the quotations above the Convention looks to be silent with the enforcement of 
provisional measures, however, on the subject of interim measures,
1068
 the absence of a provision 
for authority to grant interim measures is not surprising as the main aim of the Convention was 
to promote the enforcement and recognition of awards rather than provide a procedural 
framework for arbitral proceedings. In advancement of arbitration, three years after McCreary 
was decided,
1069
 the Federal Court in California, in Uranex,
1070
 held that prejudgement 
attachments can be enforced in cases governed by the New York Convention. The court’s 
reasoning in Uranex was based on the argument that nothing in the text of the New York 
Convention implies that court ordered interim measures were prohibited in arbitration. The court 
found no meaningful distinction between Article II (3) of the Convention and s.3 of FAA, which 
directs courts stay trial of action. Stay does not mean directive but to apply the convention 
purposively. It should, however, be noted in the recent case of Contichen LPG v Parsons 
shipping Co,
1071
that the second circuit court held that the New York Convention interim relief 
under Article II (3) is not available in international arbitration governed by the convention as the 
legislative history of the statute specified that the decision was not meant to displace Cooper, 
hence the application may vary depending on a case-by-case basis.
1072
 
On a preliminary basis, it should be stressed that the specific objectives of the New York 
Convention are, on the one hand, the recognition of the arbitration agreement, and on the other, 
the recognition of arbitral awards made pursuant thereto. It would be practically inconsistent to 
consider interim measures excluded from the scope of the New York Convention in respect of 
the former,
1073
 and covered by it in respect of the latter.
1074
 However, admitting that provisional 
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measures can be recognized and enforced on the basis of the Convention would necessarily lead 
to admitting that arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction to make provisional measures under the 
Convention which, on the contrary, is almost universally excluded.
1075
 Considering the arbitral 
tribunal’s power to revoke or modify provisional measures, the Convention should provide for 
adequate mechanisms for the corresponding revocation or modification of the exequatur, but no 
such mechanisms presently exist in the New York Convention. 
Although the scope of the New York Convention should not be confused with the requirements 
set out therein for the enforcement of awards, several grounds for refusing the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards under the Convention, 
1076
are clearly applicable exclusively to the 
final awards on merits, and not to provisional measures, which would require the elaboration of a 
specific regime.
1077
 This is particularly true in respect of the New York Convention,
1078
 which 
allows municipal courts in which recognition is sought, to refuse exequatur if the arbitration 
agreement is invalid; thus implying a previous and positive assessment of the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction on its merits. 
 It should, however, be noted due to the urgency of provisional measures, that they’re frequently 
granted before the full assessment of the arbitral jurisdiction. It would be of great imperative to 
note that a suitable mechanism for recognizing provisional measures should therefore take these 
circumstances into consideration, while the Convention does not allow any flexibility in this 
respect. Another ground for refusal that is incompatible with the recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures is the lack of uniformity with most public policy of the state in which the 
enforcement is sought.
1079
 The concept of public policy is a useful criterion with which to 
challenge the effectiveness of decisions on the merits when they are in conflict with the 
fundamental principles of the legal order of the state in which recognition is sought. 
 The author argues that the concept of public policy does not make any sense in regard to arbitral 
provisional measures, the contents of which largely depend on a comparative assessment of the 
interests of the parties involved and are generally neutral with regard to public policy.  Another 
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bar to the New York Convention
1080
 is the bar on the recognition of ex parte measures, which 
allows judges to refuse the recognition of awards issued against parties which were not given 
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrators and the arbitral proceedings, or were 
otherwise unable to present their case.  It should be noted that part of the doctrine (ex parte 
order) is in favour of the recognition and enforcement of provisional measures in countries like 
Italy, where arbitrators have no power to make provisional measures. 
 The approach is based on the already mentioned theory that allows enforcement of provisional 
measures, provided that they are adopted in the form of awards. Any recourse to this formal 
requirement, according to the same theory, would be possible, provided that the parties have 
specifically agreed to it possibly by making reference to the rules of arbitration, and that it is not 
contrary to the law of the place of arbitration.
1081
 In the same vein, judges of a country where 
arbitrators have no powers to make provisional orders should enforce foreign orders under the 
New York Convention when the orders can be characterized as awards.
1082
 
The choice of the form of the order, even when it confirms that the parties cannot provide it with 
a legal nature of which it is devoid due to the lack of the relevant substantive elements don't 
understand. The approach would result in the inequality of treatment at the stage of enforcement 
on the place of arbitration.
1083
 It should be noted that in order to enhance arbitration in England 
and internationally, the New York Convention should adopt a special provision for interim 
measures’ enforcement, otherwise assets will be dissipated by the defendant and they would not 
be enforced in foreign jurisdictions by courts, hence awards become meaningless and more 
costly to the claimants. In addition, the approach of most USA courts in regard to the 
enforcement of provisional measures by courts should be given a wide acceptance by all 
signatory states, since the purposeful interpretation of the New York Convention, harmonizes or 
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enhances the effectiveness of arbitral provisional measures through international enforcement, 
despite the criticism of those against this mechanism of arbitral recognition and enforcement.
1084
 
 
7.5 The work of UNCITRAL in respect of the recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures 
The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in its present 
version does not contain any provision on the recognition and enforcement of provisional 
measures. However, the lack of satisfactory and harmonized mechanisms for the recognition and 
enforcement of interim measures has prompted the UNCITRAL working Group on International 
Conciliation and Arbitration to pay specific attention to these issues during the recent work 
aimed at amending the Model Law.
1085
 
The work on this topic, which lasted for many years, resulted in two new provisions that are 
intended to be integrated in the Model Law, respectively devoted to the recognition and 
enforcement of provisional measures,
1086
and the grounds for refusing enforcement.
1087
 Both 
provisions clearly allow an exequatur approach similar to that applicable for awards under the 
same Model Law.
1088
 Among the most innovative aspect of the new provisions, one should 
mention their extension to all types of provisional measures, irrespective of the place of origin, 
which intended to overcome the difficulties that are presently being experienced with regard to a 
transnational circulation of the measures. Furthermore, the amended text provides the 
introduction of several specific new grounds for refusal, In addition to those applying towards 
what are mandatory and do not allow the judges any discretion. As with most of the jurisdiction 
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allowing the exequatur of provisional measures, the draft also states that the form of the measure 
is irrelevant for the purpose of its enforcement and recognition.
1089
 
As far as the specific grounds for refusal are concerned, the amended text distinguishes between 
grounds which have to be raised by a party,
1090
to non-compliance with a tribunal’s orders to 
provide security in connection with an interim measure, and to the termination or suspension of 
the measure, and grounds which can be raised by the court on its own motion.
1091
 One of the 
problems of Model Law is the failure of the states to adopt the changes of enforcing provisional 
measures with no any hindrances. Since many states have not adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in support of the New York Convention, and the costs embedded in adopting it in their 
national laws, the success of this innovation has not yielded as expected. The harmonization and 
effective enforcement will only be achieved after the new adoption of an enforcement protocol to 
the New York Convention that deals with the enforcement of Provisional measures. 
7.6 Enforcement under the Brussels Regime/Regulation 
One of the purposes of the Brussels regime is to simplify the formalities governing recognition 
and enforcement of judgements.
1092
The  main  aim of the Brussels Regime is to facilitate, to the 
greatest possible extent, the free movement of judgements by providing a simple and rapid 
enforcement procedure.
1093
  The rules governing the enforcement of judgements
1094
 generally 
apply to the enforcement of provisional measures in member states other than the one in which 
they have been granted. This is provided by Article 38 which provides that: 
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“a judgement  given in a member state and enforceable in that state shall be enforced in 
another member state when, on the application of any interested party, it has been 
declared enforceable there.” 
 An important principle in this respect is declared in the Italian Leather case,
1095
 where the ECJ 
declared that : 
 “it is unimportant whether the judgement at issue has been delivered in proceedings for 
interim measures or in proceedings on the substance.”1096 
 Further Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation,
1097
 provides that:  
“for the purpose of the free circulation of judgements, a judgement given in a member state 
should be recognized and enforceable in another member state even if it is given against a 
person not domiciled in a member state.” 
 A classic case on enforcement of provisional measures was demonstrated in the decision of   
Uzan v Motorola Credit Corporation,
1098
where the Motorola Credit Corporation (Motorola) 
granted Telsim, the second largest GSM operator in Turkey, substantial  loans primarily for the 
purpose of acquiring Motorola hardware. Telsim was controlled by the Turkish Uzan family. As 
a consequence of a very severe economic crisis which hit Turkey at the end of 2000 and 2001, 
combined with a sharp downturn in the worldwide telecom markets, Telsim was unable, by April 
2001, to repay the loans granted by Motorola. Attempts to agree on the rescheduling of the loan 
repayment failed. Litigation commenced in England and USA. Motorola, rather than initiating 
arbitration proceedings as agreed in the loan agreement, sued members of the Uzan family 
personally plus some companies of the Rumeli Group in New York for alleged violation. A New 
York Judge granted an ex parte temporary order restraining certain assets in New York owned by 
Uzan family. Later, on application  by Motorola, the  UK high Court, on 30
th
May 2002, issued  
an ex parte freezing order against the Uzan family under s.25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgement Act 1980. One of the defendants had a domicile in England and owned real estate in 
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London, the other two defendants had no contact with the United Kingdom.  On 12
th
November 
2002 Motorola  was granted an enforcement order in Switzerland, which was presented to the 
District judge in Switzerland. The District court rejected it on the grounds of Article 34 of 
Brussels1, due to the fact that the defendants were not heard by the  Zurich court,  and were not 
aware of the ex parte order. Motorola appealed successfully, and granted enforcement.  
However, the Uzan family challenged the enforcement of the order. The Supreme court of 
Switzerland explicitly confirmed that the UK freezing ex parte order under  Article 34 would be 
enforceable. This decision  contradicts the ECJ decision in Daniulaule,
1099
 where a freezing 
order was refused for enforcement on the grounds that a party had not been summoned to defend 
itself. Hence the measure did not fall within Article 34 and was unenforceable. 
 This cases raises  a debate since none of the Uzan family were residents of the Brussels Regime 
to rely on the jurisdiction grounds of enforceability and recognition.
1100
 This case extended the 
scope of Brussels, where the Supreme Court held that Van Uden and Mietz
1101
 principles are 
generally applicable not only in the case of decisions relating to the preliminary performance, but 
also to decisions of provisional measures solely aimed at preserving the status quo, and the ECJ 
did not reject this decision. 
Tension exists between arbitration and Brussels and it posed the question of whether English 
courts have allowed the Regulation to be used to evade arbitration clauses as demonstrated by 
Van Uden. It should  not be a mechanism to deprive the parties of their wish to go to arbitration 
by bringing arbitration disputes to the Regulation. After all, the main purpose of arbitration is to 
exclude the jurisdiction of national courts. It should be noted that one of the unique features of 
arbitration is its neutrality. The place of arbitration is often unrelated to the substance of the 
dispute and this ensures the all-important neutrality. If the Brussels 1 Regime or Council  
Regulation 42/2001 is applied it would mean one would have to determine what provisions of 
the Regulation conferred jurisdiction on the court at the place of arbitration. Surely this defeats 
the whole purpose of having an arbitration agreement as it is no longer a private agreement 
between the parties. 
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7.6.1 Restrictions on the enforcement of protective measures under Brussels 
The Brussels 1 Regulation provides for a member state judgement to be recognized in other 
member states without any special procedure being required.
1102
 However, a judgement will not 
be recognized and enforced under the limited grounds of objection set out in Article 34 (public 
policy, default judgement and irreconcilable judgements). Or Article 35 (1) of(limited review of 
jurisdiction). 
Chapter III of the Brussels Convention/Regulation contains far-reaching and compulsory rules 
that leave little scope for judgements given in one member state to be refused recognition and 
enforcement in another member state, which are usually called an “automatic defence”. This 
simplification is possible thanks to the introduction of unified direct rules of jurisdiction in 
Chapter II allowing for the due respect of the rights of the defence. As the ECJ observed in 
Danilauler decision: 
“ all the provisions of the convention, both those contained in Chapter II on Jurisdiction 
and those contained in Chapter III on Recognition and Enforcement, express the 
intentions to ensure that within the scope of the objective of the convention, proceedings 
leading to the delivery of judicial decisions take place in such away that the rights of the 
defence are observed. It is because of the guarantees given by the defendant in the 
original proceedings that the convention is very liberal in Chapter III in regard to 
recognition and enforcement.”1103 
It should be noted that after the Commission’s proposal, the new Regulation 1215/2012,1104 
provides that:  
“ the judgement is enforceable in a member state of origin; and where the measure was 
ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, proof of service of the 
judgement.” 
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This quotation is a change, indeed, by allowing ex parte judgements to be recognized under 
Brussels is a clear step towards greater trust between a jurisdiction. Although the new Regulation 
considers the enforcement of ex parte measures, it does not consider that such measures should 
be better granted by the states of origin which could at least establish the extent necessary for 
protective measures or the existence of the debt. Indeed, this was one of  Commission’s 
proposals for the revision of Brussels, in order to allow provisions to be implemented without 
reference to court.  All contracting states grant interim measures, and there is a large degree of 
similarity of the kind of measures made available. The author argues that the European law on 
provisional measures should be given more trust among member states like other areas for 
example; in areas of financial services, companies are regulated by a competent authority in a 
member state(FSA),
1105
 and other host states are confident that appropriate standards  of 
regulation  are being applied, and can allow service providers to access their own domestic 
consumers. Possibly there is scope for European Protective Measures to be based on similar 
principles. If minimum standards were established for the granting of such measures, any other 
state requested to enforce measures should  have  no grounds for objection. 
7.6.1 Exclusive jurisdiction  and protective measures 
Article 22 of the Brussels Regulation provides several areas where courts of the respective 
member states have exclusive jurisdiction. According to Article 35(1) of the Regulation 
infringement of the rules on exclusive jurisdiction, there is a ground for refusal for recognizing 
and enforcing judgement. Generally, the rules for recognition and enforcement of judgement also 
apply to protective measures. However, it is not particularly clear whether certain protective 
measures, relating to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts, can be granted only by the courts 
having such jurisdiction. 
Exclusive jurisdiction is related to certain matters, which will be executed in the same member 
state, where courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Such matters are connected with immovable 
property or the state’s public authorities (such as public register and other state bodies). These 
are areas of particular importance to the state, which justifies the exclusive jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction of the courts in such member states to grant interim measures is unquestionable. This 
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conclusion  may also be seen in the ECJ decision.
1106
 On the other hand, Article 31 of Brussels 
clearly states that any court of a member state seized with a motion for granting interim measures 
has the jurisdiction to authorize such measures, regardless of the fact that under the Brussels 
Regulation, the courts of another member state may have jurisdiction as to the substance of the 
matter. The provision does not differentiate between the rules on exclusive jurisdiction and other 
jurisdiction rules in the Regulation. Under Article 34 (1) failure to observe the rules of exclusive 
jurisdiction is also grounds for the refusal of the enforcement of protective measures. However, 
under Article 42 of the Regulation, both these grounds have to be invoked by the defendant on 
appeal against the declaration of enforceability. Therefore, the Regulation lacks clear grounds on 
which a court, does not have exclusive jurisdiction and can declare inadmissible a motion 
granting protective measures, which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of another state’s 
courts. The rules governing exclusive jurisdiction have precedence over any other jurisdictional 
rules, including Article 31. This conclusion also follows the fact that exclusive jurisdiction rules 
are the same as in  Chapter II on the Brussels 1 Regulation, as the rule governing jurisdiction on 
interim measures. 
7.6.2 Procedures for obtaining an order for enforcement 
 An important principle is declared by the ECJ in  Deutscsche Genossens chaftsbank v 
Braseriedu Pecher.
1107
The Convention merely regulates the procedures for obtaining an order for 
the enforcement of foreign enforceable instruments and does not deal with execution itself, 
which continues to be governed by the domestic law of the court in which the execution is 
sought. Consequently, a foreign judgement for which an enforcement order has been issued is 
executed in accordance with the procedure rules of the domestic law of the court in which 
execution is sought, including those on legal remedies. This principle has  important correlated 
consequences: firstly, the interested parties have at their disposal the legal remedies provided by 
the national law of the state where the execution take place, secondly, the legal remedies 
available under national law must be precluded when an appeal against the execution of a foreign 
judgement for which an enforcement order has been issued is lodged by the same person who 
could have appealed against the enforcement order and is based on an argument which could 
                                                 
1106
Van Uden case. 
1107
 See case  C-148/84 [1985] ECR 1-1981. 
  
 240  
 
have been raised in such an appeal.
1108
 Since this principle applies to the enforcement of interim 
measures, this means that the claimant may only rely on the provisional measure he has obtained 
to the extent that such measures are enforceable in the state, where it  will be executed. 
7.6.3 Irreconcilable decisions 
The  ECJ has also interpreted one of the grounds on which the national courts may refuse the 
enforcement of protective measures under Article 34 (3) of Brussels.
1109
 If a measure is 
irreconcilable with the decisions on interim measures given in a dispute between the same parties 
in the member state which recognition is sought, it will be unenforceable. The ECJ attempted to 
define irreconcilable decisions in these case at stake as follows: 
“a foreign decision on interim measures ordering an obligor not to carry certain acts is 
irreconcilable with a decision on interim measures refusing to grant such an order act is 
irreconcilable with a decision on interim measure refusing to grant such an order in a 
dispute between the same parties in the state where recognition is sought.”1110 
The irreconcilability lies in the effects of the judgements. It does not concern the requirement 
governing admissibility and procedure which determine whether judgements can be given and 
which may differ from one state to another. Accordingly, concluded the court, where a court in 
the state in which recognition is sought finds that a judgement of a court of another contracting 
state is irreconcilable with a judgement given by a court of the former state in a dispute between 
the same parties, it is required to refuse to recognize the foreign judgement. It is obvious that this 
rule is unconditional. As the court pointed out in Article  34(3) of Brussels, it sets out a ground 
for refusing to recognize a judgement which is mandatory. It should be noted that any ground for 
refusal of enforcement can only be brought  by the defendant. Article 41 of the 
Regulation422001, provides that judgements shall be declared enforceable immediately on 
completion of formalities in Article 53.
1111
 The party against whom enforcement is sought shall 
not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submission on the 
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application.
1112
Therefore, these are the grounds for refusal of the enforcement. Such measures 
can only be enforced on appeal, which are regulated by Article 43 of the Brussels 1 regulation. In 
the opinion of the ECJ Article 36 of the Convention, it must be interpreted as meaning that a 
party who has not appealed against the enforcement order referred to in that provision is 
thereafter precluded, at the stage of the execution of the judgement, from relying on a valid 
ground which such a party could have pleaded  forin the appeal against the enforcement order, 
and that this rule must be applied for their own motion by the courts of the state in which 
enforcement is sought.
1113
 
 
7.6.4 Public policy related restriction on the enforcement of protective measures 
The main defence against the recognition of a foreign judgement is the fact such recognition 
would be contrary to public of the state in which the recognition is sought. It is generally 
accepted that this ground for refusal should be interpreted strictly. The narrow scope of 
interpretation of this provision was confirmed in Krombach and Renault,
1114
 in the judgement of 
the court of justice and eventually validated during the transformation of the Brussels. It is 
underlined, in Article 34(1) that a judgement shall not be recognized if such recognition is 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the recognizing member state. It is  interesting to call 
that the Renault judgement was given in an intellectual property case don't understand. In Italy, 
the claimant sought the enforcement of a decision of a French court that found the defendant 
guilty of forging manufactured and marketed body parts for Renault cars. 
 The ECJ held that a judgement of a court or tribunal of contracting (member) states recognized 
the existence of an intellectual property right in body parts for cars, and conferred the holder of 
those rights enabling him to prevent a third party trading in another contracting state from 
manufacturing and commercializing in that state such body parts that cannot be considered 
contrary to public policy. Strict interpretation of public policy does not allow invoking it in order 
to thwart the enforcement of cross-border judgement prohibiting the patent infringement, and 
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this judgement was given in the summary proceedings. Such conclusions are well illustrated by a 
French decision of 28
th
January 1994 in the Eurosensory v Teiman& Blind Equipment case.
1115
 In 
this case a Dutch Court granted a cross border injunction in the summary proceedings that was to 
be enforced , among others, in France. In first instance, the President of the Court of the First 
Instance in Paris had registered the Dutch judgement for enforcement. On appeal, the French 
company claimed that the recognition of an extraterritorial judgement was contrary to the public  
order in France because it would  not be possible to obtain a similar provisional injunction in the 
summary proceedings under French law. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and 
recognized the Dutch decision. 
The lack of appropriate national enforcement procedural rules for a particular measure would 
usually would mean that the legal order of such a state does not recognize such a protective 
measure. In some situations, such protective measures may be manifestly contrary to  basic legal 
principles in the state where enforcement is sought and thus contrary to public policy. Although 
provisional measures vary from one state to another, the differences are seen between civil and 
common law states. Anti-suit injunctions are readily granted in the UK, to refrain a party from 
commencing proceedings in another state. Generally, a court in one member state has no 
jurisdiction to order the court in another state to take or decline jurisdiction. The recognition and 
enforcement under Brussels 1,however, raises the question of whether such measures can be 
recognised in another member state. In Turner v Grovit,
1116
 the ECJ ruled that: 
“  a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from 
commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter 
court’s jurisdiction to determine the dispute. “Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from 
bringing such an action must be seen as constituting interference with the jurisdiction of 
the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of convention.”1117 
 The court does not expressly state that such an injunction would be incompatible with the 
contracting states’ public policy, because this is a question of national law. However, it may be 
argued that in its interpretation of the ECJ, it elevates the provisions of the convention to super 
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mandatory principles, which would be considered as forming part of the contracting state’s 
public policies.
1118
  The refusal to recognize such orders on the principle of public policy is not 
proportionate, since the main aim of such orders is intended to safeguard the plaintiff’s interests 
and ensure the enforcement of the future decision on the dispute. It does not  impose restrictions 
on the jurisdiction of the courts in other member states and therefore, does not contradict the 
Brussels 1 Regulation. 
 It would seem, therefore, that the public policy argument is not a very effective tool in blocking 
the recognition and execution of a decision of a foreign court.  It should  be noted that although 
the Brussels 1 Regulation uses the word public policy with no clear procedures and definition, 
the New Regulation 1215/2012, does not provide any better success since Article  45 provides  
grounds for refusal of judgement under public policy.  These considerations show that the 
applicant of the general rules of recognition and enforcement to provisional measures is not 
particularly adequate. Article 42 (2) of Brussels 1 provides that the declaration of enforceability 
has to be served to the respondent, while Article 43 (3) refers to the rules governing appellate 
proceedings for the appeal against the declaration. Normally, the launch of an appeal suspends 
the execution of the decision being appealed. In this respect, the Bulgarian Civil Procedure 
Article 623(3) expressly provides that the declaration of enforceability may not be subject to 
preliminary enforcement in the case of an appeal. Therefore, the application of the general rules 
on recognition and enforcement to protective measures means that the respondent will be 
notified of the measures against him, before such has been executed. This is clearly central to the 
purpose of provisional measures. 
 
7.7  Conclusion 
Although the arbitral tribunal has no coercive powers, this chapter examined how the tribunal 
orders function, under its tools of enforcement. However, given the nature of arbitration, the 
English legal procedures provide a legal effect, where it is called upon to support the system. 
Most of the sanctions or the tools are voluntary by nature hence, parties may antagonize the 
process were they not abided. There cases where decisions are not complied and such orders are 
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of international effect, the New York Convention 1958, may provide support but, the support is 
also debatable due to its application and how the courts have applied its provisions in regard to 
the enforcement of provisional measures, especially Article II (3). 
 When it comes to the enforcement stage of interim measures ordered by the tribunals, it is still 
questionable whether the state will issue its own order or will issue an order for the enforcement 
of the tribunal order. There are still questions to be answered, which the national courts require 
as a condition for the enforcement of interim measures ordered by tribunals that they should 
satisfy the judicial standards of awards. The courts  will have to consider such orders as awards 
within the meaning of the convention to be enforced under New York. 
The almost universal recognition of the arbitrators’ power to adopt provisional measures is not 
sufficient to ensure the real effectiveness of arbitral interim relief in the absence of an effective 
mechanism of recognition and enforcement.
1119
 The abstract recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures might be seen as a paper tiger, unless a satisfactory enforcement 
mechanism is provided. The lack of harmony among the various legal systems, and the absence 
of an international instrument comparable to what the New York Convention is for arbitral 
awards, renders initiatives such as the text elaborated by the UNCITRAL Working Group 
extremely useful and interesting. 
The opinion of commentators concurs on the need for elaboration on an adequate regime, but no 
agreement exists as to what is the best instrument for pursuing this aim. Some authors support 
the adoption of an international convention,
1120
 while others are in favour of a softer form of 
harmonization among the various legal systems, to be fostered through uniform instruments such 
as Model Law. The version of UNCITRAL Model Law, which per se is a positive development, 
seems, however, inadequate to achieve the desired level of harmonization for several reasons; (a) 
the solution would not be binding on states, which remains entirely free to disregard the uniform 
text,(b) revision is likely to be adopted in jurisdictions that have already adopted Model Law, 
and would  be compatible with jurisdictions whose arbitration legislation follows different 
approaches and lastly(c), the newly adopted provisions are not even capable of implementation 
in the jurisdictions of all Model Law countries, since many of them have already introduced 
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modifications and amendments to the provisions on the recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures following a very different approach from that chosen by the Working 
Group. 
The adoption of a new international binding instrument therefore seems the most adequate 
manner for achieving real harmonization. However, a revision of the New York Convention, 
aimed at covering interim measures, does not seem to be an appropriate solution. It might 
jeopardize the success of the Convention by inducing states in disagreement with the version to 
withdraw their participation. Furthermore, a revision of the Convention would inevitably result 
in a lengthy and burdensome process, during which no harmonization would be realised between 
states which have already ratified the revised text and states... Finally, since the New York 
Convention, was drafted in the view of final decisions on the merits, its extension would result in 
the mere combination of different and in homogeneous regimes. 
The only viable solution therefore, seems to be the adoption of a distinct international 
instrument, drawn up on the basis of the experience of the New York Convention, but 
substantially different in its content. The adoption of such an instrument, though certainly 
problematic, would not jeopardize the success of the Convention, and would allow the 
peculiarity of provisional measures to be fully taken into account. The Model Law needs to be 
modified to add enforceable provisions that would explicitly require courts to enforce interim 
measures granted by the arbitral tribunal. 
The current Brussels 42/2001does not provide sufficiently detailed rules on the jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement of protective measures or the new Regulation 1215/2012.Indeed the 
member states seems reluctant to introduce change in this area, which could probably be 
attributed to the considerable differences in their legal systems. However, the development of 
international civil proceedings and the growing number of cross-border disputes would 
eventually lead to changes in the regulation of the fast and effective relief which the protective 
measures provide. One of the main objectives of such future changes should be the easier 
enforcement of protective measures-without notification to the defendant and without the 
possibility to stay the enforcement on appeal. A step towards the achievement of these objectives 
would be the adoption of the European order on the attachment of bank accounts. For the time 
being, though, the parties seem to prefer applying for protective measures to the court in the 
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member state, where this will be executed as this the most secure approach. The other important 
issue that is of great importance is whether the European Convention on Human Rights will not 
be violated as result of court’s enforcement of an ex parte order? The answer to such a question 
is clear as any ex parte orders in breach of the Convention rights, should not be enforced at all 
and courts should try to interpret the Brussels Regulation, in so far as possible, according to the 
Convention Rights. It should, however, be noted that neither the Brussels 1 Regulation nor its 
new successor, has addressed this issue. The author argues that, in order to avoid commercial 
litigants being exploited by the system, they should all be given the right to be heard under 
Article (6) (1) and the right to challenge any provisional order before it is enforced.
1121
Since  
England provides a subsidiarity model, human rights should be adopted in all provisional 
measures,
1122
 the only irony is that some courts may argue that since arbitral tribunals are not 
public, the Convention does not apply,
1123
and such a scope should be interpreted purposively to 
promote human rights in arbitral proceedings.
1124
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8 Conclusion and recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions 
The aim of the thesis has been to examine whether the arbitral tribunal has the autonomy to grant 
all provisional measures or the courts have the same power to grant provisional measures. In 
order to enhance the effectiveness of arbitration, and to meet the expectations of business 
persons, and ultimately, to ensure the success of arbitration, the problems and uncertainties 
regarding the interim measures should be resolved, because they are as important as the final 
award. The thesis is in favour of the subsidiarity model whereby both the courts and arbitral 
tribunals work together in granting provisional measures as this promotes efficiency and reduces 
tension between the two jurisdictions, due to mutual respect. However, the power of courts 
should be used cautiously since parties chose this private dispute settlement to avoid litigation. 
The identification of the above problems, as well as their suggested solutions, are affected by 
business needs which are set out below. 
Chapter one offered an introduction outlining the research significance, the initiation of arbitral 
provisional measures and the duration, questions of research, the problem of the study, the aims 
of the thesis, research methodology, previous studies, the limitations of the project, definitions of 
terminology, the characteristics of the provisional measures’ initiation of arbitral proceedings, 
the composition of a request, the duration for a request and lastly the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter two; the thesis started by examining the early relationship between the courts and 
arbitration or legislative legal developments.
1125
  It investigated the reasons for the early conflicts 
between the courts and arbitration and why the courts were not so receptive towards 
arbitration.
1126
 It clearly demonstrated that the early conflicts were not based on grounds of 
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public policy, but on jealous grounds.
1127
This  jealousy hampered the  arbitral competence and 
autonomy to grant provisional measures or any disputes emanating from the arbitration 
agreement. The tension between the two jurisdictions started to improve, with the enactment of 
the 1950,
1128
 and 1979
1129
 Arbitration Acts, however, there was still mistrust, and parties lacked 
autonomy in regard to arbitral proceedings, due to the stated procedure provided by the 
Arbitration Act 1950 s.21 and Arbitration Act 1979 s.22. In order to rectify the appalling 
situation, the 1996 Arbitration Act was enacted as an attempt to reform arbitration law in 
England and to see that English arbitral laws reflected Model Law,
1130
and the New York 
Convention. The motive for reform was the fear of losing London as a leading centre for 
commercial disputes and that economic powers may shift to other territories. The thesis, in 
examination, has adduced that there are still short-comings to the Arbitration Act 1996 and it 
needs reform, since it does not address all the recommendations of the DAC Report,
1131
 and 
Model  Law which was supposed to be a true reflection. Furthermore, the Act does not consider 
the European Convention for Human Rights,
1132
 especially when it comes to ex parte measures.  
The degree of court intervention should be restricted only to enforcement, and any other 
provisions like s.37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, should be precluded in the arbitral 
proceedings to the municipal courts. The scope of provisional measures granted should be 
widened, to meet the demands of litigants who use arbitration as a private dispute mechanism,
1133
 
and for this process to be effective, arbitrators should have the power to grant all measures 
sought by a party to arbitration agreement. 
Chapter Three examined the doctrine of party autonomy as the main source of arbitral authority 
to grant provisional measures.
1134
 Party autonomy is based on the assumption that parties to an 
arbitration agreement are knowledgeable and informed,
1135
 and that they use the doctrine 
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responsibly.
1136
  The expression “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” is a common 
phenomenon of occurrence in the Arbitration Act 1996.
1137
  International conventions like the 
New York Convention,
1138
the ICC Rules,
1139
 UNCITRAL Model Law,
1140
and  LCIA,
1141
 support 
the notion of party autonomy as the main source of arbitral power to grant provisional 
measures.
1142
 The concept of party autonomy is derived from the concept that the intent of the 
parties shall be respected and enforceable.
1143
 Hence, a guiding principle in determining the 
procedure should be followed in international commercial arbitration, as Hong Lin perceives 
that“ arbitration, unlike national courts system, is a commercially oriented product that 
flourishes on the basis of the market forces. To avoid fading away, the popularity of this product 
depends on whether the demands of customers are satisfied. However, excessive interference 
exercised by state courts can result in the dissatisfaction of the customers,”1144 as further evident 
in the Channel Tunnel.
1145
 The chapter examined the main sources of party autonomy, for 
example, case law as demonstrated in McCrearyTire Rubber Co v CEAT,
1146
 Black Clawson 
International Ltd,
1147
 Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter
1148
. 
 Furthermore, the thesis examined the theories advanced in support of party autonomy. First, 
there is contractual theory.
1149
 It is argued that party autonomy is the essence of arbitration.
1150
  
According to contractual theory, arbitration is an agent of parties, and what is done therefore is 
regarded as the will expressed by the parties. This theory has been supported by many prominent 
judges like Diplock, and academic scholars like Fourchard, Gillard & Goodman,
1151
Mustill and 
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Boyd.
1152
 However, contractual theory fails to explain the much needed coercive palliative And 
coercive powers of the state in helping the proper function of arbitration.
1153
 
Secondly, is jurisdictional theory,
1154
 advanced by Rubelin.
1155
 He argues that arbitration is 
controlled by the state and that the tribunal is on the same footing as municipal courts. Since the 
theory provides that party autonomy is derived from the state, the author argues that it is against 
the wishes of the parties who surrender to arbitration to avoid recourse to courts.
1156
 This theory 
sits with a view that there must be state control over arbitration for ultimate public policy,
1157
 and 
fails to take into account the need to free arbitration from the shackles of the state and the 
judicial grasp.
1158
 
Thirdly, there is competence theory, provided under s.30,
1159
 which provides that parties vest 
their powers in an arbitration agreement;
1160
 this principle means that courts should only 
intervene in limited cases. Lord Steyn in response to adoption of the Model Law said that 
“arbitrators are entitled and indeed required, to consider whether they will assume jurisdiction. 
But that decision does not alter the legal rights of the parties, and the courts has the last 
word.
1161
  The advantage of permitting the arbitral tribunal to rule on matters of its own 
jurisdiction was emphasised in the DAC Report where it was noted that the application of the 
Komtenz-Komptenz principle would prevent parties from delaying “ valid arbitration 
proceedings indefinitely by making spurious challenges to its jurisdiction.”1162 
Furthermore,Rokinson explains that“ it is probably true to say that the majority of those who 
include arbitration in their contract do so because they do not wish their disputes and their 
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commercial relationship to be referred to a national court, whether out of a desire for privacy or 
for a fear for suspicion of bias.”1163 
The courts make a distinction between the issues on which arbitrators should be allowed in the 
first instance to rule the jurisdiction on their own and those on which it is preferable for the court 
to resolve themselves.
1164
 In some circumstances, there is an issue of urgency, for example; the 
existence of a clause where the courts are happier to deal with the issue themselves. Indeed, even 
the validity of an arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitration tribunal not 
municipal courts. The argument that courts can examine the clause better is not a good 
justification of intervention. There is the possibility of erroneous and incorrect findings arising in 
the aspect of arbitration not only in s.30. Why have the courts not said that there is a possibility 
that the tribunal may get it wrong and why should decisions in the tribunal be challenged by the 
courts? The issue of arbitrability is not determined by competence but left to courts
1165
 and also 
the issue of illegality is outside the scope of the competence of the arbitral tribunal. The theory 
provides that the tribunal has the power to decide on its own jurisdiction without having to refer 
to courts. The author argues that this theory does not consider the practical reality of the English 
courts’ constant interfering and the different provisions that provide court intervention. 
 Fourthly, there is separability theory,
1166
 which provides that an arbitration agreement is 
separable from the main contract,
1167
 hence a contractual obligation.
1168
 It should be noted that 
given the private nature of arbitration party, autonomy provides a lot of advantages, and 
disadvantages. For parties to have exclusive autonomy they have to exclusively exclude courts in 
the arbitral process,
1169
 which in practice is impossible given the lack of coercive powers in the 
Arbitration Act 1996 and arbitral rules, and the need for the enforcement of measures by support 
of the courts. The freedom of modern arbitration should be a system which is a consensual 
process under which the agreement of the parties should be respected. The views of the users or 
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parties to an arbitration agreement should be respected and must be listened to.
1170
 Any form of 
reasoning to oust arbitral tribunal is arguably inconsistent with the principle of separability,
1171
 
and jurisdiction embodied in s.7 and 30, and overrides the express agreement of the parties to 
confer jurisdiction on arbitrators.
1172
 
Chapter Four provided conditions and procedures for granting provisional measures. The 
chapter commenced by discussing the authority to determine procedures and conditions for 
granting arbitral provisional measures and arbitral proceedings; both negative and positive.  The 
Arbitration Act 1996 under s.34 (1) (2) provides that a tribunal has the authority to grant all the 
procedures and conditions, as adduced in Mobil Oil Indonesia v Samera.
1173
 It should be noted 
that tribunals should only set such procedures, after the parties have agreed to the conditions. 
Indeed, this sets conflict, and the Act has not been supportive in regard to party autonomy 
relating to proceedings. The tribunal should only implement what it is agreed by the parties. 
There is still a lack of clarity in regard to the conditions and most of the time tribunals refer to 
municipal courts’ criteria, which conflicts with the arbitral due process. In addition, the chapter 
examined the advantages of arbitral provisional measures. 
Chapter fives examined the types of provisional measures. The thesis, in examining the types of 
provisional measures, demonstrated that the arbitral tribunal has a very limited scope of granting 
provisional measures enshrined in s.39, which in reality is too limited in scope and inadequate 
when a party seeks provisional measures from the arbitral tribunal. English Arbitration needs to 
provide a wide scope in regard to the types of provisional measures that can be granted by an 
arbitral tribunal. The author argues that given the current legal framework, the English arbitrators 
should adopt the ICSID Rules,
1174
and the German Model,
1175
 Netherlands Arbitration rules, 
Italian Civil Code,
1176
French Civil Code,
1177
 where all disputes emanating from the tribunal are 
all decided by the tribunal, including emergency measures.
1178
In addition,  since there is no 
tribunal at the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, the municipal courts should only be 
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called in where the emergency arbitral referee is unable to enforce a given order or when  
granting freezing orders.
1179
 Since the  Arbitration Court for Sports (CAS), can handle all cases 
for sports without recourse to courts, it is of great importance that the English Arbitration Act 
should limit courts in granting  provisional measures in emergency as provided under s.44 (5) as 
supported by Diplock in Bremer VulkanSchffbau and MaschinenFabrik v South India Shipping 
Corporation Ltd.
1180
The irony is that in theory it may be easy but in practice it may not be 
implemented. Since the efficacy of  arbitration depends on provisional measures to prevent 
adverse parties from destroying assets or removing assets as to render the award meaningless,
1181
 
the Arbitration Act 1996 needs to be adjusted to meet the  demands of commerce. The author 
argues that ex parte orders should be left to municipal courts,
1182
 but with taking into account the 
Convention of Human Rights,
1183
 so that a party to whom a measure is issued is given a chance 
to represent his case. The current English Arbitration Act lacks this legal tool of fairness 
manifested also in the Brussels Regulation
1184
 as adduced in Van Uden.
1185
 The issues that courts 
are more prepared to handle ex parte orders
1186
 is a truism and should  not be halted to avoid a 
breach of an agreed mechanism of dispute resolution. It would be incumbent if all provisional 
measures are granted by the tribunal and the courts’ role is to give legal effect to the arbitral 
measures if called upon.  
Chapter six examined the role of the courts in arbitral proceedings and how court involvement 
supports the arbitral process.
1187
 Although arbitration is a private mechanism which would mean 
courts keeps out, it has become unavoidable for courts to intervene for host reasons in  support of 
arbitration proceedings.
1188
 There is an interface between courts and tribunals in England to work 
together, with mutual respect and support. The main reason for the intervention of courts is 
enshrined in s.42 (1), s. 43, 44, 45, and 66.  Although courts have such powers provided by the 
Arbitration Act 1996, this power should be applied cautiously. The thesis identified the stages of 
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court intervention for example; prior to the formation of the tribunal, courts get involved in 
emergencies to avoid the dissipation of assets, as demonstrated in Hiscox Underwriting Ltd v 
Dickson Manchester and Company Ltd,
1189
 which renders the final award meaningful. In 
addition, during the arbitral proceedings courts get involved providing orders to third parties 
which the tribunal cannot,
1190
 arbitral contractual obligation does not bind third parties. Hence, in 
cases of liquidation, it would be impossible for the tribunal to make orders and be enforced, since 
it lacks the coercive powers to enforce orders like guarantees from banks.
1191
 In given 
circumstances, they may be called upon to give a legal effect to an arbitration measure,
1192
 for 
example; an arbitral measure can be converted into contempt of court if a party does not comply 
with it under s.37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Since the tribunal lacks the power to preserve 
evidence as evident in Claxton Engineering services Ltd v Txm, deutz v Amarco,
1193
 The Golden 
Anne.
1194
 The relationship between courts is termed as concurrent, which means that a tribunal is 
not an island. This has been supported by advanced theories. Firstly, the doctrine of 
complimentary should be noted that any intervention of courts is against the freedom of the 
parties and party autonomy.
1195
 The courts involvement is determined by the doctrine of 
complimentary. The author argues that courts need to consider the main purpose of arbitration 
which is to avoid municipal courts, hence courts need to strike a balance of justice. The irony is 
that if courts have jurisdiction over a respondent under the conflict of laws, then the court 
jurisdiction cannot be excluded by arbitral agreement, indeed this creates a tension between the 
tribunal and the courts, which is not the main aim and objective of the parties choosing 
arbitration for provisional measures. Furthermore, the doctrine of subsidiary should be used 
purposefully in support of party autonomy as demonstrated by Mustill LJ in Tunnel
1196
. The 
party applying for this support should first notify the person and the tribunal in time. The 
doctrine of compatibility, complimentary, coordination, and cooperation are subject to debate, 
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since any court intervention is a breach of party autonomy, as provided by the interpretation of 
the New York Convention Article II (3) in McCreary
1197
 and Caroline Power.
1198
 
Under the European Union to which England is a member, there are stringent conditions for 
courts to grant provisional as demonstrated in Van Uden
1199
 and West Tankers.
1200
 Conflicting 
decisions, in regard to European law under the Brussels I Regulation,
1201
 impede the grant of 
provisional measures. It should be noted that Brussels should not be used as a mechanism to 
deprive the parties
1202
 of their wish to go into arbitration,
1203
 after all the purpose of the 
arbitration is to exclude the courts.
1204
 If the Regulation is applied,
1205
 it would determine what 
provision of Regulation conferred jurisdiction on the courts at the place of arbitration. This 
defeats the main purpose of having an arbitration agreement,
1206
 and public not private between 
parties.
1207
 In order to make the granting of provisional measures international, the role of the 
courts cannot be avoided despite some complications, and in order to harmonize and promote 
efficacy, the New York Convention should be interpreted purposefully in order to fill in the gap 
in the law of arbitration.
1208
In addition, the Brussels Regulation should adopt a directive on 
provisional measures,
1209
 to enhance arbitration in its member states,
1210
 if not the European 
Union will be invaded by competition from Asia which has very strong grounds for the 
enforcement of provisional measures. This will impact on the status of London as the leading 
commercial city in the world. 
Chapter seven examined the enforcement of provisional measures granted by a tribunal.   
Arbitral provisional measures are voluntarily complied with. This can be demonstrated with the 
                                                 
1197
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growing market of arbitration internationally. Parties comply with orders to avoid any 
encumbrances during the final stage. Where the measures are not complied with, the tribunal has 
the power to grant sanctions for non–compliance. Such sanctions just pressurize the recalcitrant 
party and have less chances of success.
1211
 The main sanctions are damages and costs.
1212
 Where 
a measure is not complied with, such sanctions can be granted. Such remedies are implied from 
the contractual theory that arbitration is a contract; hence a breach is subject to damages.
1213
 It 
should be noted since such measures have no legal effect, there are cases where parties will 
dissipate assets or sell the assets, even when the order was granted for example; in the case of 
Kastner v Jason.
1214
Secondly a tribunal may grant adverse consequences to a party who does not 
comply with the measure, especially in the case of the dissipation of assets. For the tribunal to 
order such an order there must be a causal link between the parties in the final award. In practice, 
parties do not antagonize the process; few cases have been reported in regard to non-compliance. 
The tribunal may even impose a time limit for compliance which has a psychological effect.
1215
 
At times, the tribunal may be permitted to impose a penalty for failure to comply with a decision. 
What is most important is the weight and effectiveness of the sanctions; most of the measures do 
not ascertain evidence.  
 In England there are no coercive powers available to the tribunal to respect their order for 
payment. Unless the tribunal in England is put on the same footing as courts, like Sweden, 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, there is a grey area in regard to the  enforcement of these 
measures.  It should be noted that arbitral orders are given legal effect by the courts, where a 
failure may be sanctioned as a contempt of court.
1216
 In some cases they did not comply, and it 
became an issue of urgency that a court had to render its support. As far as the present system 
goes, the English Arbitration Act 1996 is probably the only national legislation that comes close 
to providing a comprehensive coverage of all types of provisional measures. Both the courts and 
the legislation have supported the provision of interim measures from courts and arbitrators. As 
seen in Chapters two and five, traditionally the English have been favourable to the availability 
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of provisional measures over the years. But even in English Legislation,
1217
 there is some doubt 
regarding the enforcement of provisional measures by the arbitrators themselves and the power 
to approach the courts for enforcement. This position holds good for most countries where civil 
and common law are based, hence there is a need for a more harmonized international set up to 
address this issue. 
Provisional measures can be enforced under the New York convention.
1218
 However, it was 
demonstrated that it is not automatic for a provisional measure to be granted by the English 
courts which will be automatically enforced under the New York Convention.
1219
This is not clear 
and provides neither the definition nor the procedures of enforcement, and creates a tension 
between different courts. New York, as demonstrated in the thesis, is subject to debate and 
criticisms, since the text and preparatory materials on the Convention are silent on the scope of 
arbitral provisional measures. Courts, tribunals and commentators have different views on the 
application of the New York Convention. The application of New York would be achieved by a 
purposeful interpretation of Article V (1) (e) under the law of the state where the award was 
rendered. That should be sufficient to consider the enforcement of an award or provisional 
measures, the irony being that New York’s main objective was to enforce a final award,1220 and 
this may be seen as a contradiction and breach of the convention. In order to harmonize the 
enforcement of provisional measures, the only viable solution therefore seems to be the adoption 
of a distinct international instrument, drawn up on the basis of the experience of the Convention, 
but substantially different in content. The model law needs to adopt a special provision for 
procedures of enforcement, in order to harmonize the enforcement of provisional measures. 
The work of the UNCITRAL to amend the Model Law, so as to provide for issues involved in 
the interim measures is really important. Indeed, many countries whether developed or 
developing, are considering the UNCITRAL Model Law as a basis for drafting their own 
legislation. So, a comprehensive application of the Model Law in England would definitely go a 
long way in setting up a more harmonized view on this issue. Looking at the extensive 
discussions so far, the working group would consider the varying aspects involved and would 
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come up with coherent, extensive and universally accepted provisions to deal with all the issues 
surrounding the availability of provisional measures. It would be of great importance in England 
to consider amending their rules by providing a more elaborate structure for the tribunals to work 
with like the preconditions necessary for providing provisional measures,
1221
 the scope of the 
relief that the arbitrators can grant which are not contained in the Arbitration Act 1996, and 
whether the arbitrators may have difficulty in deciding if an interim measure is necessary and if 
they have authority to grant such an order.  The author suggests that the UNCITRAL Working 
Group should also work on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to make it in consonance with the 
amendment to the Model Law, so that parties using the rules for ad-hoc arbitration and also other 
institutions can take advantage. 
8.2 Recommendations 
Since the English Arbitration Act 1996 was adopted on the recommendation of the DAC which 
advanced its study on Model Law,
1222
 it would be of great importance if the Arbitration Act 
completely matched Model Law instead of its piecemeal sections,
1223
 which leaves the arbitrators 
in state of quagmire.
1224
 One of the advantages would be the exclusion of recourse to courts in 
arbitration proceedings.
1225
 The  role of the courts should be supportive in that the courts 
supports the parties’ agreement to solve their disputes privately without judicial interference. The 
courts should not be directly be concerned with supervision of the arbitral proceedings. The 
question is really is whether national courts judges will restrict  their involvement, and uphold 
the principle of non-intervention, resisting temptation to make ex post facto value judgements of 
the work and conclusions of the arbitral tribunal.
1226
 The  proposal for developing the Arbitration 
Act 1996,
1227
 in a friendly manner was to mirror the Model Law of 1985.In other wards to reflect 
the provisions of the Model law in its entirety.
1228
 This was to give autonomy to the arbitral 
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tribunal and  any recourse to courts  or intervention was to be  halted.
1229
 The main objective of 
1996 was to promote arbitration internationally, from the domestic, and adopting the Model Law 
does not take away all the powers of the English tribunals, something that was feared at the time 
of the bill, but a key element for making London the best centre for settling arbitral disputes and 
best venue.
1230
 This is clearly evidenced by Lord,  who said that “ only time will tell whether we 
have succeeded in our objective to retain and enhance the reputation of this country as the 
leading place for the form of dispute resolution known as arbitration.”1231 This was further 
advanced by Sims and Rutherford who said that “ there is a strong feeling that EAA arbitral 
system should take account of the needs and wishes of the commercial and trading 
community.”1232 
The current EEA,provides only two types of provisional measures provided under S.38. 39 and 
48. The model law which was adopted has been regularly revised from 1976,1986, 2006,2010 
and 2012, when one revisits   UNCITRAL Model law 1976,
1233
 there is a clearly expression that 
a tribunal has the power to grant  provisional measures which deems necessary in respect of the 
subject matter. This provision provides abroad power to grant provisional measures by imposing  
a  limitation on any court intervention.  
Further Model Law 1985, which was  recommended by DAC, provides that “ unless the parties 
agreed the tribunal may at the request of a party order any to take such measures of protection 
as the tribunal may consider necessary in respect of subject matter of a dispute
1234
. It expressly 
confirms the power of the tribunal to order a significant range of provisional measures, which the 
EAA does not provide in its two provisions of S.38 and 39. 
Model Law 2006 Article 17 was amended  and provides that “ unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties the tribunal  may at request of a party grant interim measures.”   The new revision 
confirms the expensive scope of or wide discretion of Article 17 by omitting the provisions of 
the original language- that interim measures may be granted, where the tribunal considers them 
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“necessary” in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The 2006 revision of Model Law,1235 
permits even granting of ex parte measures, which the EAA does not provide for an important 
tool in enforcement of provisional measures within England and Wales.  The 2006 Model Law,  
further provides that “interim measures issued by the tribunal shall be recognised as binding, 
and unless otherwise agreed by the tribunal, enforced upon application  to the competent 
court”.1236In other wards, enforcement may be sought irrespective of the country in which it has 
granted,permiting provisional measures to be enforced outside the seat of arbitration. As  a 
practical matter  it means that  where the law of the seat forbids or limits arbitrators from 
granting provisional measures they will not do so.
1237
 
The 2010 UNCITRAL revision, widens the gap of authority to the tribunal, where it gives the 
tribunal power to order a party to preserve status quo, to refrain from actions that cause imminent 
harm to protect or preserve assets to satisfy an award. The author’s view in respect to this 
revision provides a wide scope that gives the tribunal impunity from court intervention, hence 
promoting the sanctity of party autonomy. 
 The arbitration Act 1996, despite the fact that it provides some provisions on provisional 
measures as provided in s.39 38 and 48, does not provide a clear definition of what the 
provisional measures are,
1238
 in order to set clear prerequisites for granting such measures. 
International Conventions, like New York,
1239
 do not expressly define provisional measures. This 
creates tension in the application of the law by courts and tribunals when a request is brought to 
attention by the two mechanisms.
1240
In addition, arbitrators should be given the mandate to grant 
orders to third parties, who have a close connection to the subject matter of a dispute. 
Parties to arbitration should have autonomy in practice to draft their conditions, determine the 
procedures, and choose the venue and where the courts have been exclusively precluded by 
parties, to be respected by courts. It would be very important if parties seeking provisional 
measures are also given some time to learn the types of measures that they can practically seek 
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from the tribunals so that they are given a better chance whether to seek recourse to the courts or 
not. All types of provisional measures should be subject to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, so that no measures are given in ex parte, as this deprives the other party of the right to a 
fair hearing, and also breaches the notion of European Union of mutual respect and co-operation. 
 Party autonomy should only be the source of any arbitral tribunal authority in regard to 
provisional measures.
1241
 This means that provisions in the Arbitration Act that invite recourse to 
the courts should be subject to strict conditions, and that parties have to be consulted before the 
tribunal seeks assistance of the parties.
1242
 The tribunal should have a wider scope of provisional 
measures  than the  two provided by the Act, namely a provisional order for payment of money 
or the disposition of property and the interim payment on account of the costs of arbitration. In 
order to make arbitration effective, the Arbitration Act 1996 needs to be amended, to provide 
clarity and the scope of application. This will reduce tension between the courts and tribunals 
that compete for jurisdictions. Furthermore, the LCIA should also address the problem of 
enforcement, to avoid parties going to alternative forums to enforce their awards. 
Since the most contentious issue for provisions measures is enforcement, the Arbitration Act 
1996 should specifically address this issue as a case of urgency. Failure to do so will make the 
final award unenforceable.
1243
 Since arbitrators have no legal effect, the role of the courts should 
only be to enforce the measures granted by the arbitral tribunal. In addition,  the principle of 
public policy should be limited when enforcing provisional measures under the New York 
Convention.
1244
 It would be of great importance if England champions an additional instrument 
for enforcement of provisional measures under the New York Convention, in order to enforce 
provisional measures internationally, as this will harmonize the system. 
8.3 Future Study 
Arbitral provisional measures in England have been considered in a few studies in accordance 
with research knowledge. The current study is one of the first to investigate or to critically 
analyse the role of the courts and arbitral tribunals in granting arbitral provisional measures in 
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England. Therefore, there is a need for research, from different areas of law that permit the 
granting of arbitral interim measures as well as literature to fill the gap relating to provisional 
measures in England. Some suggestions for future research regarding provisional measures are; 
1.  The enforcement of provisional measures under European law, since England is a 
signatory state to the European Union or whether provisional measures are better 
protected under New York than the European Union Regulation.  
2. The study of arbitral provisional measures in England is still in its infancy; therefore, 
there is enormous potential to research this area using comparative analysis, with civil 
jurisdictions. 
3. The enforcement of provisional measures taking into account the Convention on Human 
Rights will be a significant contribution to knowledge, since the current thesis does not 
address issues of human rights in regard to provisional measures. 
4. The arbitrability of provisional measures will be a great impetus to knowledge. A study 
that excludes courts in determining whether a case is arbitral? is required to enhance the 
scope of provisional measures. 
5.  The importance of the Brussels Regulation directive on recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures should not be seen as  stumbling block for granting and 
enforcement of provisional measures within European member states. A new Regulation 
is needed like that of Intellectual property  to address issues on provisional members  
within signatory countries.  
6.    The study does not analyse case-by-case or award-by-award to find the true position of 
provisional measures. Future research, with a survey of cases, through developing  
solutions in the light of the text of relevant laws would be of great importance to 
arbitration not only England as an international venue but also to other states both with 
common and civil law. In addition, the research only covered few provisions of the Act 
1996 (S. 7,38,39,41,41,42,4 48), future research with all provisions of the Arbitration Act 
would be a significant tool to clear ambiguity in the law of arbitration.  
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